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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Officers of the Commonwealth Public Service 
of Australia, permanently employed under 
the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1922-65, 
henceforward referred to as the Public Service 
Act.
Permanent staff of public authorities.
Persons directly employed by government 
departments. The term is used in preference 
to civil servants except where such use would 
be confusing.
All persons directly employed by public 
authorities of all kinds.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The universal growth of governmental activities and the
consequent expansion of public employment since the advent of the
industrial revolution have extended the special relationship between
the government and its employees to an increasing proportion of the
workforce. While the rights and obligations of public employees are
identical to those of private employees in many respects,^ there are
important differences which set them apart. The origin, extent,
nature and justification of these differences are attracting greater
interest on the part of both official and staff sides but the subject
is complicated by difficulties of definition and conflicting concepts
of rights. It does not seem to belong to a single discipline although
the main body would properly belong to the realm of administrative law,
as the rights and obligations of public employees involve delegated
legislation, administrative tribunals and judicial review of
2administrative discretion. In common law countries, this specialised
'“See V.A. Thompson, Modern Organization, New York, 1963, pp. 60-6.
2The definition of administrative law is discussed in J.A.G. Griffith 
and H. Street, Principles of Administrative Law, London, 2nd ed.,
1957, pp. 2-5.
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2aspect of administrative law has been largely confined to the bare 
outlines of judicial decision, leaving the interpretation of rights 
and obligations virtually untouched. This study of the rights and 
obligations of Commonwealth public servants in Australia has a two­
fold purpose - to raise some of the wider issues involved and to 
explore a relatively neglected area in Australian administrative law.
No two countries seem to treat the rights and obligations of public 
employees alike and within a country no two public authorities have an 
identical approach to the subject. For this reason, the scope of this 
study is limited to a consideration of the rights and obligations of 
officers of the Commonwealth Public Service only, though from time to 
time comparisons and contrasts will be made with the State public 
services in Australia and with theories and practices adopted in other 
democratic countries with a Western culture. The Commonwealth Public 
Service of Australia merits special attention, as from its establishment 
in 1903 it recognised and emphasised the rights of permanent officers 
in law. Although it has followed common law doctrines of Great 
Britain which formally insist upon unilateral interpretation of 
rights by the official side, and High Court decisions in disputes 
over interpretation of rights are based on British precedent, the 
rights and obligations of permanent officers are more liberal in 
content and practice than those in Britain. Examination of the 
experience of the Commonwealth Public Service in administering the
3law relating to officers' rights and obligations during the twentieth 
century may therefore yield useful data for comparative purposes, may 
reveal difficulties and shortcomings in the Commonwealth's approach, 
and may even challenge the notion that public employees ought to 
possess fewer rights and owe more obligations than private employees.
The Definition of Rights
The increasing importance of the Commonwealth Public Service in 
Australian society has attracted the attention of academic scholars and 
they have been drawn into debates over the liberality of law relating 
to officers' rights and obligations, especially after the amendment of 
the law by the Menzies Government during the 1950s and early 1960s.
They have tended to concentrate on the more spectacular issues, such as
3 4 5political rights, public expression and strike action, while other
aspects have been touched in passing in works dealing with public
administration, industrial law and arbitration. Valuable as they are,
none of these attempts to consider the whole field, to contrast
experience in one area with another, or relate Commonwealth officers'
3V. Subramaniam, 'Political Rights of Commonwealth Public Servants', 
Public Administration, (Syd.), pp. 22-33, March 1958.
4R.S. Parker, 'Official Neutrality and the Right of Public Comment , 
Public Administration, (Syd.), December 1961 and September 1964.
^G.E. Caiden, 'The Strike of Commonwealth Public Servants 1919', 
Public Administration, (Syd.), pp. 262-74, September 1962.
4rights to community notions about the place of the public employee in 
the general order of things. Individually they have avoided the problems 
of defining rights in general and of deciding upon the existence of a 
particular right and some have ignored altogether the emotive overtones 
of the word 'rights' itself.
These questions are part of a wider general discussion of rights 
with which this study is not concerned except as an aid in 
identifying rights. Rights may be divided into moral and positive 
rights. The former may be seen as claims upon ethical rather than legal 
grounds, and are not necessarily recognised by any authority. They 
vary according to the frame of reference of the person making them, and 
thus may be multiplied almost indefinitely in relation to any issue. 
Positive rights are those which are effective because of their 
recognition in law. They may be conceived either narrowly or widely.^ 
Narrowly, they may be regarded as only those rights explicitly 
recognised in written law upheld through judicial procedures. More
Fo Ch'uan Chang has found 115 examples of different adjectives which 
have been used to describe the word 'right'. 'In Praise of "Right"', 
American Behavioural Scientist, pp. 7-9, January 1962.
^This division closely parallels that between two views of law, one 
of which recognises as law only the command emanating from a sovereign 
authority, while the other regards it as existing to satisfy human 
wants and consequently expressed in custom. See C.K. Allen, Law in 
the Making, Oxford, 6th ed., 1958, p.l.
5widely, they may be considered in relation to the way in which people 
actually behave. Thus, effective rights may exist through customary 
acceptance in spite of their lack of recognition in law, while it is 
possible that legal rights may become inoperative.
This study is concerned mainly with positive rights, although 
reference is also made to moral rights which are claimed but not 
recognised, where these are relevant because they represent widely held 
views either in Australia or other countries. The written law - common 
law as embodied in judicial precedent, statute and regulation - is used 
as a starting point and compared with practice. Rights are thus loosely 
defined, based primarily on statute but extending beyond legal 
formulation to considerations of the officer's ability to enforce his 
claims through constitutional enactment, legal sanction, community mores, 
political action or group pressure. At one end of the spectrum are 
absolute rights enforced by the courts while at the other are 
discretionary privileges interpreted unilaterally by the official side. 
Between them lie conditional rights, still derived from law. These rights 
fall within the definition of 'a legal, equitable or moral title or
g
claim' and involve compulsion upon authority to satisfy them. A second 
category of rights, owing their existence to absence of restriction 
rather than positive enactment, may be termed 'liberties' to differentiate
g
Oxford English Dictionary
6them from the first. Liberties may be judged according to generally 
prevailing standards and depend largely upon the individual for their 
effective exercise. They are the most contentious and frequently 
discussed of officers' rights and obligations. Consideration of them 
is inseparable from a consideration of attendant obligations as (a) 
such rights imply obligations on the part of the other side, (b) such 
rights may be recognised as compensation for obligations, and (c) such 
rights may be conditioned by obligations as, for instance, when the 
obligation of officers to give continuous service may override their 
right to strike.
The application of these definitions of rights to Commonwealth 
officers presents more difficulties than a description of an elaborate 
code, as in the case of some Western European countries. Firstly, the 
rights are not embodied in any single document, but are scattered in a 
number of separate statutes, regulations and departmental instructions. 
Secondly, obligations, both written and assumed, modify rights and 
liberties. Thirdly, the imposition of a statutory framework upon 
common law concepts which deny the ordinary rights of a contract of 
employment to public servants, results in anomalies in judicial decision, 
and tends to remove sanction for enforcement of rights from the courts of 
law. Fourthly, no agreement exists concerning the nature and extent of 
public servants' rights. Different views co-exist, the product not only 
of the specific historical development of rights within the Commonwealth
7Public Service, but of deeply rooted notions concerning the nature of 
the state and the status of its employees. These theories derived 
from the experience of different countries form an essential background 
to the understanding of the current rights of Commonwealth officers.
It is therefore necessary to present a brief outline of the derivation 
and implications of the major theories of the government as employer 
which directly affect the rights of public servants before commencing 
upon the main study.
Concepts of the Government as Employer
(a) The British Theory of Crown Prerogative
The reliance of Australian courts of law upon British common law
doctrines and precedent makes the British theory of Crown prerogative
of particular importance to the rights of Commonwealth officers. The
relationship between the Crown and its employees is conceived as a
defective contract based upon an inherent disability of the Crown to
fetter its future actions. A term is implied in the contract of
9service which provides for dismissal at pleasure. It has further
Several good discussions of the case law exist in standard texts 
on administrative law. One of the most comprehensive may be found 
in H. Street, Governmental Liability, Cambridge, 1953, pp. 111-9, which 
summarises the law as follows:
that there is an implied term in the contract of civil servants 
that the Crown may dismiss them at will, that the implied term 
may be expressly or impliedly excluded, that provision for 
dismissal for cause will exclude it, but that employment for a 
fixed term will not in itself be inconsistent with the implied 
term. (p. 114)
8been held that a British civil servant has no right to sue for 
arrears of salary."*"^  The effect of this doctrine is to exclude 
interpretation of the rights of officials to their conditions of work
from the purview of the judiciary and to vest them wholly in the hands
£ „ 11 of the Crown.
The Civil Service... owes its existence not to statute but 
to the prerogative powers of the Crown, a matter of common 
law. Common law may be as exact a form of law as statute, 
if defined by judicial interpretation; but in this instance 
there has been virtually no judicial interpretation. The 
Crown does not claim to apply any special form of law to its 
civilian servants: it disciplines them merely as its 
servants, as a mediaeval lord might manage his household or 
a nineteenth century industrialist his employees.12
This doctrine of rights may be seen as a continuation of the
mediaeval property rights held by the king in relation to the officers
13of his household through whom he governed the country. The Crown
See D.W. Logan, 'A Civil Servant and his Pay', Law Quarterly Review, 
Vol. 66, pp. 240-67, 1945.
'^'’E.C.S. Wade and G.G. Phillips, Constitutional Law, London, 6th ed., 
1962, p. 214-
Pensions and superannuation payments are authorised by statute, 
but no recourse can be had to the courts to enforce payment 
of pensions, or to afford a remedy for wrongful dismissal 
against the Crown, the Treasury, or the head of department 
concerned.
12L. Mustoe, The Law and Organisation of the British Civil Service, 
p. 41, quoted in W.J.M. Mackenzie and J.W. Grove, Central Administration 
in Britain, London, 1957, p. 10.
13See D.L. Keir and F.H. Lawson, Cases in Constitutional Law,
Oxford, 4th ed., 1954, p. 43.
9then stood in the same relationship to its servants as any other 
feudal lord, whose freedom of action was derived from the absence of 
law covering master-servant relations and his immunity from 
litigation against him in his own courts.
Upon the emergence of the private contract and restrictions upon
ordinary master and servant relations, the Crown retained the older
position, in which in spite of the assumptions of a permanent
relationship, the master is judge of the servant as well as employer
and can dispense with his services at pleasure, while the servant can
maintain no rights against the master. However the latter assumes moral
obligations towards the servant, who finds his guarantees in accepted
custom and in his status as representative of the Crown. An examination
of early cases in the courts shows that
at one time there was no inherent inability in the Crown 
to grant offices in the public service either in perpetuity 
or in appropriate cases for a term of years certain, subject 
to a possibility of forfeiture for abuse, refusal, or 
non-use, or to suspension...
Confusion seems to have entered partly as a result of an 
atmosphere of discretion brought about by the statutory 
precautions against the existence of any enforceable claim 
to such matters as pensions, but principally as a result 
of cases concerning military officers.
14J.B.D. Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities, London, 1954, 
pp. 34-5.
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This extension was lent plausibility by the fact that the majority of
leading cases were concerned with colonial civil servants whose heavy
responsibilities in administering the British Empire did not differ to
such a marked extent from those of the armed forces:
The action of a civil servant of the Crown might, if he 
could not be dismissed, in some cases bring about a war.
A contract to employ a servant of the Crown for a fixed 
period would be against the public interest and 
unconstitutional.^
It is usually pointed out that the legal formulation does not
correspond to reality and some commentators consider it irrelevant, as
it is a fact of common observation that a civil servant 
has a greater security of tenure than any person in 
private employment, and that he has substantial pension 
rights which he can enforce by the proper procedure.^
Others are uneasy at the existence of a rule whose justification is
doubtful, is out of tune with alleged reality, lays a premium upon
discretion where right should exist and which generally confuses the 
17issue.
^ Dunn V. R. (1896) 1 Q.B. 116.
16W.I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, London, 5th ed., 1960, 
p. 179. See also L. Blair, 'The Civil Servant - Political Reality and 
Legal Myth', Public Law, pp. 32-50, 1958.
17
See J.B.D. Mitchell, H. Street and D.W. Logan op.cit., and also 
Z. Cowen 'The Armed Forces of the Crown', Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 66, 
p. 481, for criticism of the position in relation to non-civilian 
employment.
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(b) The Theory of the Sovereign Employer
Co-existing with this mediaeval theory of public servants' rights
18is that of the sovereign employer, which similarly vests interpretation 
of rights with the executive. Whereas under the former doctrine stress 
is upon the essential freedom of the Crown to administer its own 
private affairs in the way it deems fit, in the theory of sovereignty, 
the public nature of public employment is emphasised. The function of 
the state as the source of rights and duties in general, as the 
performer of tasks essential to the welfare of the community and the 
existence of ordered society, as the vehicle of the democratically 
expressed will of the community, is inseparable from its role as 
employer. Its employees partake of its sovereign nature and are in a 
fundamentally different position from other employees. On the one 
hand the state can recognise no binding rights against it for its 
essential attribute is its freedom to act in the public interest. On 
the other, the employee is identified with the state power over and 
beyond the fulfilment of his official functions and may maintain 
no legitimate separate interest of his own (a) because this might 
affect the manner in which his duties are carried out; (b) because 
this would be to threaten the essential independence of the state 
and (c) because it would place him in a position to dictate terms, 
putting a private interest above the public good.
18See C.K. Allen, Law in the Making, Oxford, 6th ed., 1958, p.10.
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This doctrine is derived from the period of absolute monarchy in
Europe. It accords with the centralisation of power in the hands of
the monarch personally and the extension of his sway over local power
centres, demanding obedience to the king's law and loyalty over and
above other loyalties. The public service, as the crucial instrument
in attaining these ends, was identified with the power and prestige
of the monarch, and correspondingly was expected to be free from
contradictory loyalties. The public servant's rights and expectations
19were thus founded entirely in the organisation to which he belonged.
The transfer of the theory to democratic government merely
involved the substitution of the will of the people as represented by
a sovereign legislature for the will of the monarch. In this form the
theory of the sovereign employer has provided the dominant framework
for public servants' rights in the United States of America. Its
adoption has been traced to the inability of an individual to sue a
20State without its consent, and the holding of office as a public 
trust compatible with rotation of offices under a spoils
The problem of maintaining loyalty to the state and personal 
incentives in relation to the German public service is discussed 
in H. Finer, 'The Civil Service and the Modern State', Public 
Administration (London), Vol. 7, pp. 323-42.
20W.R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service, 
New York, 1961.
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system. Public office is held to involve neither property nor
contract, and so is exempt from the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
enforcing due process on deprivation of property. The public servant
has no right to his office and the executive is virtually
unrestricted in its exercise of sovereignty over its own employees,
parallel to the sovereignty it exercises in performing its functions
in relation to the rest of the community. In the United States, its
guarantee of the country's system of industrial relations has been held
22to preclude its participation in this system and to justify the 
imposition upon the public servant of obligations which limit rights 
regarded as essential by private employees, in particular the right to 
bargain collectively supported by the sanction of threat to strike.
Democratic theory has in fact strengthened the doctrine of the 
sovereign employer, for in place of identification with the policies of
21'In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of 
the people, no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station 
than another. Offices were not established to give support to 
particular men at the public expense. No individual wrong is, 
therefore, done by removal, since neither appointment to nor 
continuance in office is a matter of right. The incumbent becomes 
an officer with a view to public benefits, and when these require 
his removal they are not to be sacrificed to private interests... He 
who is removed has the same means of obtaining a living that are 
enjoyed by the millions who never held office.' P.P. Van Riper, History 
of the United States Civil Service, Illinois, 1958, p. 37.
22Since 1962 a limited form of collective bargaining has been in force 
in the Federal Civil Service under President Kennedy's Executive Order 
10988. B.V.H. Schneider, 'Collective Bargaining and the Federal Civil 
Service', Industrial Relations, pp. 97-120, May 1964.
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the monarch, conformity to the policies of a changing political
executive has been substituted. The resulting political sterilisation
of the public service is the price of permanence, and the voluntary
nature of public employment is held to justify the restriction of
23constitutional liberties to free speech. In the United States the 
background of the spoils system and the elimination of its abuses have 
resulted in a detailed restriction of political rights of public 
servants, clearly setting them apart from other citizens because of 
their employment by the public employer.
The negation of rights entailed in the theory of the sovereign
employer has come under increasing criticism in recent years in the
United States, mainly because it is the major obstacle to collective
24bargaining in public employment. The sovereignty of the state as 
such has not been denied, but its meaning and consequences have been 
reinterpreted. Sovereignty is re-defined as the ultimate source of
For example, Chief Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New 
Bedford (1892) 29 N.E. 517: 'The petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant 
does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech 
as well as of idleness by the implied terms of the contract'.
24M.R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service, Mass., 1951.
A. Dotson, 'The Emerging Doctrine of Privilege in Public Employment', 
Public Administration Review, pp. 77-88, Spring 1955.
W.R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service,
New York, 1961.
S.D. Spero, Government as Employer, New York, 1948.
15
political and legal authority, as opposed to an absolute despotic 
power. While the unique functions of the state, the necessity to 
preserve democratic processes, the need for loyalty on the part of the 
public servant, are all conceded, it is pointed out that although 
employer and employee can never be in a position of equality, the 
state need not exercise the whole of its power at any given time. Its 
effective power over its employees is in any case limited by such 
factors as the impact of public opinion, possible non-co-operation by 
employees, and morale as expressed through voluntary turnover and 
standard of work. Responsiveness to political control in its 
substantive functions by the public service need not be incompatible 
with the existence of a separate public service interest, which will 
exist whether allowed expression or not. It has therefore been 
concluded that
There does not appear to be any cogent reason for concluding 
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes the 
executive from voluntarily waiving his immunity.25
More specifically
The state may consistently and practicably permit as a 
matter of everyday administration partial and responsible 
staff participation and consultation according to 
statutory standards and retain ultimate authority to 
establish basic personnel policies and to impose a 
solution of its own making should established procedures
fail to function satisfactorily.26
25
26
Hart,
Godine
op.cit.,
, op.cit.
P. 45.
p. 58.
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It is thus proposed to extend to the relationship between the
state and its employees the same standards as apply to the other
commercial dealings of the state, although it is recognised that
special conditions apply to public compared with private employment.
Any denial of those rights normally possessed by an employee must be
justified not by the blanket negation of the sovereignty theory but by
objective assessment of the importance of the right and the specific
needs of government. A. Dotson has summarised the respective needs of
government and employees as on the one hand faithful performance,
managerial freedom, flexibility of policy and continuity of service,
and on the other, reasonable working conditions, minimum security,
participation in management and preservation of political status.
His 'general theory of public employment' would alter the rights
currently possessed by employees of the United States, and would deny
the validity of the sovereignty doctrine on the grounds that
We do not in other connections between the state and 
citizens interpose the abstraction of an almighty 
sovereign. On the contrary both government and 
citizens are restricted. Because the government may 
have extraordinary needs in public employment, it 
does not thereby earn a license to deprive its employees 
of their rights.^
These writers are primarily concerned with the removal of 
restrictions upon the liberties of public servants, and do not examine
27A. Dotson, 'A General Theory of Public Employment', Publie 
Administration Review, No. 3, 1956, p. 210.
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the framework for their rights. The assumption is that these will 
continue to be subject solely to executive regulation modified only by 
collective bargaining arrangements. The tendency is to regard public 
employment as analogous to private employment, with particular public 
disabilities enforced in right of a private employer.
(c) Codes of Rights and Obligations
In contrast to the common law position in Britain and the United
States most countries on the Continent of Europe have adopted a statutory
form for public servants' rights and obligations. A public service statute
provides a 'single source designated to serve as a coherent exposition of
the civil service relationship in its various aspects', whose language
28is clear, concise and unambiguous. Its effect is to give the public
servant a special status in which his rights and duties bear no
comparison with those of the private employee. Employment by the
29government is not simply a job but a social function. The relationship 
between state and public servant is conceived as similar to that between 
state and citizen. It is regulated by legislation and disputes 
regarding rights are settled by administrative courts and not the ordinary
28F.M. Marx, The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy, 
Chicago, 1957, p. 84.
29 '... administrer n'est pas un metier comme un autre. C'est une 
fonction sociale qui s'apparente plus ou moins a la magistrature, 
en sens donne a ce mot dans l'ancienne Rome.' R. Grdgoire, La Fonction 
Publique, Librairie Armand Colin, 1954, p. 27.
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courts of law. The result is on the one hand unilateral imposition
of conditions of work fully in accordance with the theory of sovereignty,
but on the other, the existence of a code of rights and acknowledgement of
their validity against the state.
... the public servant enjoys a far greater degree of legal 
protection than in the common law jurisdiction, not only as 
regards his financial interests, but as regards his status.
And some, if not all, of the credit due to this state of 
affairs must go to the clear recognition that there is a 
public law governed by conditions vastly different from, and 
inapplicable to, civil law relationships, but establishing 
conditions of mutual rights and obligations between public 
authority and the individual.^
The origins of the statutory relationship may be found in the 
impact of war and revolution in European countries, together with a 
tradition of codification of law, as opposed to the common law 
tradition. The ending of the era of absolute monarchy in France and 
Germany at the end of the eighteenth century would seem to have 
required the reshaping of the instrument of public power, but in fact 
the public servant remained identified with the authority of the 
sovereign. In France the Revolution transferred sovereignty from the 
monarch to the nation which guarded its exclusiveness no whit less 
thoroughly than previously. During the nineteenth century the state 
remained unwilling to surrender any degree of freedom to its officials. 
Repeated attempts to enact public service legislation of a general
30W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society, California, 1959, p. 383.
19
scope were opposed by politicians and public servants alike (the 
latter fearing such legislation would increase and not diminish their 
helplessness in the face of authority) and the 1884 law recognising 
a general right of association for the community expressly excluded 
public employees. Nevertheless, piecemeal, specific rights were 
recognised in the last quarter of the century, and were secured through 
the strengthening jurisdiction of the Conseil d'Etat.
In Germany, strong professional organisation, strict public
service ethics and autocratic administration based on the secret report
emphasised the public service as a caste apart, the willing instrument
of absolutism. Codes of public servants' rights, dating from 1794,
were merely aimed at binding their fate more closely to authority.
In 1919, the Weimar Constitution, seeking the reform of the public
service as part of a radical change in the structure of government
proclaimed: 'The duly acquired rights of civil servants are
31inviolable'. The newly laid structure proved no guarantee against 
political and social upheaval, and the Law for Restoration of the 
Professional Civil Service of 1933 once again swept away rights, leaving 
the public servant as the unprotected subordinate of dictatorship.
31Some implications of the rights guaranteed by the Weimar Constitution 
are discussed in H. Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government, 
New York, 1949, pp. 915-6.
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The codes of public service law issued in many European
countries following the Second World War were similar in conception.
The legislation aimed at reconstruction of the public service as the
efficient instrument of a new democratic order. The state was
conceived less as a sovereign, drawing legitimacy from the will of the
nation, with correspondingly unrestricted powers, than as a supplier 
32of services. One consequence was the recognition in statute of
public servants' rights to tenure, disciplinary process and protection
from arbitrary action, as well as a wide measure of political, civil
and industrial liberty. Rights were granted and obligations imposed in
relation to the specific tasks to be performed by the public service
rather than in accordance with notions of sovereignty or analogy with
33the contract relationship in private employment.
(d) The Model Employer Concept
The statutory approach has some affinity with the theory of the
32 'It is the business of government to organise certain services, to 
assure their continuity, and control their operation.
'Public law is thus no longer the body of rules regulating the 
relation of a sovereign state with its subjects; it is rather the 
body of rules inherently necessary to the organisation and management 
of certain services.' L. Duguit, Law in the Modern State, (trans. F. 
and H. Laski), London, 1921, p. 243.
33This approach is illustrated by the discussion of rights and 
obligations in J.P. Guinot, J. Isaac-Georges et R. Letrou sous la 
direction de Roger Gregoire, Guide pour 1'etablissement d'un Statut du 
personnel des administrations civiles de l'etat, Brussels, 1951.
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state as a model employer. The state is conceived as leading other 
employers in the conditions it applies to its workforce, exploiting 
its position of freedom from the profit and loss criterion affecting 
private firms' ability to offer liberal conditions, and by example 
and competition raising the level of industrial conditions in employment 
generally. The state as employer ceases to be passive, relying on 
outside trends as its guide to the conditions it offers, and directly 
uses its role as employer similarly to its role as legislator. The 
theory has its roots in a socialist view of public enterprise, 
involving an increase in public employment, and therefore the need to 
work out the status of public employees. It is also connected with 
demands upon the state during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to 
regulate conditions of employment directly with a view to raising their 
standard. In terms of public servants' rights and liberties the state 
is regarded as obliged to offer the maximum degree of freedom possible 
and those conditions which the community regards as desirable for all 
employees. The regulation of its own employees' conditions of work is 
therefore an alternative to direct regulation of conditions of work 
generally by the state.
The theory of the model employer, together with the statutory 
relationship in general has been criticised mainly on the ground that 
it grants no participation to the public servant in the determination 
of his own conditions of work and entrenches a sharp distinction between
22
private and public employment. These criticisms rest upon the same 
assumptions as those made by proponents of collective bargaining in the 
United States. It is assumed that the area of public employment will 
continue to be limited and form a relatively small part of employment as 
a whole; that the roles of the state as sovereign legislator and 
employer may be separated so that the public employer may be regarded 
as almost identical to any other employer; that the rights and obligations 
and system of industrial relations appropriate to private employment may 
be equally applied to public; and that the rights and obligations 
existing in private employment in fact differ from and are more liberal 
than those in public employment.
(e) The Syndicalist View
The assumptions of those writers seeking to modify the impact of
the doctrine of sovereignty in the United States, placed in a different
political context, may be held to lead to a syndicalist view of public
servants' rights. In this, the similarity of public and private
employment is taken to mean the solidarity of the public employee with
35the working class movement and the appropriateness of the system of 
industrial relations in private enterprise refers not to current 
arrangements but to those which will exist upon the radical transformation
34See M.R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service, Mass., 1951, 
Chapter III: The State as an Employer - Theoretical Aspects.
35H. Laski, Authority in the Modern State, New Haven, 1919, p. 338.
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of the organisation and ownership of the means of production. The
syndicalist movement arose out of the dissatisfactions of public
employees in France in the early part of the twentieth century. Its
insistence upon the disappearance of the state, in view of the
expansion of state functions, has reduced its popularity and relevance
as a theory of public servants' rights. The elevation of the public
service interest above the public interest, thus subverting democracy,
is not generally regarded as legitimate, even where the right of public
servants to an interest identically with others is conceded. The
syndicalist theory of public servants' rights retains significance
however because of the increasing extent of self-regulation by public
3 6services all over the world.
Approach to the Study of Commonwealth Officers' Rights
These theories of public servants' rights which both complement and 
conflict with one another form the major strands of thinking upon the 
subject. In each case they attempt to provide the answers to certain 
basic questions, and the answers they provide are embodied in the 
legal and customary rules laid down for public servants' conduct and
3 6'Moreover, closer analysis reveals the extent to which nowadays civil 
services in all countries have become self-governing, self-administering 
groups, insulated from outside interference, whether social, 
political or judicial. This is by far the most significant event in 
this field in the last fifty years.' B. Chapman, The Profession of 
Government, London, 1959, p. 133.
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entitlements. These questions concern the extent to which public 
servants should be treated differently from other employees, the form 
their rights should take and the means by which such rights are 
interpreted and made effective. The solutions found in each country vary 
according to the structure of the legal system, the functions performed 
by government, the extent and importance of government employment, the 
social mores of the community at large and historical factors.
By the time the Commonwealth Public Service was created at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, concepts of public servants' rights 
were already a matter of common parlance in Australia, although certain 
confusions existed concerning their nature and extent. Thus, although 
the study is concerned only with the officers of the Commonwealth Public 
Service, except where comparison with State services appears relevant, 
it has been necessary to include some description of developments prior 
to its creation in the colonial public services of the nineteenth 
century, which form the subject of Chapter 2 'The Origins of Rights'. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with the crystallisation of the concept 
of officers' rights, its acceptance by the authorities and the 
development of a measure of agreement upon what is meant by the term. 
Chapter 3, 'Rights or Privileges?^ describes the main story of the 
establishment of rights against authority. Chapter 4 is concerned with 
the episode of the constitutional rights of transferred officers, which 
is not only of importance from an historical point of view but sheds
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some light on subsequent attitudes in later similar situations and 
provides a major source for the study of litigation on the subject, 
illustrating the approach of the judiciary to the interpretation of 
officers' rights in general.
The current rights of Commonwealth officers are discussed from the 
point of view of the legal position as it existed at the end of 1965.
It is obviously necessary to discuss rights at some degree of 
generality, for example, the right to remuneration rather than the 
right to a particular salary. Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with 
positive rights of officers which distinguish them from other employees. 
Chapter 5 deals with the right to security of tenure and its limitations, 
and Chapter 6 with officers' rights arising out of the career structure. 
Chapters 7 and 8 are concerned with officers' liberties. Chapter 7, 
'Public Obligations', examines the nature of restrictions upon officers' 
liberties and their justification, providing the framework for Chapter 8 
which discusses the area of freedom allowed to officers. Division of 
rights between the two chapters is according to the actual legal position 
thus an obligation to provide continuous service is discussed rather 
than a right to strike, as the latter is not acknowledged. The final 
chapter of the study attempts an assessment of the nature of Commonwealth 
officers' rights - their extent, sanction, manner of formulation and 
justification - and discusses current concepts and practice in the light 
of the various theories of public servants' rights.
CHAPTER 2
THE ORIGINS OF RIGHTS
Although the Commonwealth Public Service was not established until 
1903, the history of the rights of Commonwealth officers can only be 
understood by reference to the practices and concepts which had already 
developed in the six Australian colonial services which preceded it.
The history of these public services followed separate, and in some 
respects unique paths, so that the pace of change and the extent of 
the concrete rights gained in each colony differed, but it is possible 
to discern a broad trend of development from the period before responsible 
government to federation. Upon responsible government, the efforts of 
legislatures to assert their supremacy over the executive resulted in 
public service legislation, which incidentally gave public servants 
rights, departing from the British tradition of Executive regulation.
In subsequent years the statutes fell into desuetude, but expansion of 
government functions in the 1880s resulted in demands for reform and 
new public service legislation. The new statutes reflected a concern 
for rights, viewed as those special conditions of work customarily 
enjoyed by public servants, and the entitlements they conferred were 
upheld by the courts. By the date of federation, the principle of 
public servants' rights was accepted, although the colonies differed in
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the rights recognised in practice, and the concept itself remained 
ambiguous.
I
Before the granting of responsible government to the Australian 
colonies, the official in the colonies, identically with his 
counterpart in Britain, was regarded as the personal servant of the 
Crown. As such, he could claim no formal rights in terms of security of 
tenure, payment for services, uniform disciplinary procedure, or 
guarantee of conditions of work in general. The Colonial Office issued 
regulations, but these gave no legal rights in theory, while in practice 
their application was haphazard, as considerations of distance, more 
pressing problems at home and general acceptance of a similar situation 
in Britain, made for disinterest on the part of the Imperial authorities 
in their enforcement. The result was considerable diversity of 
conditions as between colonies and departments within the same colony.
It is doubtful whether lack of rights was of much concern to 
officials, who would hardly have conceived their position in terms of 
rights at all. As the rulers of the colonies in the absence of 
responsible government, they shared the esteem and status surrounding 
the Governors, on whose patronage their careers depended. Officials 
might have no security of tenure in law, but in fact their expectation
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of continued employment, as long as they did their jobs reasonably 
satisfactorily, was steady, and their conditions of work were privileged 
compared with the rest of the population. Their corresponding 
obligation of loyalty to the Governor and consequent lack of civil or 
political liberty probably did not weigh heavily, in view of the 
restricted political rights of the rest of the population before 
self-government.
Only South Australia attempted to put the employment of its public 
servants on a different basis, by passing the first Australian public 
service legislation. In 1851 in an attempt to impose its control over 
the Governor and his establishment, and to remedy the severe recruitment 
problem caused by the gold rushes, the newly established legislature 
passed a Bill to regulate salaries and introduce reforms in administration. 
The Bill was rejected by the Governor, who introduced a Bill of his own 
the following year, apparently in an attempt to prevent further 
criticism. The 1852 Act set out the salaries to which public servants' 
were entitled, together with increments within each of three classes.
Two years later a second Act provided for a voluntary contributory 
superannuation scheme for all public employees. Previously individual 
retiring allowances had been customarily granted, each of which had 
required separate passage through the legislature, and the new system, 
which was expected to be self-financing, was apparently intended to 
save both trouble and money.
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Neither of the Acts had any effect upon public servants' rights.
The 1852 Act, although it conferred entitlements, also made all 
disputes subject to the final decision of the Governor, so that it is 
doubtful if it conferred binding legal rights. In any case it quickly 
became obsolete, as inflation in the three following years resulted 
in salary increases which were made without alteration to the Act.
It was repealed in 1858. The 1854 superannuation scheme quickly proved 
actuarially unsound, and ceased to operate as public employees naturally 
stopped subscribing to it. It remained on the statute book, however, as 
doubts existed concerning the legal necessity to repay contributors if 
the Act were repealed. The rights incidentally conferred by the 
legislation went almost unnoticed. More liberal benefits than those 
conferred by the Acts were already being received regularly, and for the 
present officials were shielded from attacks upon them through the 
dominant position of the Governor.
II
The decade between 1855 and 1865 was characterised by the initial 
reactions of the colonies to responsible government, which, except in 
Western Australia, was granted between 1855 and 1860. The local 
legislatures, for long thwarted by the powers of the Governor, could now 
assert their supremacy over the executive branch of government by 
attempting to control expenditure upon the public services and attacking
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the privileges of officialdom. The end of the gold boom made the
officials, with their secure positions and privileges, a tempting target
for attack. The legislatures had the power to reduce salaries and
enforce retrenchments. Through the Estimates they could discuss the
salaries of officials on an individual and personal level, and by
refusing to vote funds for a position could achieve its abolition.
Mindful of the previous political role of officials they could now limit
their political activities or ensure their conformity to the policies
of the government of the day, re-inforcing the provisions of the new
constitutions which prescribed a division between political and non-
2political offices.
See G.E. Caiden, Career Service: An Introduction to the History of 
Personnel Administration in the Commonwealth Public Service of Australia 
1901-61, Melbourne, 1965, pp. 35-6.
2Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly (Vic.), 18.2.1856, 
'Minute relative to subordinate officers of the government entering 
the legislature'. Having stated that officers were expected to abstain 
from political partisanship or action, the minute continued:
'The Constitution containing no express provision on the subject 
[the Government] do not wish to preclude public Officers from becoming 
candidates for the Legislature, but they wish to lay down the conditions 
upon which, if they do so, their offices will be held.
'If, therefore, any public Officer becomes a member of either House of 
Legislature, he will be expected to support the policy, and to take his 
share in the Legislative business of the Government, assuming no 
question to be an open one unless so informed.
'Further, the Government will not feel themselves justified in retaining 
in office, any person being a candidate for the Legislature, whose 
attendance in the House and on Committees would in their opinion 
interfere with the efficient discharge of his official duties.' 
(continued next page)
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Although the new legislatures were determined to assert their 
authority, they were aware of the necessity for a loyal and efficient 
administration to keep the affairs of the colonies running smoothly.
While deploring the arrogance of some officials, they were not 
insensitive to the service which had been rendered prior to responsible 
government. In the atmosphere of progress which followed the termination 
of Imperial government, the positive need for reform and the negative 
impulse to 'clip the wings' of officialdom combined in the urge to bring 
the public service under law, as the instrument of the legislature, in 
the same way as the various activities of government were organised under 
law. Through legislation it was thought possible both to reduce 
officials' privileges and keep control of the size and expenditure of 
the administration.
Victoria was the first colony to bring in general legislation to
3regulate its public service. The 1862 Civil Service Act conferred
2 (continued from previous page)
Such prohibition was apparently considered insufficiently stringent, for 
alleged interference by officials in elections resulted in a motion in the 
Legislative Assembly that the Government should prevent officials from 
taking any part in elections beyond casting their votes and demanding 
dismissal as the penalty for disobedience. (Votes and Proceedings of the 
Legislative Assembly (Vic.), 16.2.1859). South Australia had similar 
regulations which first laid down that officers could only engage in 
political activity in support of the Government and later prohibited all 
political interference. See G.E. Caiden, The Study of Australian 
Administrative History, Australian National University, Aug. 1963,
Appendix p. 20.
3Professor W.E. Hearn who appeared to be largely responsible for the 
legislation was interested not only in the British Northcote-Trevelyan 
Report but also in the possibility of codification of the laws of Victoria.
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rights upon officials incidentally, by guaranteeing them a salary 
according to their classification, promotion on the basis of annual 
efficiency reports, a right of appeal to a board of inquiry in 
disciplinary cases, recreation leave, furlough and non-contributory pension. 
Some of these benefits had existed previously, but had been haphazard in 
their application. In 1863, a similar piece of legislation was passed 
in Queensland. A non-contributory Superannuation Act in Tasmania in 
1860 and legislation for contributory superannuation in New South Wales 
in 1864 were part of the same pattern - they cut down the resented 
privileges and extravagances of liberal, unsystematised gratuities, 
retiring allowances and pensions enjoyed at the public expense, and 
substituted what was hoped would be more economical schemes.
The legislation appeared to provide some protection for those 
included under it from the depredations and hostility of the politicians, 
although it reduced old privileges. But it is doubtful whether either 
those who framed the acts or the officials themselves were fully aware 
of the potentialities of legislation as a so'urce of rights, or of the 
implications of legal rights as the basis of their employment. In any 
case only two colonies had passed general acts, and two others pensions 
legislation, leaving general conditions of work and basis of employment 
unchanged for the majority of public servants. While those public 
servants who were under the acts were to some extent protected by them, 
there was a growing body of public employees, resulting partly from the
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expansion of public works and communications, appointed outside the 
acts, which could not claim their benefits. However, the very existence 
of the legislation and its differentiation between those employed under 
it and those exempt represented in itself a departure from the British 
tradition of governmental administration as the exclusive preserve of 
the executive.
Ill
The period from about 1865 to about 1880 saw a decline in public
service legislation. The struggles of the early years of self-government
were over, and executive responsibility to Parliament was ensured by its
necessity to maintain a Parliamentary majority. The general level of
prosperity in a period of expansion bred a lack of concern with the
methods of public administration as long as tasks were reasonably well
performed, although on any downswing in the economic cycle, popular
reaction against the costs of government was swift and the latent hostility
against the privileged official resulted in retrenchment, reduction of
salaries and even on occasion dismissal of the public service following
4refusal by the legislature to vote a government money for salaries.
4G.E. Caiden, The Study of Australian Administrative History op.cit. 
Appendix p. 3.
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In the face of other more pressing issues there was little 
inclination to continue the earlier legislative experiments, and the 
legislation itself fell into desuetude. The pension schemes proved 
either actuarially unsound where they were on a contributory basis or 
too expensive where they were not. Tasmania repealed its pension 
legislation in 1863, Queensland in 1869, New South Wales in 1873 and 
Victoria in 1881. The general public service statutes covered fewer and 
fewer people as the public sector increased in size with new functions 
of government, and whole new areas of public employment, including 
teachers, railway, construction and postal workers, were created.
Only two pieces of public service legislation reached the statute 
book during this period. In South Australia where the general concept 
of rights appears to have become well-established, a Civil Service Act 
in 1874 seems to have added little to the benefits and expectations which 
already existed, merely confirming them. The reasons for the passage of 
the Act are somewhat obscure, and probably personal motivation of a 
minister was the strongest element. In 1860 the public service had been 
re-organised without the use of legislation on the initiative of a newly 
elected government whose personnel remained unchanged in the ensuing 
fifteen years. Public servants, who were still confined to those in 
the older-established offices, could rely upon fair treatment as their 
customary due, as part of the respect they were owed, and felt entitled 
to their privileged conditions of work as a reflection of their social status
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in the community. The benefits conferred by the 1874 Act - annual 
increments within classes, the right to a board of inquiry as part of 
the disciplinary procedure, compensation upon removal from office in 
the case of incapacity, recreation leave, sick leave, furlough, public 
holidays and retiring allowances - were already enjoyed by officials, 
and with a high degree of certainty that they would not be 
arbitrarily withheld. The incorporation of these benefits in statutory 
form added little to the customary guarantee, and in any case the Act 
was careful to vest final decision as to rights and obligations with 
the Governor. In Western Australia, still under Imperial rule, a 
Superannuation Act providing for non-contributory pensions was passed 
in 1871 in conformity with long-standing British civil service policy 
and in response to the beginnings of expansion in that colony.
IV
The boom period of the 1880s saw expansion of public services to 
keep pace with the demands of the growth of population, urbanisation 
and private enterprise, and resulted in increased public criticism of 
their deficiencies. Increase in size had clearly outdated traditional 
methods of administration based on personal contact, trust and regard 
which had to some degree obviated the need for formal rules or tempered 
their application by tolerance in individual cases without serious 
repercussion. In a larger organisation absence of clear rule bred
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confusion; applied haphazardly privileges caused resentment; the 
consequences of deviation from rule became more serious and the 
weighing up of individual circumstances in every contingency more 
wearisome; administration became impersonal, petty dictatorships more 
onerous and conformity more difficult to enforce without written and 
strictly applied procedures. Public awareness of the change in the 
nature of public administration was expressed in the form of complaints 
at the low standard of services and expensive and wasteful 
administration, for which blame was placed at least partially upon the 
public servants themselves. The occasional public scandal emphasised 
the need for reforms and the serious consequences of drifting on in the 
old ways.
The concern of public servants for their interests was expressed 
through renewed efforts to associate. Up to this period, although the 
manual and less skilled workers had succeeded in forming unions, in the 
middle ranks of public employment organisation had made little headway. 
Sporadic short-lived attempts had been made to form associations since 
the 1850s, but once the issues which had sparked them off had been 
resolved, they tended to disintegrate. Public authorities were wary of 
organisation on the part of public servants which might challenge their 
rule, and without official permission the associations withered even 
if they were not actively broken up. Association tended to remain on 
an informal, social and educational level, at which it met with
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official approval and the patronage of senior officials, but during 
the 1880s in response to legislative proposals more permanent 
organisations among such groups as teachers, telegraphists and 
the higher ranks of postal employees were formed.^
These public servants were concerned to preserve their status and 
privileges and to ensure that reforms were not made at their expense. 
Their success in gaining the concrete concessions they requested and 
in maintaining their organisations varied according to the political 
and economic climate in each colony, but their contribution to the 
debate on public administration was not without effect. From a 
conservative standpoint they expressed what they considered to be their 
rights - to the conditions of work to which they had been accustomed, 
to a sufficient salary to allow them to fill their recognised place in 
the community and to live at a standard suitable to their status.
These were not rights which challenged the public employer in any way, 
or attempted to impose binding formal guarantees upon it, nor were 
they an assertion of workers' rights as such, comparable with the 
beginnings of the fight of industrial unionism outside. They 
represented, rather, a reminder that in return for faithful service, 
educational and technical qualifications, and a life-time of devotion
^See G.E. Caiden, 'The Commonwealth Public Service Associations as a 
Pressure Group', Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
pp. 296-323, December 1964.
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to the state, public servants were entitled to certain privileges, which 
in turn, were of benefit to the community in enabling them to fulfil 
their tasks to the full.
The legislation of the 1880s reflected both the desire for urgent 
reform and the notion that reform should not be at the unfair expense 
of the public servants. Victoria, forced into action by public outcry 
at accidents on the railways attributed to maladministration, 
re-organised first its railways and then the remainder of public 
employment, the latter under the single Public Service Act 1883. New 
South Wales followed suit with a Civil Service Act the following year 
and Queensland in 1889. The primary purpose of these acts was to bring 
about efficient and economical running of the public services, but they 
also reflected the public servants' concern with their existing rights. 
Thus the later statutes, in repealing older legislation, carefully 
if somewhat vaguely preserved the rights of public servants who had 
been appointed under them. In giving the new central personnel 
agencies the power to reclassify the public services, the acts made
The Public Service Act 1883 of Victoria repealed the 1862 Civil Service 
Act 'save and except as to all matters and things done under and to 
all privileges and rights now existing or hereafter accruing of all 
persons now subject to the provisions of that Act... ' (Section 2).
The Civil Service Act 1889 of Queensland provided 'Nothing in this Act 
contained shall prejudice the rights or privileges secured to any 
officer or other person in the Service under the provisions of 
'The Civil Service Act of 1863' or 'The Civil Service Act of 1863 
Extension Act'.' (Section 83).
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provision for the retention of their existing status by the incumbents 
of re-classified positions, although such provisions were carefully 
limited to preserve freedom of action for the authorities.'7
The legislation tended to cover accepted conditions of work, which 
were already in existence if not on a regular or systematised basis.
It did not intend to make any radical break with tradition, and cannot, 
particularly in view of confused drafting, be regarded as a code of 
rights for public servants. However, it broke with tradition in two 
ways. Firstly, whatever the dubious legal validity of such phrasing, 
the vocabulary of the acts was in terms of rights. Secondly, by giving
The Public Service Act 1883 of Victoria provided that officers 
classified under the 1862 Act should continue to receive the greater 
salary, if reclassified downwards, as long as they continued in that 
class. Compensation was allowed if overpaid officers previously 
unclassified could not be transferred to work equivalent to the classified 
salary. (Sections 27-8) The Governor in Council on the recommendation 
of the Public Service Board was given overriding power to fix the 
salary of any officer within a class, notwithstanding the classification.
The Civil Service Act 1884 of New South Wales provided 'that the 
classifications imposed by this Act shall not be held to diminish or 
affect the rights by way of precedence or otherwise except by way of 
emolument of any officer'. (Section 11) It was also provided that
'No officer shall be deemed to be entitled to any compensation by 
reason of any reduction of his salary or for any alteration of the limits 
of salary of his class as hereinbefore provided or by reason of any 
alteration in the scale of allowances or gratuities which may be made by 
any Act amending this Act or by the Regulations herein provided for'. 
(Section 59)
The Civil Service Act 1889 of Queensland contained a similar provision 
as to compensation as the Victorian Act (Section 16). The Governor in 
Council, following report from the Civil Service Board, had power to 
determine any question regarding rights under the Act (Section 72).
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legislative sanction to privileges, the acts aroused public servants' 
expectations that these had been transformed into rights binding 
against their employer. Whereas following the legislation of the 
1860s, public servants had neither fully realised its implications or
g
been prepared to challenge decisions affecting them through it, they 
were now ready to take advantage of the legal provisions, confident 
they had a right to do so.
The period from 1880 to the end of the century saw litigation by 
public employees of all kinds on the basis of the public service acts 
and other legislation covering specific groups of public employees.
To the vague notion of rights was now added the concrete possibility of 
legal rights which would be upheld by the courts and which constituted 
a break from the British traditional doctrines of common law concerning 
the rights of public servants which were beginning to crystallise into a 
more certain form. In view of the generally held opinion that a contract 
of service with the Crown implied a condition that the Crown could 
dismiss its servants at pleasure, it was important to know whether the 
protection provided to public servants under an Act of Parliament could 
be overridden by the Crown employer at will. A case was brought under 
the New South Wales Civil Service Act 1884 by Gould, a clerk who had
The Australian Digest 1825-1933 mentions only four cases concerned 
with public servants before 1870, and a further four before 1880.
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been dismissed from the service without the statutory procedure to 
which he held he was entitled and who claimed damages for wrongful 
dismissal. It was ruled that the provisions in the Act which regulated 
dismissal
which are manifestly intended for the protection and benefit 
of the officer, are inconsistent with importing into the 
contract of service the term that the Crown may put an end 
to it at its pleasure. In that case they would be 
superfluous, useless and delusive. This is... an exceptional 
case in which it has been deemed for the public good that a 
Civil service should be established under certain regulations 
with some qualification of the members of it, and that some 
restriction should be imposed on the power of the Crown to 
dismiss them.9
A later Act of the New South Wales Parliament attempted to retrieve the 
situation by providing
Section 58. Nothing in this Act, or in the Civil Service Act 
of 1884, shall be construed or held to abrogate or restrict 
the right or power of the Crown as it existed before the 
passing of the said Civil Service Act, to dispense with the 
services of any person employed in the Public Service.10
However it was held by the Privy Council that this section would not
restore the previous right of the Crown to dispense with the services
of any public servant who had been in the service prior to the passing
of the 1895 Act, although a case immediately following decided that
the prerogative right of the Crown to dismiss at pleasure was only
9Gould V. Stuart (1896) 17 N.S.W.L.R. 331 at 333. 
"^Public Service Act (N.S.W.) 1895.
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restricted in relation to cases of misconduct. The importance of
statute to public servants was further emphasised by a case concerning a
Western Australian public servant, in which the Privy Council reversed
a decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and held that
12public servants were liable to be dismissed at pleasure. In the 
absence of a statute regulating the public service in Western Australia, 
the Colonial Office Regulations which laid down conditions of service 
were held not to constitute a contract.
The courts of law were also called upon to settle disputes of
status. The effect of later legislation which conserved the rights of
those appointed under the earlier statutes, interim measures creating
or abolishing special categories of public servants in relation to
fresh or obsolete legislation, and the fluctuations in employment of
many public servants resulting from periodic retrenchments, had created
frequent doubts as to which piece of legislation should apply in any 
13particular case. The courts meticulously examined each dispute which
^ Young v. Adams (1898) A.C. 469.
Adams v. Young (1898) 19 N.S.W.L.R. 325.
^ Shenton v. Smith (1895) A.C. 229. See also Mattingley v. The Queen 
<1895) 22 V.L.R. 80.
^For example, Fisher v. The Queen <1890) 16 V.L.R. 77, which affirmed 
the Governor in Council's right to fix salaries under the Victorian 
Public Service Act 1883, although the officer concerned had been 
appointed under the 1862 Act, and Browne v. The Queen (.1886) 12 V.L.R. 
397, which held that officers appointed under the Victorian Civil 
Service Act 1862 were subject to the dismissal provisions of that Act 
and not the Public Service Act 1883.
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came before them on its merits and sorted out the jumble of legislative 
and personal circumstances on an ad hoc basis as best they could.
Another major area of litigation was pensions, where questions of 
definition (whether the public servant was a temporary or permanent 
officer, whether a particular case fell within a particular statute, 
what comprised 'service' for purposes of pension computation) were again 
solved through strict statutory interpretation.
V
The depression of the 1890s in reaction to industrial strife and 
repression bred a general concern for rights in the community as a 
whole, expressed politically in labor representation in the legislatures 
and the creation of arbitration machinery recognising industrial rights. 
Industrial and unskilled workers within the public services were 
similarly affected to those outside, as the result of a crisis in 
government revenues and pressure to cut down staffs. The link with 
the labor movement was strengthened as unemployed workers moved into 
the ranks of the public service and contrasted the limitations upon 
their position in it with the aspirations and gains of outside unionism. 
The movement grew for the full recognition of industrial and political 
rights, aided by and aiding the labor movement outside.
Other public servants - such as the teachers, higher paid postal 
workers and clerks - saw their position somewhat differently. The
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conditions of work which they had enjoyed and accepted as their due - 
the paid recreation leave, the relatively high salaries, the short hours 
of work, the increments, the retiring allowances - came under attack 
both through financial stringency and pressures by others less fortunate 
who could see no reason why a portion of the workforce should remain 
privileged in the face of their own misery. These public servants now 
found themselves not only less prosperous, but also insecure as the 
government policy of retrenchment affected their expectations of a 
career up to retirement and provision for their old age. The result 
was an increased emphasis on their rights, by which was meant specific 
benefits which would be binding on the authorities through the courts.
Governments themselves were well aware of the need for reforms.
The inefficiency and irregularity of public administration, as revealed 
by Royal Commissions and other inquiries were found anachronistic at a 
time when Australian self-consciousness as a new nation was coming to 
the fore. Further the notion of the public services as a closed preserve 
for those who had contacts and could avail themselves of patronage, where 
steady application to duty was more important than initiative or talent, 
where a career was interpreted as employment for life rather than 
striving for the top positions, and where privileges were accepted as 
the reward for subordination to routine and compensation for loss of 
opportunities in the field of individual enterprise, was gradually 
fading. A newly emerging, more widely spread middle class, educated
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through the state education systems, lacking contacts or independent 
capital, were attracted by the potentialities of a career in the 
public service, and pressed for open and equal opportunities to enter 
and rise through it. A corresponding need for the talents of able men 
emphasised the importance of offering them guaranteed conditions of 
work, and the prospect of appreciation of their services through 
steady promotion which would ensure the best use of those talents.
In this context, rights acquired an additional meaning to be thought 
of as equal opportunity, fair assessment of individual worth, freedom 
from capricious political deprivation of security, favouritism and the 
uncertainties of lax administration - in brief the pre-conditions of a 
career system, in which rewards were balanced against honest endeavour.
The extent of re-organisation varied as between the colonies. In 
New South Wales the Public Service Act 1895 established a strong Public 
Service Board, whose retrenchments paved the way for more orderly 
administration and an extension of public servants' rights in 1899. In 
the other colonies the forces of reaction, which saw constructive 
effort at reform as an extension of public servants' privileges and 
their pampering at the taxpayers' expense, prevented anything beyond 
desultory attempts at reclassification. However the recognition of 
public servants' rights was taken a substantial step further by the 
imminent approach of federation.
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I t  i s  a m easu re  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  a c c e p t a n c e  of  the  c o n c e p t  o f  p u b l i c
s e r v a n t s '  r i g h t s  t h a t  i n  the  s e r i e s  o f  d e b a t e s  on t h e  f e d e r a l
c o n s t i t u t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  1890s,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  the
r i g h t s  o f  t h o s e  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  to  be t r a n s f e r r e d  to  t h e  Commonwealth
was l i t t l e  q u e s t i o n e d .  As soon as  i t  became c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  Commonwealth
would t a k e  o v e r  f u n c t i o n s  c u r r e n t l y  pe r fo rm e d  by t h e  c o l o n i a l
gove rnm e n ts ,  s p e c u l a t i o n  grew among t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  l i k e l y  t o  be
t r a n s f e r r e d  w i t h  t h e  c o l o n i a l  d e p a r t m e n t s .  The f e d e r a l i s t s  were l i t t l e
con c e rn e d  w i t h  t h e  d e t a i l s  of  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  m ac h in e ry  and l e f t  them to
be worked o u t  by t h e  Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n t .  However, a n x io u s  to
a t t r a c t  as  much s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e i r  c a u se  as  p o s s i b l e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  t o
a v o id  c r e a t i n g  o p p o s i t i o n ,  they  d i d  t h e i r  b e s t  to  r e - a s s u r e  p u b l i c
s e r v a n t s  t h a t  t h e i r  c o n d i t i o n s  would be no worse  t h a n  t h o s e  t o  which
t h e y  were a c c u s to m e d .  Thus,  S e c t i o n  84 o f  t h e  f i n a l  d r a f t  o f  the
Commonwealth C o n s t i t u t i o n  Act  r e a d :
Any such  o f f i c e r  who i s  r e t a i n e d  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  the  
Commonwealth s h a l l  p r e s e r v e  a l l  h i s  e x i s t i n g  and a c c r u i n g  
r i g h t s ,  and s h a l l  be e n t i t l e d  to  r e t i r e  f rom o f f i c e  a t  the  
t im e ,  and on t h e  p e n s i o n  o r  r e t i r i n g  a l l o w a n c e  which  would 
be p e r m i t t e d  by t h e  law o f  t h e  S t a t e  i f  h i s  s e r v i c e  w i t h  
t h e  Commonwealth were a c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  h i s  s e r v i c e  w i t h  
t h e  S t a t e .
The p l e d g e  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l i s t s  to  t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  p r o v id e d  
f r e s h  im pe tu s  f o r  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  t h e  c o l o n i e s .  C o l o n i a l  governm ents  
saw t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  to  make amends f o r  p a s t  n e g l e c t  and shabby 
t r e a t m e n t  and t o  p l a c a t e  t h e  growing c h o ru s  o f  c o m p l a in t  a t  the  l e a s t
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possible expense to themselves. Vague though the wording of the 
constitutional provision was, it appeared that the rights referred to 
were statutory rights, so that public servants increasingly sought to 
ensure that they would not be penalised on transfer by demanding 
legislation. Following the example of New South Wales, Victoria and 
South Australia set up boards to classify their public services.
Tasmania and Western Australia, which for decades had resisted the 
pressure for legislation, finally passed Civil Service Acts to regulate 
their administration. By the date of federation, all the colonies 
administered their public services through some form of legislation, 
although the benefits conferred by the statutes varied.
The general principle of security of tenure was accepted by all 
the colonies, but in each statute some provision was made to dispense 
with the services of those public servants no longer required. Except 
in Tasmania, some procedure was laid down for disciplinary proceedings, 
usually dividing minor from major offences. In South Australia, 
Queensland and Western Australia public servants could demand a board 
of inquiry which was appointed by the Governor (upon whom there was no 
obligation to act in accordance with its report). In New South Wales 
more serious offences were dealt with by the Public Service Board or 
a board of inquiry or person appointed by the Governor, and legal counsel 
was not allowed, although it was stipulated that a full record of 
proceedings should be kept. Public servants had a general right to
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examine prejudicial decisions against them and to appeal against the 
Public Service Board to a District Court judge. In Victoria, departments 
could inflict punishment up to a £5 fine, against which no appeal was 
allowed. For more serious offences the Public Service Board could 
itself make an inquiry or appoint a board to do so, and legal 
representation was allowed.
A similar assumption was made regarding classification: once a 
public servant was classified it was assumed that he would not be 
reduced in salary, although each statute enumerated cases where any 
public servant could be reduced. In the general procedure for 
classifying the public services provision was usually made for public 
servants to retain their existing positions for a certain period of 
time, or until position and worth of incumbent could be matched up, and 
for appeal against the classification. In Victoria, a schedule to the 
Public Service Act set out a scale of annual increments which were 
dependent on good conduct, and against the deprivation of which right 
of appeal lay to the Public Service Board. Promotion in New South Wales 
and Victoria was regulated according to a combination of merit and 
seniority, vacancies were filled by the Governor on the recommendation 
of the Public Service Board, and examinations were held for progression 
from lower to higher classes. In the other colonies no system existed.
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Public servants could also claim privileges in relation to leave, 
although except in Western Australia no entitlement existed.
Generally they were allowed three weeks annual leave (two in Western 
Australia and an unspecified amount in Tasmania), public holidays 
(with the right to time off in lieu if they were required to work) and 
varying amounts of extended (sick) leave. Furlough was similarly 
discretionary except in Western Australia, and was usually for six 
months on full pay or twelve months on half pay after twenty years' 
service.
Public service employment was regarded as permanent, but because 
attempts to provide contributory or non-contributory pensions had in 
most colonies run into difficulties, the subject had become very complex. 
Retirement was usually stipulated between the ages of 60 (optional) 
and 65 (compulsory), although in South Australia and Tasmania no 
retiring age was laid down at all. New South Wales, Victoria and 
Tasmania had a system of compulsory life assurance, South Australia a 
rather sketchy scheme of retiring allowances and Western Australia 
retained non-contributory superannuation on the British model.
The rights incorporated in legislation were limited by obligations, 
on which as a rule the statutes were silent - obedience and deference to 
superiors, official secrecy as to the matters affecting office, 
propriety in private life, abstinence from political activity apart 
from voting, and acknowledgement that industrial tactics were out of
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place in the public service. Rights were further limited by loose, 
complex and ambiguous phrasing which made evasion easy, and by the 
ample measure of discretion allowed to the authorities. It was 
difficult for public servants to challenge the authorities on the 
basis of the legislation, as the courts tended to uphold only absolute 
rights and because their position made them vulnerable to victimisation 
or unpleasantness if they protested. Nevertheless, on the eve of 
federation public servants' rights had become an accepted part of 
common vocabulary. The creation and formative years of the Commonwealth 
Public Service were to bring to the fore the ambiguities of the term, 
and to resolve major disputes as to its interpretation.
CHAPTER 3
RIGHTS OR PRIVILEGES ?
Two Concepts of Rights
At the time of the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
the rights of public servants were the subject of considerable 
discussion. Public servants' existing and accruing rights were 
preserved in the Constitution Act; those about to be transferred were 
anxious to retain their existing conditions of work; the problems of 
public servants' liberty to associate or take part in politics remained 
unresolved; a certain guilt existed regarding the treatment of public 
servants during the depression years so that it was felt that some 
compensation was due to them; legislation affecting rights had been 
passed on the eve of federation by the colonial legislatures; and the 
necessity to shape legislation suitable for the Commonwealth Public 
Service made the issue of more than sectional or marginal interest.
However the concept of rights remained not only vague, but 
ambiguous. Much of the confusion which characterised discussion on 
the subject was due to a division between two major attitudes, although 
neither was completely distinct or adhered to consistently. They were 
implied rather than explicit. They overlapped, sub-divided, were 
subtly changed by differing emphases at different times and shaded
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into one another. They differed upon which claims or conditions of 
work could be legitimately considered as rights, but agreed upon the 
recognition of certain concrete rights, although their justifications 
may have been different.
The view of rights which had emerged as dominant at the end of 
the nineteenth century was an essentially conservative one. The rights 
of public servants were conceived as the privileged conditions of work 
which they were owed in compensation for the limitations which their 
special position as servants of the Crown placed upon them, and also to 
enable them to maintain a status compatible with that position. They 
were expected to be politically neutral and circumspect, and to devote 
themselves to the service of the state alone, thus cutting themselves 
off from opportunities of personal gain. In return they could claim 
rights subject to the overriding claims of the public interest and to 
state sovereignty, as interpreted by the authorities and enforceable 
only by them, but which in a sense remained their due, even if 
authority exercised its discretion in refusing them. Legislation could 
be accommodated within this concept of rights, as it provided a written 
guarantee of customary expectation, although any rights conferred by 
it did not lose their character as benefits to be granted at the 
discretion of the authorities, and not as binding against them. The 
theory of the independent personnel agency and impartial administration 
of the public service, which was becoming accepted in Australia,
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strengthened this concept of rights, by guaranteeing public servants 
against the depredations of politicians and setting up a system of 
fair administration. It emphasised even further the idea of public 
servants as a distinct group, whose legitimate claims could be met 
within the system in which they worked, thus obviating, and rendering 
improper, appeal or challenge through outside forces.
In contrast to the conservative view a more radical theory of 
public servants' rights was emerging. Public servants were considered 
to be entitled to the same rights as other employees. They should be 
neither deprived of rights, nor privileged above others, and so were 
entitled to full political, civil and industrial rights. Like other 
employees they were entitled to justice in their relationship with their 
employer, whose discretion in dealing with them ought to be limited by 
the concrete rights enforcing his obligations to them. Rights, to be 
meaningful, had to be binding against the employer, and as such 
constituted a legitimate challenge to him. Legislation, therefore, 
existed as a guarantee against abuse of discretion, and the creation 
of an impartial personnel agency did not obviate the need for rights 
or outside appeal.
Although both views used the same vocabulary, it seems that 
sometimes the word "right" was being used where "privilege" would be 
more appropriate, and some preliminary clarification would appear to
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be necessary to avoid confusion on this point. In terms of legal 
phraseology (in the absence of any common law recognition of public 
servants' rights), the term "right" is confined to those benefits 
binding by virtue of their inclusion in mandatory wording in a statute. 
Where any discretion is conferred upon an authority to decide whether 
the benefit is to be granted, only a "privilege" exists. This 
distinction was not clearly appreciated when the initial Commonwealth 
legislation was framed'*' and even more confusion existed on the question 
of moral rights. Whereas in the conservative view, public servants 
possessed a moral right to certain conditions of work, based primarily on 
custom, in the more radical view, such a right existed only relative to 
the rights of others, so that any right claimed by public servants to 
superior conditions above what was thought to be appropriate for the rest 
of the workforce, was in fact a privilege. The development from 
privileges to rights, which took place between federation and the First 
World War, involved the eclipse of the conservative view in favour of
^The difficulties of terminology may be illustrated by Isaacs' remark 
in relation to the preservation of the right to long service increments 
which he contended had been enjoyed by Victorian officers prior to 
transfer:
There is a right in one sense, though not an absolute right 
in another sense. There is no absolute right to these long 
service increments unless the authorities choose to give them.
But there is the right that officers may have these increments 
if the authorities choose to exercise their discretion to give 
them.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. II, p. 2003.
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the more radical, the substitution of binding rights for benefits 
dependent on discretion and the beginning of the improvement of 
conditions of work of the ordinary employee to a level comparable with 
those previously enjoyed mainly in the public service.
The Framing of the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902
Apart from the constitutional guarantee to conserve the rights of
transferred officers, the Commonwealth was given full powers to make
arrangements for the Commonwealth Public Service. By federation
legislation had become the accepted method of dealing with the public
service, and in due course a Public Service Bill came before Parliament.
It had been framed along conservative lines, chiefly on the basis of
provisions culled from existing legislation and made little departure
2from older principles. As far as rights were concerned, the attitude 
of those drawing up the Bill had been negative, as indicated by Clause 57, 
based on a similar provision in the Public Service Act (N.S.W.) 1895, 
which read
Nothing in this Act shall be construed or held to abrogate or 
restrict the right or power of the Crown to dispense with 
the services of any person employed in the public service 
other than the commissioner and inspectors.
This lack of regard for officers' rights was regarded as unsatisfactory,
and during the Parliamentary debates the Bill was transformed, so that
2The derivation of the clauses of the Public Service Bill 1902 may be 
found in G.E. Caide, Career Service, Melbourne, 1965, p. 49.
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the resulting statute was considerably in advance of State legislation 
in the rights it conferred.
A predominant influence upon the Bill was the largest, most
influential officers' association - the Australian Commonwealth Post
and Telegraph Officers' Association, which even before federation had
become concerned with the rights its members would possess under the
3new administration. The Association's view of public servants' rights 
was essentially conservative, bent on preserving the rights which its 
members already possessed, but the experiences of colonial administration 
had bred a distrust of discretion exercised without check, a preference 
for statutory enactment and an appreciation of the benefits it could 
confer, and a clear idea of the specific provisions desired. These 
officers conceived rights as their due, as a matter of fairness, in 
recognition of their services, their skills, the trust reposed in them, 
the limitations of office they assumed, and also as part of a particular 
view of their career, similar to that prevailing in craft occupations, 
in which a person was accepted initially into their calling, gradually 
learned the skills of the trade, and progressed accordingly. Their
3The contribution of the A.G.P.T.O.A. to the framing of the Commonwealth 
Public Service Act has been drawn from G.E. Caiden, The A.C.P.T.A .:
A Study of White Collar Public Service Unionism in the Commonwealth 
of Australia 1885-1922, Canberra, 1965, pp. 26-49. The proposals of 
the A.C.P.T.O.A. were adopted at the founding conference in October 1900, 
and added to by the deputation of leading officers of the Association 
to the Postmaster-General on 11.7.1901.
57
specific proposals concerning rights tended to reflect this concept.
These included the right to a minimum adult wage, in recognition of 
their qualifications and as an attraction to good calibre recruits. 
Automatic increments, as skills improved, would provide steady 
progression, irrespective of promotion, up to a reasonably high level. 
Equal pay for female officers would prevent the undermining of rates of 
pay or the employment of females in preference to males. The elimination 
of political control of personnel matters and the entrusting of the 
public service to impartial administration as a self-regulating mechanism 
were appreciated, but did not over-ride a certain suspicion of senior 
officers. Proposals were therefore made for an Appeal Court, including 
an elected public servants' representative, thus widening participation 
in management. In addition suggestions were put forward for various 
allowances, for cumulative recreation leave and free accommodation in 
residential post offices.
The influence of these proposals was far-reaching. They were 
pressed directly upon Cabinet ministers and were taken up by Labor and 
radical Members of Parliament, who drew their implications in terms of 
their own view of officers' rights - those which it was generally 
desirable for employees to possess, and which would be compOetely 
binding against the employer. Whereas the officers had been content 
to conceive their rights as the privileged conditions of work to which 
they felt entitled by their office, the Labor Party was prepared to
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go further, and to ensure political and industrial freedom for them.
In an attempt to prevent future restriction by regulation, usual in
Australian public services, it was proposed that
Nothing in this Act shall in any way prevent an officer 
becoming a member of any properly constituted society or 
political association.
The motion was narrowly defeated, but Senator de Largie's (Labor, 
Western Australia) justification of his case indicated the general 
radical view of rights:
We do not pay civil servants for talking politics. We pay 
them for eight hours' work and when they have done that 
eight hours' work the rest of the twenty-four hours should 
be their time and theirs alone. Neither the community in 
the shape of the Federal Government, nor any other body should 
have any controlling power which would enable them to say how 
they should spend their spare time. If the civil servant 
gives an equivalent in service for the salary he receives, 
that is all that the Commonwealth Government have any claim 
to. I do not see how we can expect anything more. We do not 
buy a man's political soul when we give him employment in 
the civil service... it may come about that the majority of 
the citizens of the Commonwealth will be working under the 
Government. Let honorable senators imagine the state of 
affairs if, during an election, the overwhelming majority of 
the citizens of the Commonwealth should not have the power to 
speak their minds upon politics.4
The proposals for the extension of public servants' rights were 
on the whole sympathetically received, and suggestions tended to be 
dealt with on their merits by both government and other speakers. The 
atmosphere of setting out on a new venture was responsible for a desire
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. VII, p. 9435.
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to create a lasting institution, worthy of the new Commonwealth, and 
for a willingness to ignore precedent in favour of pragmatic 
experiment. The colonial experience with its confusions, injustices, 
irregularities and discontents was no example for emulation, and a 
general determination existed to avoid pitfalls from the beginning. 
Efforts in this direction took two main paths - firstly to increase the 
powers of the Public Service Commissioner as an impartial independent 
administrator, in whose very presence many saw the guarantee of fair 
administration, and secondly, by firm provision to clarify the legal 
rights of public servants. The government, while willing to alter the 
Bill in the first direction was less willing to eliminate discretionary 
clauses, although Isaacs' attack on the principle of dismissability at 
pleasure was successful:
Public servants ought to know, like any other contractors with 
the State, what are their rights. I certainly cannot recognise 
the position that these rights are only tentative, and, that 
civil servants are to understand that we are making provisions 
to which we do not intend to adhere... [This provision] 
deprives public servants of the power of going to court, and 
claiming that they have not had the formalities prescribed by 
this Act observed ... Let us either say that we will leave 
the matter absolutely in the hands of the Government or let 
us give a reality to those provisions which guard the rights 
of public servants.5
The Commonwealth Public Service Act which emerged from the debates 
reflected the general concern for public servants' rights and embodied
5Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. I, P- 1116.
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many of their proposals. The principles of minimum wage, annual
ß
increments, and equal pay for women were accepted. Although seniority 
as the basis of promotion had been rejected, the senior officer was 
safeguarded by the provision that he could not be passed over by a 
junior without the certificate of the Public Service Commissioner that 
no capable senior officer was available. In addition, a right of 
general appeal was granted to any officer affected by any report or 
recommendation made or action taken under the Act (with certain 
exceptions) to a board consisting of a Public Service Inspector, the 
chief officer of the department or his nominee, and a divisional 
representative. The board would hear the appeal and report back to the 
Public Service Commissioner who would determine the matter. The 
principle of an elected divisional representative upon disciplinary 
boards of appeal was also adopted. Public servants were re-assured as 
to the continuance of customary privileges through the repetition of the 
constitutional pledge to transferred officers, and through the
ß
A certain vagueness seems to be apparent as to the nature of the annual 
increments. The general understanding seems to have been that they 
represented
... a guarantee that the meritorious and deserving public 
servant should get his increment, that he should not be 
dependent on the circumstances of the Treasurer of the day, 
but that whether promotion came his way or not, until he 
reached the top of the fifth class, he should be able to 
advance by steady stages so long as he was worthy of those 
advances.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. I, p. 1544.
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enactment of provisions for annual recreation leave, sick leave, public 
holidays, furlough and limitation of rent deduction in cases of 
compulsory residence, although much in this area was left to later 
regulation. Finally, an independent Public Service Commissioner, who in 
the original Bill had been conceived as merely a watchdog, had become 
through the transfer of functions to him, responsible for most aspects 
of personnel administration.
The Administration of the Public Service Act 1902
As the major responsibility for the implementation of the Public 
Service Act had been laid upon the Public Service Commissioner, the rights 
of officers in practice would depend largely upon his views. The First 
Public Service Commissioner, D.C. McLachlan, was not unaware of the 
importance of statutory rights to public servants.^ His own personal 
career in the New South Wales administration during which he had seen
gconsiderable re-organisation had given him an appreciation of the 
benefits of the protection of the career public servant from political 
interference. He regarded such protection, however, as only justifiable 
if it were matched by a fair and efficient administration. Public 
servants' rights were privileges, not as compensation for the
^See First Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1904, p. 45.gSee G.E. Caiden, 'The Early Career of D.C. McLachlan', Public 
Administration (Syd.), XXII, June 1963, pp. 199-201. Also G.E. Caiden, 
Career Service op.cit., pp. 72-74.
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limitations of public office, but in return for individual effort and
worth, which should be under continual scrutiny to ensure that each
gave of his best. The only entitlement the public servant possessed
was the right to fair treatment within the bounds of the public
interest, both of which the Commissioner was in the best possible
position to judge. All other benefits should be conditional to be withheld
at the discretion of the authorities should conditions warrant. He would
have preferred his administration untrammelled by the over-riding rights
of officers which to him impeded sound administration and the essential
9exercise of wise discretion upon which it rested. However, he was 
prepared to abide strictly by the letter of the law, but insisted upon 
any latitude it offered him.
To some extent the views of the Public Service Commissioner were 
influenced by the situation with which he was confronted. Apart from 
the diversity of practices existing through the transfer of departments 
from six separate State services, the legacy of confusion and
9'To whatever piece of Australian Public Service legislation one turns 
there will be found clause after clause and provision after provision 
designed solely in the interest and for the benefit of the officer, each 
of which has the logical and legal effect of cutting away from the Crown 
its erstwhile prerogative right of being free and untrammelled in 
getting rid of a servant, who, through wilful neglect, indifference to 
or disregard of, his employers' interest, and of his own responsibility 
therein, is undeserving of, and possesses no equitable claim for, 
continued employment.'
First Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1904, p. 45.
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maladministration of the colonial era threatened to perpetuate itself 
under the Commonwealth. Further, the burst of enthusiasm on the 
founding of the Commonwealth, had given way to a preoccupation with 
economy, in excess of what was required to meet the liabilities 
imposed on the Commonwealth by the 'Braddon clause' of the Constitution 
Act. The result was pressure upon staff, remuneration and conditions 
of work.
Thus, the Commissioner was early forced to distinguish rights from 
privileges, and in the promulgation of his regulations and ensuing 
annual reports, he made it clear that the privileges which officers 
received as a matter of custom were not to be automatic in their 
application, but conferred only in return for satisfactory service and 
subject to individual assessment. As the majority of these privileges 
did not exist outside the public services, the Commissioner had some 
justification for his views in this area. Recreation leave was to be 
dependent 'upon the good conduct and regular attention to duty of the 
officer' ,^  and acted therefore as a disciplinary device operating 
outside as well as part of the normal disciplinary machinery. Furlough 
was not to be 'granted to any officer who has been reduced for misconduct 
or at any time deprived of leave of absence as a punishment for an
^Commonwealth Public Service Regulations, 1902, Regulation 76. See 
also Third Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1907-8, p. 23.
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11offence', and was to depend not only upon an officer's 'diligence,
efficiency, regular attendance, the cheerful and ready performance of
all work entrusted to him', but also 'upon whether he can be spared
12without inconvenience to public business'. Overtime payment was to 
be exceptional and applicable only to work 'which, from its character or
from special circumstances, cannot be performed during the prescribed
13office hours', as determined by the Commissioner.
The Commissioner was prepared to recognise the minimum salary
provisions (for officers only and not exempt or temporary staff) and to
award equal rates for men and women in the same positions (although he
maintained that he had power through regulation to impose differential
rates), but insisted that all increments were to be discretionary.
Although in the Clerical Division he was prepared to grant increments in
the lowest class provided the officer's 'conduct, diligence and general
efficiency' were satisfactory, in all other cases increments were to be
treated as sub-divisional promotions and to be dependent not merely on
satisfactory performance of duties but also upon increased work value,
14either through a change in duties or through greater efficiency.
11
13
Commonwealth Public Service Regulations, 1902, Regulation 89.
>
'First Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1904, p. 39. 
Commonwealth Public Service Regulations, 1902, Regulation 98.
Ibid., Regulation 57. See also Second Report of the Public Service 
Commissioner, 1905, p. 10.
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While the Commissioner regarded such items as leave or increments
as privileges, he considered that the officers' entitlement to fair
treatment was amply covered in his administration, and that any officer
who carried out his duties to the best of his ability had no reason
to grumble. He had little sympathy with officers who came under
suspicion as having committed an offence, but strictly carried out the
procedures in the Public Service Act relating to disciplinary appeal.
The general right of appeal granted to officers under Section 50 he
resented more strongly on the grounds that it tied the hands of his
administration and encouraged malcontents.^ He took legal advice to
restrict the interpretation of the section to cases where an officer
was 'affected' only by a change in his own classification or a reduction
of his own salary, so that appeal would not lie to an officer against
another's promotion, or against transfer, or against an action not 
16taken. In practice, the chances of a successful appeal were even
'In view of the almost unlimited application of the right of appeal, 
it must at once be apparent that the hands of Chief Officers, Permanent 
Heads, the Inspectors and myself are unreasonably tied, and that our 
administration will remain greatly hampered until some amendment of the 
Act is effected, there being hardly a step taken in administration that 
cannot with impunity and absolute immunity from any pecuniary loss be 
made the subject of appeal at the hands of a disappointed, dissatisfied, 
or querulous officer, no matter how remote his chances of success may be, 
or how groundless his cause of complaint.'
First Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1904, p. 40.
16Second Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1905, p. 18.
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slimmer, for officers rarely knew of any report, recommendation or 
action taken before approval by the Governor General, after which, 
according to the Act, the right of appeal lapsed.
The attitude of the Commissioner towards appeal against his
administration was intensified where officers used outside means to
challenge his decisions, which he interpreted as both insubordination
and an attempt to exercise improper pressure contrary to the intentions
of the Public Service Act.^ His attitude towards public service
associations was therefore somewhat cautious. He stressed that no
right to organise existed and that recognition depended on his own
discretion and the proper behaviour of the associations themselves, but
his own connection with public service unionism in New South Wales in
the 1890s, and the recognition already extended by Ministers to the
A.C.P.T.O.A., despite some difficulties in Victoria and Western Australia,
had to some extent pre-judged the issue. He contented himself with
laying down strict rules for the associations, which were in no sense to
18challenge his administration.
'All the rights of officers are amply safeguarded by the Act, which, by 
establishing Boards of Appeal, provides abundant means for the impartial 
investigation and redress of legitimate grievances.'
First Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1904, p. 45.
18First Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1904, pp. 54-5.
See also G.E. Caiden, Career Service, op.cit., p. 73.
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In regard to political rights, the Commissioner, unrestrained by 
any limitation to the contrary in the Public Service Act, laid down the 
following prohibition:
Officers are expressly forbidden to publicly discuss or in 
any way promote political movements. They are further 
forbidden to use for political purposes information gained 
by them in the course of their duty.
He justified the prohibition in general terms:
It would be impossible to secure that harmonious and united 
effort which officers should display in carrying on the 
executive business of Government unless there existed an 
unequivocal loyalty to whatever party happens to be in power; 
and the right of officers to publicly discuss questions of 
political policy, or to canvass or to advocate the views of 
any particular party or candidate, would certainly militate 
against that loyal co-operation which every officer should at 
all times render. Further, the public expression by Civil 
Servants of their views on political matters would in many 
instances lead to unfriendly relations with large bodies of 
the public with whom they have official relations, and this
should be avoided.20
The promulgation of the regulations and the 1904 reclassification 
of officers, against which appeal had been allowed to the Commissioner, 
met with varying reactions among Commonwealth public servants, according 
to their effects upon different groups. Attitudes tended towards 
caution, so that although expectations were in some cases disappointed, 
officers were prepared to trust to the Commissioner and keep within his 
rules, partly in the hope that these tactics would bear fruit later,
19Commonwealth Public Service Regulations, 1902, Regulation 41.
20First Report of the Commonwealth Public Service Commissioner, 1904, 
P. 37.
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partly in fear lest worse befall. The predominant attitude towards 
rights was still conservative, and pre-occupation remained with customary 
conditions of work and the upholding of status.
By 1906 a change in attitude on the part of the public servants had
become evident and there was less inclination to confine tactics to
those approved by the Commissioner or accept his interpretation of their
rights. It had become increasingly clear that the policy of the
Commissioner was to recognise only those rights forced upon him
through their absolute legal nature, and to regard all others as
completely dependent on his discretion. Had he applied this policy in
a liberal manner, little objection might have been taken to it, but in
the increasingly stringent emphasis on economy, the exercise of
discretion and invocation of the public interest became little more than
21a euphemism for saving money. Officers saw their privileged conditions 
of work, thought of as their due and embodied in legislation, stagnate 
and decline as increments became rare, promotion for those doing work 
higher than their own position was withheld, furlough was restricted to 
those who wished to travel abroad, and unpaid overtime became a 
substitute for recruitment of extra staff. Discontent, with the bad 
conditions of work grew, particularly in the Postmaster-General's 
Department, and provided a stimulus to the formation of more militant
See G.E. Caiden, Career Service, op.cit., pp. 84-5.21
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associations in the lower ranks, as well as a less conservative attitude 
on the part of the older-established associations. The authorities were 
no more responsive to vehement protests and threats of strike action than 
they had been to polite representations, and the cleavage between the 
Commissioner's restricted interpretation of rights and that of the 
public servants grew as the latter, in the face of his stubbornness, 
were forced to clarify their views. They were no longer content with 
assurances of fair treatment, or with privileges to be denied at their 
expense in the cause of the public interest, or benefits which though 
provided for in legislation, were withheld as a matter of course. They 
wanted rights either automatic in their application or based on 
objective criteria open to appeal, as opposed to subjective discretion 
which could not be challenged. They were no longer prepared to confine 
their protests within the closed world of the public service, and the 
call for an inquiry into the Postmaster-General's Department, between 
1906 and 1908, was the expression of what they considered their 
legitimate citizens' right to appeal to the legislature.
The Extension of Rights
The change in attitude of the associations had led to the 
re-opening of contacts with politicians, and particularly Labor 
politicians, who though not interested in preserving public servants' 
privileges, were for a number of reasons, concerned with public servants'
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rights. The participation in the Labor Party of public employees such 
as railway workers and tramway workers and the history of deprivation 
of the rights of such groups by State governments, made it susceptible 
to pressure on their behalf. Restriction of full political and 
industrial rights of public servants did not only represent an 
infringement of the fundamental liberty of the citizen, but also the 
immobilisation of important potential support for the party. On an 
ideological level the Labor Party was committed to a Socialist platform, 
which implied the extension of public employment, and could therefore 
transform the problem from one concerning a minority to one affecting the 
majority. More generally sentiment in the party was against the 
atmosphere of subordination and hierarchy in the public services, and 
any expectation by senior officers of unquestioning obedience from the 
rank and file.
Until 1909 the Labor Party in the Commonwealth Parliament had had
little opportunity to take any effective action upon the rights of
public servants. In 1903 it took the initiative in debating political 
22rights, and in 1904 a minority Labor Government, in enacting 
arbitration legislation at federal level for workers in general, had 
intended by implication to include public servants. Governments
22 See V. Subramaniam, 'Political Rights of Commonwealth Public Servants', 
Public Administration, pp. 22-33, March 1958.
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p r e f e r r e d  t o  l e a v e  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  t o  t h e
C o m m i s s i o n e r ,  and P a r l i a m e n t a r y  q u e s t i o n s  by L ab o r  p o l i t i c i a n s  had
e l i c i t e d  l i t t l e  r e s p o n s e .  The m a i n  l i n e  o f  a t t a c k  o f  t h e  L a b o r  P a r t y
was upon  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n e r ' s  r e g u l a t i o n  b a n n i n g  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  by
p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s ,  w h i c h  i n c l u d e d  S t a t e  and m u n i c i p a l  a s  w e l l  a s
Commonweal th p u b l i c  a f f a i r s .  As a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a
r e s o l u t i o n  f o r  f u l l  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  i n  p u b l i c  em ploymen t  a t  t h e  L abor
P a r t y  C o n f e r e n c e  i n  1908,  t h e  m a t t e r  was o n ce  a g a i n  d e b a t e d  i n  
23P a r l i a m e n t  w i t h  l i t t l e  e f f e c t ,  b u t  when s h o r t l y  a f t e r w a r d s  t h e  
Govern m en t  f e l l  an d  a s e c o n d  L ab o r  G o ve rn m en t  t o o k  o f f i c e ,  one o f  i t s  
f i r s t  a c t i o n s  was t o  a b o l i s h  R e g u l a t i o n  4 1 ,  t h u s  r e c o g n i s i n g  t h e  f u l l  
p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  o f  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s ,  s h o r t  o f  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t u r e ,  
and r e t a i n i n g  o n l y  p r o v i s i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  o f f i c i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n .
The e x t e n s i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  t o  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  n o t  o n l y  
a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  a p p e a l  o u t s i d e  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  f a i r  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s e t  up u n d e r  t h e  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e  C o m m i s s i o n e r ,  b u t  was t h e  
f i r s t  s t e p  i n  d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  w h o l e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  e a r l i e r  d o c t r i n e  t h a t  
p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  w e r e  c o m p e n s a t e d  f o r  l o s s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  and c i v i l  
r i g h t s  by t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  o t h e r  p r i v i l e g e s .  The L a b o r  P a r t y  saw t h e  
e n d i n g  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n  upon  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  a s  an  e q u a l i s i n g  m e a s u r e
23 I b i d . ,  p . 24 .
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between public servants and the rest of the work force, opening the 
way for the assessment of public servants' rights, obligations and 
privileges in comparison with those of the rest of the population.
24Although officers welcomed the recognition of political liberties, 
their conception of rights and that of the Labor Party still did not 
co-incide. They saw the measure less as restoring to them the 
fundamental rights of the citizen, than as an indication that the 
Commissioner no longer blocked the channels between themselves and the 
government, which could now grant them their customary due.
The conflict between the two conceptions became apparent upon the 
return of the first majority Labor government, when officers expected 
alleviation of their conditions of work through direct legislative action. 
However the Labor government as employer was not prepared to improve the 
material working conditions of a single sector of the workforce by its own 
unilateral action, when it was precluded from extending such benefits to 
workers generally through constitutional limitation on its powers.
The rights to which public servants were entitled were only those fairly 
applicable to other workers, and the government found itself in an 
invidious position in determining this standard. An alternative was
The attitude of public servants was still somewhat uncertain with 
regard to full political rights. In 1900 a motion for full political 
rights was lost at the conference of the A.C.P.T.0.A., in 1903 adopted, 
in 1905 lost once again, and also narrowly lost in 1906.
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readily available in the form of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation 
and Arbitration which had been set up in 1904. The Arbitration 
(Public Service) Act 1911 defined public servants as an industry and 
gave public service organisations the same right to approach the Court 
as other employees' organisations. The requirements for registration 
were modified to meet the smaller size of groups of workers in the public 
service, and the necessity for the existence of an inter-state dispute 
was waived. Otherwise the only departure from the general 
legislation was to allow the Court to make awards inconsistent with 
statute, and to provide that all awards should be laid before Parliament 
for approval before coming into force.
The introduction of arbitration for public servants marked a further
step towards the dominance of the idea of public servants' rights as
basically similar to those of the rest of the community. Firstly the
Commonwealth Government had implied its willingness to assume the same
relationship with its employees as was expected of other employers:
No man that works for an employer in Australia is denied 
the right to go somewhere else over the head of the 
employer and ask, "Am I being treated justly? Are my rates 
of pay and conditions of labour those which ought 
to obtain?" The 35,000 public servants of the Commonwealth 
alone are denied that right, and are now being given it.25
25W.M. Hughes, Attorney General, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 
Vol. 63, p. 3632.
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Secondly, arbitration implied definite recognition of the right to
associate, which had not previously existed, and associations had on
occasion met with difficulties through the disapproval of senior
2 6officers. Thirdly, public servants gained rights through the
arbitration procedure itself, as they now met their employer on equal
terms, could press for reasons for decisions and cross-examine the
authorities. Finally the rights gained through arbitration award were
binding upon the employer indefinitely in the absence of later
legislation to the contrary. True the Court had been given no power to
enforce its awards, but a later decision of the High Court indicated that
27awards were recognised as legally binding.
The change in the general nature of public servants' rights was 
recognised by the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration itself from the 
first determination for Commonwealth public servants handed down by 
Mr Justice Higgins in a case brought by the Australian Postal 
Electricians' Union in 1913. Higgins rejected the view that public 
servants deserved only low compensation in recognition of exceptional 
privileges they possessed, or that public servants should possess no
O  £
See G.E. Caiden, The A.C.P.T.A ., op.cit., p. 105.
27Kay v. Commonwealth, 27 C.L.R. 327 (1920). It was held that an action 
would lie against the Commonwealth to recover the difference between the 
salary paid to an officer of the Public Service of the Commonwealth, and 
that to which he was entitled under an award made by the Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.
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rights at all against their employer (although these were qualified
through the demands of internal administration) or that political
considerations should over-ride the justice of any claim, as unlike the
ordinary employer Parliament could reject the award if it thought fit.
He made it clear that through the arbitration process public servants
could establish rights against the Commissioner, curtailing his
discretion. Thus, he awarded certain classes
a legal right to annual increments, unless in cases where the 
Commissioner determines that the officer has not been 
performing his duties satisfactorily... but there is a great 
difference between this power and the present position, where 
the officer has no right to the increment unless the 
Commissioner so determine, for any one of a multitude of 
reasons.28
Similarly he laid down that a higher duties allowance should be granted 
after one month's acting duty in a higher position, that promotion should 
automatically follow the passing of certain examinations, and that new 
salary scales should apply to particular classifications. The 
Commissioner attempted to by-pass the award by altering the 
classification, but a further application to the Court by the 
association ensured that in the future arbitration awards would supersede 
classifications made by the central personnel authority.
The officers' associations were not on the whole favourable to the 
idea of arbitration, and it was some time before they took advantage
28Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, Vol. 7, p. 15.
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of it. Not only did it mean changes in their organisation to accord 
with the rules necessary for registration and efforts to formulate 
plaints, but involved a re-alignment in thinking. It was no longer 
appropriate to rely upon the Government to recognise rights as a matter 
of custom and as its duty towards its employees without reference to the 
rest of the workforce and officers somewhat resented their assimilation 
to the position of the ordinary employee. Lagging conditions in the 
public services and the results of the first cases before the Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration brought the realisation that through 
arbitration public servants could gain the same right which had been 
fought for by employees as a whole - adjudication of disputes by an 
independent authority, whose determinations were equally binding upon 
both sides.
The government had not surrendered its right to lay down conditions 
in the public service, and the introduction of the Commonwealth 
Workmen's Compensation Act removed another disability from Commonwealth 
public servants in relation to other employees. All the States except 
Victoria had Workmen's Compensation Acts applying to private employment, 
although only New South Wales and Queensland had legislation applying 
to public employment. It was doubtful if a Commonwealth public servant 
could sue the Commonwealth Government under the ordinary Workmen's 
Compensation Acts, and the common law position was unsatisfactory. 
Certain departments allowed compensation for injury as a general rule,
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and others spasmodically, and the amounts necessary to cover the sums
paid out had been appropriated annually when towards the end of each
session an Officers' Compensation Act was hurried through Parliament.
The procedure was open to obvious criticism since there was no
certainty that compensation would be granted, only cases reaching the
attention of the permanent head and minister were considered,
departmental policies varied, no compensation was available for injury
short of death or incapacity, and dependants of officers frequently did
not even know they could claim compensation. The Commonwealth
Workmen's Compensation Act, which was not opposed in Parliament,
remedied the situation "not as charity, or even as the result of
29generosity on the part of the Government, but as a right".
The beginning of the First World War did not mark the end of the 
development of the rights of Commonwealth public servants. Changes were 
made through the Public Service Act 1922, the Superannuation Act 1922 
and the Public Service (Arbitration) Act 1920, and their subsequent 
amendments, which will be covered in later chapters dealing with 
particular groups of rights. Although many of these changes were of 
considerable importance, they did not alter the general concept of public 
servants' rights which had emerged during the earlier years. The theory
29A. Fisher, Prime Minister, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 67, 
p. 4850.
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of privilege had lost its dominance, although echoes still remain in 
certain quarters. The general view of rights which has replaced it 
has as its core the notions that public servants' rights should be 
similar to those of other citizens and employees, and that these 
rights, expressed in legislation and arbitration awards, may be 
justifiably upheld by the public servant. The importance of absolute 
rights which could be insisted upon against the authorities had 
become evident, but of no less significance had been the development 
of the rights of the ordinary employee, which transformed what had 
previously been matters of discretion and privilege in the public 
service into the accepted conditions of employment which would be 
rarely denied.
CHAPTER 4
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Although the practice of incorporating a Bill of Rights for the 
safeguard of fundamental liberties has recently become more fashionable 
in constitutions of countries of the British Commonwealth, the Australian 
Constitution Act is silent upon such matters. As in Britain, 
protection of individual rights is left largely to the interpretation of 
common law through the judiciary, so that citizens cannot claim 
constitutional rights. A departure from this principle was the 
constitutional preservation of the rights of officers transferred from 
State public services to that of the Commonwealth on federation. The 
wisdom of using a constitution for such a purpose may be questioned.'*’
Constitutional rights may be divided into fundamental, protecting 
the basic political and civil rights of citizens (such as the right to 
free speech), programmatic, ensuring the citizen the necessities for a 
full life (such as the right to education), and preservative, ensuring 
certain groups perpetuation of their present situation (such as 
guaranteed minority representation in a legislature). It would appear
'’Other constitutions which have conferred rights upon public servants 
have been the German Weimar Constitution of 1919, the Constitution of 
the French Fourth Republic 1946, and the current Constitutions of 
Cyprus, Sweden and Norway.
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inadvisable to confer the last category of constitutional rights except
in cases of extreme political necessity. Because constitutional rights
take precedence over all other rights and considerations, and
alteration is often made intentionally difficult, changing circumstances
may transform legitimate protection of a group's rights into the
entrenchment of its privileges. Further, the interpretation of
constitutional rights is essentially the province of the judiciary,
which may not be suitable to settle this kind of dispute:
The vaguer the standards to which legislative encroachments 
on the guaranteed freedoms must conform, the wider will be 
the field of uncertainty and the scope for speculative litigation. 
In the process of constitutional interpretation the private 
philosophies and prejudices of individual judges will 
inevitably emerge. Decisions in highly controversial cases 
are likely to be ascribed to the judge's personal 
predilections... Is it not wiser to leave these matters to 
be provided for by the ordinary law of the land?^
The Origins of the Constitutional Guarantee
The constitutional rights of transferred officers may be traced to 
the early discussions concerning federation, where discussion arose 
concerning those employed in departments which would be taken over by 
the Commonwealth. The principle expressed in the draft constitution 
presented at the 1891 National Australasian Convention that ' ... all
existing rights of any such officers shall be preserved' was familiar
S.A. de Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions, London, 1964, 
p. 169.
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in those colonies which had passed public service legislation during 
3the 1880s. As federation drew nearer, the concern of public servants 
that administrative change might involve deterioration of conditions 
became more acute, particularly in view of their treatment during the 
depression. Public service associations regained impetus and pressed 
their case upon the federalists, who, anxious not to antagonise any 
section of the population and gain votes in the coming referendum, were 
willing to allay their fears. The draft constitution presented at the 
Second Federal Convention in 1897 had, under watchful draftsmanship, 
apparently absolved the Commonwealth of responsibility for previous 
obligations assumed by colonial governments by substituting for 
preservation of the rights of transferred officers Clause 83 stating 
'every officer shall be entitled to receive from the State any gratuity 
pension or retiring allowance, payable under the law of the State on 
abolition of his office'. By this date leading figures in the 
federation movement had become convinced of the necessity of assuring 
'substantial justice' to the transferred officers, and were prepared to 
acknowledge some obligation towards them on the part of the Commonwealth. 
Barton (N.S.W.) proposed an amendment that officers retained in the
3Chapter IV, Clause 5. See Chapter 2.
4For example, at the 1897 Convention, O'Connor emphasised that officers 
should not be placed in an unfair position or lose any rights through 
transfer, and Barton considered that rights should gradually die out 
under the Commonwealth so that transfer should not prejudice any officer.
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service of the Commonwealth should be 'entitled to retire from office
at the time and upon the pension or retiring allowance permitted and
provided by the law of the State on such retirement', and an amendment
by Deakin (Vic.) extended preservation to the other rights possessed by
officers. The final draft of the clause, agreed to at the Third Session
of the Convention in Melbourne in 1898 read:
Section 84: When any department of the public service of a 
State becomes transferred to the Commonwealth, all officers 
of the department shall become subject to the control of 
the Executive Government of the Commonwealth.
Any such officer who is not retained in the service of the 
Commonwealth shall, unless he is appointed to some other 
office of equal emolument in the public service of the State, 
be entitled to receive from the State any pension, gratuity, 
or other compensation payable under the law of the State on 
the abolition of his office.
Any such officer who is retained in the service of the 
Commonwealth shall preserve all his existing and accruing 
rights, and shall be entitled to retire from office at the 
time, and on the pension or retiring allowance, which would 
be permitted by the law of the State if his service with the 
Commonwealth were a continuation of his service with the State.
Such pension or retiring allowance shall be paid to him by the 
Commonwealth; but the State shall pay to the Commonwealth a 
part thereof, to be calculated on the proportion which his 
term of service with the State bears to his whole term of 
service, and for the purpose of the calculation his salary 
shall be taken to be that paid to him by the State at the 
time of the transfer.
Any officer who is, at the establishment of the Commonwealth, 
in the public service of a State, and, who is, by consent of 
the Governor of the State with the advice of the Executive 
Council thereof, transferred to the public service of the 
Commonwealth, shall have the same rights as if he had been an 
officer of a department transferred to the Commonwealth and 
were retained in the service of the Commonwealth.
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Apart from the provision for retention of pension rights, the 
section was vague, and no attempt was made in the debates to define 
'existing and accruing rights'. Delegates to the Conventions were not 
interested in the detail of public service organisation, nor prepared 
to limit the future Commonwealth Government in its dealings with its 
employees, and had little conception of any difficulties which might 
arise. The dominant voices at the Conventions came from those 
colonies which had fairly recently passed legislation setting out the 
rights of their public servants, and took little note of the customary 
practices which constituted rights in the view of public servants under 
the less formal type of administration in the other colonies. The 
only opposition to the preservation of rights came from Gordon (S.A.) 
and Higgins (Vic.), whose respective proposals for compensation instead 
of preservation of rights and clear definitions with a view to avoiding 
extensive litigation, were brushed aside, and the problems of dealing 
with the public service in general were left to the Commonwealth 
Parliament.
The debates on the treatment of transferred officers' rights in the 
Commonwealth Public Service Bill 1902 were a combination of reassurance 
and evasiveness. The constitutional pledge was repeated in Section 60 
of the Act, and leading members of the Government promised that public 
servants would not be treated less generously by the Commonwealth than
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they had been by the States. But the relationship between the rights 
based on earlier legislation and the new legislative arrangements was 
already causing difficulties,^ and the Government was cautious when 
pressed to compensate for the omission of the constitution-makers by 
defining specific rights.^
The Question of the Effective Rights of Transferred Officers
The Government was reluctant to compromise the Public Service 
Commissioner in advance, so that interpretation of transferred officers' 
rights was one of the general administrative tasks he faced on taking 
office. The desire of the Commissioner to unify the Commonwealth Public
'We ought to legislate in such a way that transferred officers cannot 
be placed in a worse position than they would have been in had they 
continued in the State service...
'The spirit of the Constitution is that they are not only to be preserved 
in their rights and privileges, but to receive as fair and generous 
treatment from the Commonwealth as they received from the State Government'.
J.G. Drake, Postmaster General, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. VII, 
p. 9229.0
'... it would really be most inconvenient if the different laws and 
conditions regulating promotions and salaries which prevailed in the 
different States were to follow the officers transferred to the Commonwealth 
... The sooner it is understood throughout the whole service of the 
Commonwealth that once a man becomes an officer of the Commonwealth he 
is under a uniform law, and does not carry with him exceptional 
advantages gained in the particular part of the continent from which 
he comes, the better it will be for the service...'
G.H. Reid, M.H.R. for East Sydney, C.P.D., II, p. 2074.
^'No right will be taken away, and the whole of the members of the 
service must have the same rights, but it is too early to define what 
these rights are'.
Sir W. Lyne, Attorney General, C.P.D., II, p. 2005.
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Service under his own strong direction, together with his general view
of public servants' rights as conditional upon individual worth and
subordinate to the public interest, resulted in a narrow interpretation,
based on the advice of the Attorney General:
The 'existing and accruing rights' referred to in Section 84 
only apply to such absolute legal rights as were capable of 
enforcement at the time of transfer and... the Constitution 
merely preserves but does not extend such rights.^
However the replacement of the old conditions of work by the uniform
administration of the Commissioner's Regulations, which came into force
at the beginning of 1903, caused comparatively little protest among
public servants as far as transferred rights were concerned, despite
the disallowance of 'all sorts of State practices, privileges, permits,
9indulgences, concessions and discretionary allowances'. Firstly, the 
regulations themselves were not illiberal and in some cases an 
improvement upon colonial practices, such as the need in Western 
Australia for an officer to pay for his own replacement before he could 
take recreation leave. Secondly they were not very different from those 
already existing in the larger States. Thirdly, there had never been 
any question of denial of major rights preserved by the Constitution, 
such as pensions.
First Annual Report of the Public Service Commissioner, p. 12. 
9Ibid.
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Difficulties arose less from the reconciliation of diverse 
statutory provisions than from the alteration of practices and 
privileges which had been accepted as rights in the laxer, more 
personal administration of those colonial public services where a firm 
statutory basis had not been adopted. The legal basis of these 
practices was at best doubtful; in Western Australia and Tasmania, the 
legislation of 1900 had received assent or had come into force too late 
to confer binding rights, and claims for free medical care and extended 
long service leave by Western Australian officers and gratuities for 
widows in Tasmania were quickly abandoned in the face of the 
Commissioner's firm attitude. The South Australian officers' position 
was somewhat different, as it appeared they could claim rights under 
the Civil Service Act 1874 and other legislation. In fact by the end 
of the nineteenth century the 1874 Act covered only a minority of South 
Australian public servants, but shortly before federation 'provisional 
and temporary' officers were also classified under the Act, to establish 
entitlements which had usually been received, but not as a matter of 
right. The new administration of the Commonwealth Public Service Act 
and Regulations had the effect of denying their claims to:
(1) Eight months' furlough on full salary after twenty years' 
service. Section 71 of the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902 allowed 
only six months' discretionary long service leave.
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(2) The right to continue in office irrespective of age, as no 
section in the 1874 Act laid down a retiring age. The power of the 
Governor to request resignation and ultimately to enforce removal 
subject to compensation had been held to apply only to incapacity as 
defined by Section 28 of the Act. Section 73 of the Commonwealth Public 
Service Act 1902 laid down a retiring age of 65.
(3) Increments claimed as the result of action by the South 
Australian government shortly before federation which had (i) transferred 
officers from 'provisional and temporary' status, under which they 
received no increments, to permanent status, and (ii) raised permanent 
officers at the top of their class to the next higher class, entitling 
them to increments of £10 p.a. for the next five years.
The South Australian transferred officers, who had previously been 
able to rely upon customary practices without the need for statutory 
rights (in fact most 'pro. and tern.' officers had received increments 
and continued in office irrespective of age) resented the withdrawal of 
what they held as rights, but their efforts to regain them were confined 
to representations to the Commissioner and the taking of legal advice
u 10on the matter.
10G.E. Caiden, The A.C.P.T.A. op.cit., p. 69.
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Another group of transferred officers, from Victoria, had less 
hesitation in pressing their rights. Among the most blatant of the 
efforts by State governments to compensate public servants for neglect 
during the depression years at the least possible expense to themselves 
by the establishment of new legal rights was the Public Service Act 1900 
(No. 1721), passed by the Victorian legislature, Section 19 of which 
read:
From the commencement of this Act every officer of the Trade 
and Customs, Defence, Post and Telegraphs Departments shall 
be entitled to receive a salary equal to the highest salary 
then payable to an officer of corresponding position in any 
Australian colony; provided that this section diall not entitle 
any officer to receive more than £150 per annum.
Nothing had been done to put the measure into effect when transfer took
place, and officers were still being paid the same amount as previously.
Repeated claims against the Commonwealth for adjustment were refused,
until the Victorian letter carriers, a less conservative group than the
South Australian officers, with experience of statutory rights and
official hostility, took legal action. E.D. Miller claimed salary up
to the date of transfer at the rate of £150 p.a., which was being
received by a letter carrier in South Australia, instead of the £90 p.a.
he had himself been receiving. The claim was rejected, as the former
salary had been achieved through accumulation of increments, but on
appeal Miller gained the minimum salary of the class (£100 p.a.)
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and his claim against the Victorian Government was validated. He 
later sued the Commonwealth Government for the increments he had failed 
to gain in his original action, arguing that through the Victorian 
legislation he was entitled to the benefits of provisions of law 
applicable in another State as well as the salary payable, but this 
interpretation was rejected.^
The way was now open for action against the Commonwealth, which was 
taken by E.M. Bond, another letter carrier, who validated his claim 
against the Victorian Government and proceeded to action in the High 
Court to claim arrears of salary between 1.3.01 and 1.9.01 corresponding 
to the difference between his actual salary of £132 p.a. and £150 p.a. 
The Commonwealth refused the claim on the grounds that Section 84 of 
the Constitution was subordinate to Section 52 (ii) allowing Parliament 
to make laws for the Commonwealth Public Service and Section 83 
empowering appropriation for salaries. Further no legal enforceable 
right existed even under State legislation to a particular salary.
The Chief Justice held, however, that Bond had a definite 'existing' 
right against the Victorian Government which was preserved by Section 84 
of the Constitution:
U Miller v. R. (1903) 28 V.L.R. 530.
^ Miller v. Commonwealth (1904) 1 C.L.R. 668.
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the existing rights of the plaintiff at the time of 
transfer included... a right to continue to receive a 
salary at the then existing rate until that rate was 
lawfully reduced by a competent authority. It was 
contended for the plaintiff that this latter qualification 
ought not to be added, because, it was said, the 
preservation of his existing rights precludes any such 
reduction. It is not, however, necessary, and, not being 
necessary, it is certainly not desirable, to consider this 
question in the present case.^
The test came when the Commissioner reclassified the whole Service.
Although officers in positions which had been reduced in value retained
their actual salary as long as they occupied the positions, and officers
in positions which had been raised in value which they were not worthy to
fill remained in them pending arrangements for transfer, the Commissioner
ignored the effect of Section 19 of the (Vic.) Public Service Act 1900,
under which as the result of Bond v. Commonwealth several Victorian
officers had been receiving higher salaries than they had in the State
service. A test case in the High Court was brought by James Cousins, a
letter carrier, who had been paid £132 p.a. by the State, had been held
entitled to £150 p.a. under Section 19, and had been reclassified at 
14£138 p.a.
The arguments of each side in the case centred on the nature of 
officers' statutory rights. The Commonwealth argued that as a salary 
could be altered by the State at any time, so it could also be altered
13Bond v. Commonwealth (1903) 1 C.L.R. 13, at p. 24.
14Cousins V. Commonwealth (1906) 3 C.L.R. 529.
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by the Commonwealth, and that all officers' rights were subject to 
later change by Parliament. Cousins submitted that such an 
interpretation made Section 84 of the Constitution meaningless, but 
the High Court based its judgment on an interpretation of Section 19 
of the 1900 Act as a temporary expedient fixing the status of officers 
at time of transfer, beyond which it had no binding effect. As an 
amendment to be read in conjunction with the (Vic.) Public Service Act 
1890, the section was subject to the overall powers of the Governor in 
Council as stated in that Act to fix salaries from time to time, a power 
which had now passed to the Commonwealth in terms of the (Commonwealth) 
Public Service Act 1902.
The apparent paradoxical implication of the case was that while the 
rights of transferred officers were preserved by Section 84 of the 
Constitution, public servants had no rights which could not be 
altered by subsequent statutory enactment, and as this power of change 
had passed from the State to the Commonwealth, no further attention 
need be paid to transferred officers' rights. In practice, the 
judgment did not affect transferred rights already granted, nor the 
possibility of litigation by individuals where a general right had been 
conceded but particular circumstances had to be taken into account, 
but it appeared finally to dispose of the more doubtful claims, 
prominent among which were those of the South Australian officers.
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The Recognition of the Rights of Transferred Officers
The South Australian transferred officers had already suffered 
infringement of their alleged rights through the administration of the 
Commonwealth Public Service Act and Regulations. The classification 
made further inroads into the position they had previously occupied.
Not only was the uniform system adopted less favourable to them than the 
more haphazard, customary arrangements they had previously enjoyed, but 
they also lost certain emoluments additional to salary. These 
consisted of a percentage commission on the sale of postage stamps to 
postmasters, payable under the Post Office Act 1876, and fees for 
Savings Bank business which postal officials had received from the 
Trustees of the State Savings Bank. Following the classification the 
South Australian officers had at last decided to test their rights in 
the High Court. Two cases were lodged, Pilgrim v. Commonwealth and 
Howley v. Commonwealth, but upon the decision in the Cousins case in 
1906, legal action was abandoned, and the South Australian officers did 
their best to gain recognition of their rights by other means.
It seemed that in the absence of legal compulsion through the 
courts of law, which had been abandoned, the South Australian officers 
had little chance of regaining the rights they had lost. The 
Commissioner could see no reason to make exceptions in favour of clearly 
outdated administrative practices with which he was totally out of 
sympathy and which he had not hesitated to eliminate in other cases
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where no constitutional right could be claimed. He had established 
uniform regulations, certain in their application, and a rational 
classification, which appeared to meet the needs of the majority of 
officers, were fair to the taxpayer and represented sound administrative 
practice. He was prepared to recognise the absolute legal rights of 
officers, but no evidence existed that the South Australian practices 
were legal rights, and his view had been vindicated by the Cousins case.
Politically also the position of the South Australian officers 
was weak. The early Commonwealth Governments saw no reason to over­
ride the Commissioner on this matter in the absence of legal compulsion,
16as they had refused to do so on other matters. They had comparatively 
little support from other public servants. Even when the attitude of 
the A.C.P.T.0*A., to which as postal officers the majority of them 
belonged, changed from caution about 1906, its support was not of an
For example in Tasmania also no retiring age had been laid down, 
but no real attempt could be made to claim a right as no legislation 
existed at date of transfer. The lack of retiring age was less a 
privilege than a convenient means of avoiding regular provision for 
the old age of officers.
16Both Reid and Deakin had expressed their views on the question of 
transferred rights. From Deakin's remarks during the Second Federal 
Convention, and as legal adviser to the Government, it appeared he 
had thought of the preservation of public servants' rights as merely 
temporary until uniform conditions could be established, while Reid's 
opinions voiced during the debates on the Commonwealth Public Service 
Bill have been noted in Footnote 6.
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active kind, although the South Australian officers benefited from
the general tactics being used by public servants to draw attention to
their cases. On the appointment of the Royal Commission on Postal
Services in 1908 officials of the South Australian Posts and Telegraph
18Association took the opportunity to submit evidence. They pointed 
out that the emoluments they had received had no more than compensated 
them for low salaries, that the increments to which they had become 
entitled on the eve of federation were long over-due because of the 
hold-up of promotion during the depression; that their right to continue 
in the service had always been considered as such, while few had any 
right to retiring allowances; and that the differences between 
'provisional and temporary' and permanent officers were only of theoretical 
and not practical importance. Apart from the justice of their claim on 
moral grounds, their legal rights had been infringed. The federation 
debates had clearly shown the intention that transfer to the Commonwealth 
should not prejudice any officer; the constitutional provision itself did 
not indicate that preservation of rights was merely temporary; the 
Commonwealth Parliament through Section 60 of the Public Service Act 1902 
had affirmed the binding nature of the promise, while the classification 
as an act of administration did not constitute a change in the Act and
^South Australian delegates received support at the 1906 Conference, but 
only in a general way, and no decision was made to act upon the legal 
advice they had received. G.E. Caiden, The A.C.P.T.A. op.cit., p. 95.
18Report of the Royal Commission on Postal Services, p. 1040.
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should not be inconsistent with it. Not surprisingly the Royal Commission 
was not prepared to decide questions of constitutional law, and 
declined to recommend recognition.
A spark of hope was kindled by the election of a majority Labor 
Government, and the South Australian officers hoped for some change in 
attitude in view of the new Government's readiness to over-rule the 
Commissioner on other issues. Negotiations were initiated with the 
Postmaster-General and Attorney-General, with a view to settlement of 
the claims through a mediator, but by the end of 1911 it became clear 
that the Labor Government had no intention of recognising so-called 
legal rights whose claimants were unprepared to prove their case in a 
court of law. Negotiations were discontinued, and the officers looked 
to the Opposition for sources of support.
Members of Parliament from South Australia were prepared to take up 
their case and towards the end of 1912, succeeded in debating the matter 
in both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Representatives, Gordon 
(Boothby) outlined the course of events since the constitutional promise 
had been made, and pointed out that promises by the federalists both at 
the Federal Convention in Adelaide and elsewhere had been broken since 
officers had suffered loss through federation. He implied that the 
Government had withdrawn its initial offer to allow arbitration through 
a mediator and had sheltered behind legal technicalities, refusing to
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act except as a result of court action, although it had been admitted
that it was within its powers to recognise the claims on its own 
19initiative. Other speakers took up the same theme of breach of faith, 
whatever the legal complexities, and attacked the Government for its 
proposal that the officers should take their case to the Arbitration 
Court although the latter was responsible for its own procedure. In the
Senate, Senator Vardon (S.A.) moved that a Select Committee be set up to
)
inquire into the claims, and again stressed that the 1904 classification
20negated the intentions expressed at the Second Federal Convention.
The Government made little reply to the attacks, beyond indicating 
that South Australian officers could present their case to the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, but the reasons for 
its disinclination to satisfy the claims may easily be inferred. The 
Labor Government saw no reason to act upon claims which had been 
steadfastly denied by previous governments, on official legal advice by 
experts in constitutional law. If any guarantee had been given, it had not 
been a party to it, and felt no moral commitment on its part to uphold 
doubtful obligations which leading federalists had for so long been in a 
position to fulfil themselves. The 'rights' which the South Australian 
officers were asserting had been claimed by no other group, and
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 66, pp. 3231-9. 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 67, p. 3157.
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constituted privileges as against the conditions under which other public 
servants were expected to work. In the absence of legal proof the 
Government would not concede that rights existed, although should the 
South Australian officers succeed in gaining the approval of the Court 
of Conciliation and Arbitration for their case the Government would 
honour its commitments. In fact attempts during the First World War by 
the South Australian officers to gain consideration by the Court failed 
when it declared constitutional determinations outside its jurisdiction.
After the war the matter was taken up by another association.
At its 1919 Annual Conference, the Commonwealth Public Service
Clerical Association decided to apply for legal advice on the rights
to increments, emoluments and exemption from retiring age. Favourable
advice being received on the latter a test case was selected and a writ
21issued in the High Court against the Commonwealth. F.L. Le Leu a 
Customs Officer, had received notification of compulsory retirement on 
reaching the age of 65 on 20.9.1920. He claimed he was entitled to 
remain in the Service until death, a right preserved by Section 84 of the 
Constitution and Section 60 of the Public Service Act 1902.
The Commonwealth denied the claim on the ground that:
(i) As the South Australian Civil Service Act 1874 was silent 
upon the question of retiring age, public servants were dismissible at
21Le Leu v. Commonwealth (1921) 29 C.L.R. 305.
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p l e a s u r e  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  c o n t r a r y  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n ;  and
( i i )  J u s t  a s  r i g h t s  u n d e r  a S t a t e  s t a t u t e  c o u l d  be v a r i e d  by a 
S t a t e  P a r l i a m e n t ,  t h e  Commonweal th P a r l i a m e n t  was a l s o  f r e e  t o  v a r y  them .
22The High  C o u r t  u p h e l d  t h e  c l a i m  o f  Le Leu.  I t  h e l d  t h a t  S e c t i o n  28 
o f  t h e  1874 C i v i l  S e r v i c e  Ac t  had  i m p l i e d  a d e f i n i t e  r i g h t  t o  t e n u r e ,  
i t s  t e r m s  b e i n g  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  d i s m i s s a l  a t  p l e a s u r e ,  and t h a t  t h i s  
r i g h t  was p r e s e r v e d  t h r o u g h  S e c t i o n  60 o f  t h e  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e  Ac t  1902,  
w h i c h  d e a l t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  w i t h  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t r a n s f e r r e d  o f f i c e r s .  I t  
t h e r e f o r e  d i s s e n t e d  f r o m  C o u s i n s  v .  Commonweal th , i n  w h i c h  i t  had b e e n  
h e l d  t h a t  o t h e r  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e  Ac t  1902 o v e r - r o d e  
S e c t i o n  60.  I n  a m i n o r i t y  j u d g m e n t  H i g g i n s  J .  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t  w o u ld  
h a v e  b e e n  p r e s e r v e d  u n d e r  S e c t i o n  84 o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
C o u s i n s  V .  Commonweal th a s  r e f e r r i n g  o n l y  t o  s a l a r y  and  t o  an  Ac t  o f  t h e  
V i c t o r i a n  P a r l i a m e n t  w h i c h  c o u l d  be  c o n s t r u e d  a s  o n l y  t e m p o r a r y  i n  e f f e c t .
The C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  R e c o g n i t i o n
The i m m e d i a t e  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  Le Leu c a s e  was t h a t  Le Leu was
r e - i n s t a t e d ,  and o t h e r  S o u th  A u s t r a l i a n  ' c l a s s i f i e d '  o f f i c e r s  ( a b o u t  300)
23w e r e  a l l o w e d  t o  c o n t i n u e  i n  t h e  S e r v i c e  b eyond  t h e  ag e  o f  65 .  The 
22 ' T h e  G o v e r n o r  may r e q u i r e  any o f f i c e r  who h a s  become i n c a p a c i t a t e d  f o r  
t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  h i s  d u t i e s ,  t o  r e s i g n  h i s  o f f i c e ,  an d ,  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  
n o n - c o m p l i a n c e ,  may remove s u c h  o f f i c e r ,  who s h a l l  t h e r e u p o n  be e n t i t l e d  
t o  t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  p r o v i d e d  by t h i s  A c t . '
23 The a r r a n g e m e n t s  made may be  f o u n d  i n  t h e  1 7 t h  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  P u b l i c  
S e r v i c e  C o m m i s s i o n e r ,  pp .  1 1 -1 2 .
99
officers who had been compulsorily retired between 1901 and 1921 lodged
claims for compensation, and the basis of damages for breach of contract
24was decided in Lucy v. Commonwealth. Although the Le Leu case had 
laid down the general principle that rights which had been binding 
against colonial governments remained binding against the Commonwealth, 
the South Australian officers did not attempt to take their other claims, 
on emoluments, increments or furlough to the High Court, and these 
were tacitly abandoned.
The reversal of the decision in Cousins v. Commonwealth may be 
attributed partly to the altered composition of the High Court, and to 
the changed attitude towards public servants' rights in which the 
obligations of the state had become more clearly defined. The 
recognition of transferred officers' rights in general by the High Court 
brought with it new problems of interpretation. For example what was 
the effect of State legislation subsequent to federation on transferred 
officers' rights? Where substantially the same limitation on rights 
existed in both State and Commonwealth legislation, were differences in 
procedure as between the statutes of importance? Could powers exercised 
by a State authority be exercised by a corresponding Commonwealth 
authority where the powers were identical? In assessing damages should 
salary be assessed as at date of transfer or at current salary rates?
24Lucy v. Commonwealth (1923) 33 C.L.R. 229.
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Some of these questions were never fully answered, but they were 
complicating factors in the cases which followed.
Le Leu v. Commonwealth did not provoke an overwhelming mass of
litigation. The discretionary wording of many State legislative
provisions had not yielded enforceable rights, legislation in two States
which could have affected transferred officers' rights came into effect
too late to do so, Commonwealth legislation in some cases improved upon
State conditions, and a major area of rights, that of pensions, had been
honoured by the Commonwealth. South Australian officers brought other
cases, but the courts showed considerable caution in extending their
25rights. Thus, Bradshaw brought a case claiming that he could not be 
dismissed on grounds of incapacity under the Commonwealth Public Service 
Act 1922 as the 1874 Act vested dismissal for incapacity in the Governor 
of South Australia, who could enforce it only after requesting 
resignation. Higgins J. and Isaacs J. were prepared to uphold Bradshaw's 
claims, as the due procedure had not been carried out, but the majority 
judgment held that Bradshaw could have been dismissed for incapacity 
under the State legislation, and had no right to any particular 
procedure.
25Bradshaw v. Commonwealth (1925) 36 C.L.R. 585.
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Other cases failed not on principle, but because on examination the
claims of the officers were faulty. Among such failures may be counted
Schedlich, a postal clerk, whose right to increments had not been
recognised in the 1904 classification, but who was found to have reached
the top of his class by transfer so that the increments he had gained
27since then had not been in virtue of State rights; and Ferguson, whose
broken service in South Australia had deprived him of status as a 
'non-classified' officer, a class discontinued in 1881, and thus of 
claiming the life tenure conferred on this class by legislation in 1890.
These two cases follow a pattern of litigation which had been 
established earlier, where the legacy of colonial maladministration 
caused difficulty. In this area the courts provided a means of appeal 
from decisions of the administration, but it is doubtful whether they 
handled more than a small fraction of the grievances of individual public 
servants. Most confined their protest to letters to their staff 
associations which did their best to sift the legitimate claims and 
contact the authorities, but which were wary of expensive litigation on 
behalf of causes which would benefit only an individual or perhaps a 
small group. When cases did reach the courts they were dealt with 
through strict statutory interpretation. Within this category fall the
9 Schedlich v. Commonwealth (1926) 38 C.L.R. 518.
Ferguson v. Commonwealth (1938) 61 G.L.R. 516.27
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cases of Mason, a telegraph line repairer whose name had been in
error included in a list of those exempted from the superannuation
provisions of the N.S.W. Civil Service Act 1884 and whose pension on
29retirement had been diminished in consequence; Hendy-Pooley who in
contravention of the 1884 legislation had been employed in a temporary
capacity by the New South Wales Public Service for six years before
permanent employment and wished to include this period in his pension
30calculation; and Blaney, the breaks in whose service with the Victorian 
Government had coincided with the passage of retrospective legislation 
in 1883 which would have preserved his pension under the 1862 Civil 
Service Act, thus depriving him of its benefits.
In recognising the rights of transferred officers the decision in 
the Le Leu case had had the effect of crystallising these rights as at 
the time of federation, so that subsequent State or Commonwealth 
legislation was ineffective against them. The principle was still not 
entirely clear, since the possibility still existed that the rights of 
the transferred officers could be interpreted as those not at the date 
of transfer, but those which would have applied had they not transferred 
to the Commonwealth. The issue was finally decided in the cases which 
occurred during the Depression, when certain groups of transferred
28Mason v. Commonwealth (1910) 10 C.L.R. 655.
29Hendy-Pooley v. Commonwealth (1912) 13 C.L.R. 609.
30Blaney v. Commonwealth (Jl917) 23 C.L.R. 177.
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o f f i c e r s  c l a im e d  e xem pt ion  from m ea su res  t a k e n  t o  r e d u c e  s a l a r i e s ,  
a l l o w a n c e s  and p e n s i o n s  and to  r e t r e n c h  s t a f f .
31The f i r s t  c a s e  was b r o u g h t  by F l i n t ,  a t r a n s f e r r e d  V i c t o r i a n  
o f f i c e r ,  who had r e t i r e d  i n  1924, and whose r e t i r i n g  a l l o w a n c e ,  to  
which he had a r i g h t  under  t h e  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  Act  1862, had been  r ed u c e d  
under  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  Emergency Act  1931. F l i n t  c l a im e d  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
be tw een  t h e  amount he had r e c e i v e d  and th e  f u l l  p e n s i o n .  Had he 
rem ained  i n  t h e  V i c t o r i a n  s e r v i c e  h i s  p e n s i o n  would have  been r educ e d  
unde r  t h e  V i c t o r i a n  F i n a n c i a l  Emergency Act 1931. The High Cour t  h e l d  
t h a t  t h e  r i g h t s  p r e s e r v e d  by S e c t i o n  84 were t h o s e  a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  p e r i o d  
o f  t im e ,  t r a n s f o r m i n g  them from o r d i n a r y  s t a t u t o r y  r i g h t s  c a p a b l e  o f  
change  th ro u g h  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i o n ,  i n t o  a b s o l u t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t s  
immune from a l t e r a t i o n  e i t h e r  by th e  Commonwealth o r  V i c t o r i a n  
P a r l i a m e n t s .  F l i n t ' s  p e n s io n  was t h e r e f o r e  exempt f rom any r e d u c t i o n .
The p r i n c i p l e  was f o l l o w e d  a y e a r  l a t e r  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  Pember ton  v .
32Commonwealth i n  which  a V i c t o r i a n  p o s t a l  o f f i c e r  who had been d e p r i v e d  
o f  a p e n s i o n  t h r o u g h  an anomaly o f  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  l e g i s l a t i o n  had 
been  g r a n t e d  one under  t h e  Commonwealth S u p e r a n n u a t i o n  Act  1922. He 
c la im e d  t h e  h i g h e r  p e n s io n  which  he would have r e c e i v e d  had he rem a ined  
i n  t h e  V i c t o r i a n  S e r v i c e  as  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  l e g i s l a t i o n
~^F l i n t  v .  Commonwealth (1932)  47 C.L .R.  274.
32 Pember ton  v.  Commonwealth (1933)  49 C.L .R .  382.
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passed by the Victorian Parliament in 1926 to correct the anomaly. The 
High Court refused to uphold the claim, since no right to the pension 
existed at the date of transfer, and subsequent action by the State 
legislature did not fall within the terms of Section 84 of the Constitution.
The policy of retrenchment carried out by the Commonwealth
government affected the rights of those South Australian officers, who,
though over the age of 65, claimed immunity from retirement in accordance
with the decision in the Le Leu case. Retrenchment of these officers
took place under powers exercised by the Public Service Board in
accordance with the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1922 Section 20, which
allowed retirement of excess officers. The action was challenged in a
33test case brought by Edwards, a telegraphist, whose office had been 
abolished in 1932 and who was retired soon afterwards. The case was 
rejected by the High Court on the grounds that under Section 14 of the 
1874 Civil Service Act, power existed to alter the establishment of 
departments and retrench staff. On appeal, however, it was held that 
under State legislation, retrenchment could only take place where an 
excess of officers existed in a department taken as a whole, while under 
the Commonwealth an excess in a particular classification was sufficient. 
Since Edwards' retrenchment did not fall within the State provision, it 
was held he had been wrongfully dismissed. The Court avoided considering
33Edwards v. Commonwealth (1936) 54 C.L.R. 313.
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whether the powers exercisable by the Governor of South Australia could
be exercised by the Governor General. Two cases, Ryan and Shephard v.
34Commonwealth, followed to settle the basis of compensation.
The implication of the Depression cases was that certain officers,
by virtue of their constitutional rights could claim exemption from
government policy applying to public servants as a whole. The courts
were strict in confining the application of the rights to those officers
compulsorily transferred at federation, and later transfers or voluntary
changes in employment were definitely excluded from its operation. Thus
35it was ruled that Trower, a Queensland officer transferred to the office
of the Director of Lands in the Northern Territory whose employment did
36not extend from a date prior to federation, and Cosway, a blacksmith 
whose employment record had followed the vicissitudes of the Williamstown 
Naval Dockyard, were unable to claim constitutional protection of their 
rights.
The Impact of Transferred Officers' Rights upon Later Commonwealth Practice 
It took until 1960 before it was finally ensured that the 
constitutional rights of transferred officers had disappeared, and 
Section 45 of the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1922-59 (which had
34Ryan and Shephard v. Commonwealth (1936) 57 C.L.R. 136.
35Trower v. Commonwealth (1923) 32 C.L.R. 585 and (1924) 34 C.L.R. 587.
36Cosway v. Commonwealth (1942) 65 C.L.R. 628.
106
replaced Section 60 of the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902) was 
repealed. Section 84 still remains in the Constitution, but its force 
is spent. The length of time taken for the effects of the constitutional 
guarantee to disappear may be illustrated by the necessity as late as 
1956 to renew the Transferred Officers' Allowance Act, originally passed 
in 1948, to grant an increase in pensions to Western Australian 
transferred officers whose pension rights under the 1871 Superannuation 
Act had been preserved under Section 84 of the Constitution. Their pensions 
were varied in accordance not with Commonwealth increases in superannuation, 
but with increases made by the Western Australian legislature. The 
Commonwealth Government accepted the obligation to increase these non­
contributory pensions, but refused to go beyond it to confer the more 
generous increases which were paid about the same time to Commonwealth 
officers.
Although the legal obligations of the Commonwealth related only to 
officers transferred at federation, consciousness of a general obligation 
to officers transferred from one authority to another remains. The 
lesson of the constitutional rights however has been learned, and care 
has been taken to specify exactly which conditions of work, irrespective 
of their previous legal standing, are considered as rights against the 
Commonwealth. Thus the Officers' Rights Declaration Act 1928-40 specifies 
the rights an officer of the Commonwealth Public Service who is 
transferred to certain Commonwealth authorities takes with him, viz.
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leave on ground of illness, long service leave or pay in lieu thereof,
superannuation, child endowment, and in the case of female officers,
payment on marriage. Alternatively he may elect to become subject to
the rule of the authority, and the case of an officer temporarily
transferred and then re-employed in the Commonwealth Public Service is 
37also covered. Similarly, in the case of State officers or employees
of Commonwealth instrumentalities transferred to the Commonwealth Public
Service because of extended Commonwealth functions or re-organisation,
provision has been made in the Commonwealth Public Service Act that
remuneration should not be less favourable than previously, that prior
service should be reckoned as Commonwealth service and that sick leave,
recreation leave and furlough credits and entitlements should be 
38preserved. An alternative approach has been taken by the New South
Wales Public Service Board when re-organisation involved transfer of
employees from different authorities:
The price of uniformity was to select the best conditions from 
each service and amalgamate them... Slowly but surely order 
and uniformity have been introduced, but generally only at the 
expense of giving much of the best of everything or of 
recompensing employees for lost privileges in their former 
employment.39
37Officers' Rights Declaration Act 1928-40, Sections 5 and 6.
38Commonwealth Public Service Act 1922-60, Sections 81A - 81ZL.
39W.C. Wurth, 'Some public service management problems in New South Wales 
Public Administration (Sydney), XIX, March 1960, p.36. The reference is 
to the establishment of the Electricity Commission, involving employees 
from the Department of Public Works, Sydney County Council, Department 
of Railways and private power authorities.
CHAPTER 5
RIGHT TO TENURE OF OFFICE
Factors Upholding the Right to Tenure
The need cf the state for a permanent specialised workforce on the 
one hand and for flexibility in accordance with democratic control on 
the other, are responsible for a distinctive relationship between the 
state and its employees, expressed in a different form from other types 
of relationship. The ability of the voluntary association to rely upon 
the loyalty of its members without the need for formal ties, or the 
purely monetary arrangement expressed in the contract governing private 
employment are insufficient to guarantee the needs of the state.'*' 
Similarly the compulsion which characterises military employment, while 
it guarantees a permanent relationship, is out of place where civilians 
are concerned.^
The failure of the concept of contract to meet the situation in public 
employment may be illustrated by the tortuous legal arguments and 
uncertainties in common law countries, where attempts have been made 
to stipulate the contract as the basis of public employment while 
depriving it of its major characteristics. See Bond v. Commonwealth 
(1903) 1 C.L.R. 13 at pp. 23-4. In Commonwealth v. Quince (1944) 68 C.L.R. 
227 at p. 242, it was held that no contract existed in civil as well as 
military employment. It has also been contended that the contract 
relationship is no longer applicable in private employment. See 
K.S. Carlston, Law and Structure of Social Action, New York, 1956, pp. 245-6. 
2The compulsory nature of military employment may be illustrated by the 
case of Marks v. Commonwealth (1964) 38 A.L.J.R. 140, in which it was held 
that at common law the resignation of an office under the Crown requires 
acceptance to make it effective.
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The common law doctrine of dismissibility at pleasure which is
formally accepted in Australia as well as in Britain emphasises the
necessity for flexibility in extreme terms notwithstanding the desire
for security on the part of public servants and the requirements of a
permanent workforce. The common law doctrine has lingered on in Britain,
as the strength of the executive has been considered sufficient guarantee
of employee security. In Australia the doctrine applies only to
officials not appointed under public service legislation who cannot
claim the protection of its provisions. The position may be illustrated
3by the case of Carey v. Commonwealth, in which it was held that the
Director of the Northern Territory who had been appointed with a fixed
term of office under an Executive Minute had no grounds on which to sue
for wrongful dismissal when his appointment was terminated before the
term was completed. R.S. Parker has similarly remarked on the weak
position of officials in statutory offices subject to removal by
Parliament as compared with those appointed under public service
legislation, and upon the situation where such officials are expected to
4act independently in the public interest.
The effect of the statutory procedures safeguarding the security of 
the Commonwealth officer is to over-ride the common law assertion of
3Carey v. Commonwealth (1921) 30 C.L.R. 132.
4R.S. Parker, 'Public Service Neutrality: a Moral Problem, the Creighton 
Case' in B.B. Schaffer and D.C. Corbett, Decisions: Case Studies in 
Australian Administration, Melbourne, 1965, pp. 201-222.
no
dismissibility at pleasure.“* Therefore although no explicit right to 
continued employment is to be found in the Public Service Act, it is 
generally assumed that once an officer has been appointed and served 
the compulsory probation period, his future career is assured until the 
age of 60 (optional retirement) or 65 (compulsory retirement) when he 
will be entitled to a pension augmented by the Commonwealth based on 
the size of his contributions over his working life, and when he dies
ß
his widow will similarly be cared for.
The security of tenure extended by statute is further buttressed by 
an emphasis on caution, security and order, perhaps resulting from 
climatic and geographical factors or the attitudes of an originally
Dismissibility at pleasure has been incorporated into public service 
legislation in New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania. In the 
Commonwealth, the common law position is overruled by the procedures of 
the Public Service Act. See Gould v. Stuart (1896) 17 N.S.W.L.R. 331 
and Williamson v. Commonwealth (1907) 5 C.L.R.:
’It seems to be beyond question that in the case of an officer 
under the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902 there is no right to 
dismiss at will, or otherwise than in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed in the Act.' (Higgins J. at p. 179)0
Superannuation Act 1922-65, Section 37. The same assumption is not 
applicable to female officers. Upon her marriage a female officer must 
retire from the Service, receiving a bonus payment according to length 
of service. Married women may only be retained if there are special 
reasons in the public interest for doing so. In practice, married women 
tend to be re-appointed, or initially appointed, in a temporary 
capacity. The rule is under consideration at the time of writing.
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migrant people questing security as a major motive of settlement. The 
acceptance of the legitimacy of permanent employment in general modifies 
the exceptional nature of public employment and helps to ensure the 
security of the individual public servant. The atmosphere of security 
is enhanced by inbuilt factors affecting a large organisation whose 
permanence is assured. Minor fault is more easily hidden and 
responsibility less easy to allocate; complicated processes deter easy 
dismissal; work relationships tend to be more tolerant and status 
differentials narrower; and in the face of the general impersonality the 
small unit acquires its own friendships and interests against the rest 
of the organisation making strict action difficult as compared with 
highly personalised medium or small-scale enterprise where employer is 
clearly distinguished from employee. Further guarantee is extended by 
the existence of strong public service associations, which protect general 
job security for their members by insistence on the carrying out of due 
procedures, and watchfulness against the undermining of conditions.
They are prepared to intervene on behalf of the individual member if the 
latter's case is strong, or where a test case is involved, although they 
are reluctant to act where an individual is attempting to assert a
^The preference for security appears to be reflected for example in the 
extent of regulation of industry through enforceable arbitration award, 
and the premium placed on the continued existence of organisations 
employing large numbers, at the price of government subsidy for possibly 
inefficient working.
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privilege over other members, or his case is poor and its pursuit may- 
damage good relations with the authorities or other associations.
They provide a more powerful voice, a kind of anonymous front for the 
individual who may find difficulty in defending his own interests or 
disturbing general smooth running semi-personal relationships of his 
work situation. It would only be in exceptional circumstances that an 
individual would venture to challenge the authorities through means 
outside the public service itself, as to do so would arouse an 
antagonism which would make concession and compromise almost impossible 
and strain relationships to such an extent that victory would be of 
comparatively little advantage, unless accompanied by arrangements for 
transfer or monetary recompense together with a decision to leave the 
Service. Such outside sanctions nevertheless provide protection through 
their existence, and include the normal channels open to any citizen 
aggrieved by governmental action such as newspaper publicity or approach 
to a Member of Parliament or political party. Recourse to such channels 
is rare, not only because of the factors mentioned, but also because of 
the careful definition of statutory procedures governing termination of 
employment.
The Limitations to Security
The concept of dismissibility at pleasure is the expression of the 
subordination of the officer's security of employment to the public good.
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The Australian approach is essentially no different, but allows for 
officers' rights by specifying in legislation the causes for which an 
officer's services may be terminated, and outlining the procedures which 
must be adhered to in each case. The remainder of this chapter is 
concerned with the procedures applicable to the major causes of possible 
termination of service before normal retirement - retrenchment, 
misconduct and incapacity.
g
(a) Retrenchment
It is a well-accepted principle of public service management that the 
permanent staff should be kept somewhat below strength, and fluctuations 
in workflow should be dealt with by the employment of temporary staff, 
who are not given any claim upon continued employment. This practice 
aims to ensure economy, for only the number of employees required is 
employed at any one time, while disruption of the major part of the 
public service through constant turnover of staff is avoided. It has 
the additional effect of ensuring security to permanent officers by 
encouraging a cautious approach to the creation of permanent positions. 
Provision is however made for the Public Service Board to transfer and 
in the last resort retire officers to even out staffing excesses or
g
Strictly speaking 'retrenchment' used only for the compulsory 
termination of the services of an exempt or temporary employee because 
his services are no longer required. For the purposes of this 
discussion the term has been expanded to include the premature 
retirement of excess permanent officers allowed for in the Public 
Service Act.
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s h o r t a g e s .  I t  i s  o b l i g e d  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  f i n d  an  e x c e s s  o f f i c e r  a p o s i t i o n  
o f  e q u a l  s t a t u s ;  i f  non e i s  a v a i l a b l e  i t  may t r a n s f e r  h im t o  a l o w er  
p o s i t i o n ;  and o n l y  i f  no p o s i t i o n  c a n  be  fo u n d  may he  be  r e t i r e d  f r o m  t h e  
S e r v i c e .  Such an  o f f i c e r  o f  t e n  y e a r s ’ s t a n d i n g  o r  more  w o u ld  be e n t i t l e d  
t o  a r e f u n d  o f  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  S u p e r a n n u a t i o n  Fund p l u s  t h e  
p r o p o r t i o n a l  Commonweal th c o n t r i b u t i o n ,  and i f  o f  l e s s  t h a n  t e n  y e a r s '  
s t a n d i n g ,  o n l y  t o  r e f u n d  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s . ^  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  p e r m a n e n t  
o f f i c e r s  a r e  n o t  r e t r e n c h e d  and when r e d u c t i o n s  o f  s t a f f  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  
t h e y  a r e  made f r o m  among t e m p o r a r y  and exem pt  e m p l o y e e s .
The s e r v i c e s  o f  t e m p o r a r y  e m p l o y e e s  may be  d i s p e n s e d  w i t h  a t  any 
t i m e ,  and c o n t i n u e d  em ploym ent  i s  d e p e n d e n t  on t h e  a n n u a l  c e r t i f i c a t e  o f  
t h e  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e  B o a r d . ^  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  l o n g - s t a n d i n g  
n a t u r e  o f  some t e m p o r a r y  em p lo y m en t ,  i t  h a s  become a c c e p t e d  t h a t  t e m p o r a r y  
o r  exempt  e m p l o y e e s  do h av e  some c l a i m  upon  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n .  Thus  
t e m p o r a r y  e m p l o y e e s  o f  more  t h a n  f i v e  y e a r s '  c o n t i n u o u s  s e r v i c e  g a i n e d  
s u p e r a n n u a t i o n  r i g h t s  i n  1942, f u r l o u g h  r i g h t s  i n  1943 and t h e  r i g h t  t o  
a  d i s c i p l i n a r y  p r o c e d u r e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  o f f i c e r s  i n  1947.  S h o u ld  
r e t r e n c h m e n t  become n e c e s s a r y ,  e m p l o y e e s  a r e  d i s p e n s e d  w i t h  i n  o r d e r ,  
c o - i n c i d i n g  w i t h  t h e  c l a i m  i t  i s  f e l t  e a c h  p o s s e s s e s  f o r  c o n t i n u e d  
em p lo y m en t  b a s e d  on a c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  c r i t e r i a  o f  l e n g t h  o f  s e r v i c e ,
9
P u b l i c  S e r v i c e  A c t ,  S e c t i o n  20.
S u p e r a n n u a t i o n  A c t ,  S e c t i o n s  3 0 - 1 .
^ P u b l i c  S e r v i c e  A c t ,  S e c t i o n  8 2 ( 6 ) .
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efficiency and social responsibilities. Those with less than twelve 
months' service are retrenched first on a 'last on, first off' basis; 
secondly employees over 65 and married women not dependent on earnings, 
according firstly to efficiency and in the event of equal efficiency 
according to length of service; thirdly, other employees listed 
according to relative efficiency and in the event of equal efficiency, 
according to length of service, but subject to family considerations and 
returned servicemen's preference."^
Retrenchment becomes necessary because the number of persons employed 
exceeds that required for the amount of work which has to be done. An 
overall excess, during a period of expanding government services and 
general shortage of labour, is less likely than excess employees in 
particular areas at particular times due to local fluctuations. Another 
cause, possibly of greater significance in the future, affecting 
permanent as well as temporary positions, is redundancy through 
automation of work processes. It is usually accepted that automation 
should not cause overall unemployment, but may call for redirection of 
manpower, learning of new skills and so on. In private employment, the 
employer usually claims to be free from responsibility in this area.
In the public sector it may be held that greater responsibility should 
be assumed by the public employer in view of its promise on recruitment
12General Orders 13/B/l.
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of a 'career', because special skills may be involved which had been 
acquired purely for the needs of the public service and in order to set 
an example to the rest of the community. In fact it is doubtful whether 
redundancy in the public service would be met by wholesale retrenchment, 
which would be contrary to the general assumptions regarding job 
security. It is more likely that staff would be reduced over time by 
failing to recruit replacements for those who retired. The problem 
cannot be considered as one that affects the public service alone, and 
the matter of rights is affected by government policy in general towards 
automation, the extent of the problem, the state of the employment market, 
and the strength and attitude of unions.
Retrenchment may also be caused through government economic policy,
as in 1951 when retrenchments were instituted in order to redistribute
13labour in a period of overfull employment. No permanent staff were 
involved, but it is a debatable point to what extent the career official 
should be expected to bear disproportionately the impact of political 
decisions, or a government should be entitled to use its power as employer 
as a factor in its economic policy. According to the theory of the 
sovereignty of the state, or of the law, such action is completely 
legitimate and it may be argued that the potential insecurity which 
the officer suffers is similar to that which the private employee
G.E. Caiden, Career Service, Melbourne, 1965, pp. 341-6.13
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accepts if his employer is unable to remain in business. The public 
servant has no freehold tenure of his office, and the protection extended 
to employment has never been comparable to that extended to property, 
even though each may represent livelihood to its possessor. The sub­
ordination to the public interest, as represented by government policy 
ultimately responsible to the electorate, which is a characteristic of 
the public service, may similarly be held to govern this area, and it 
is difficult to find any basis for a right to security in this formulation.
Nevertheless, should such a practice become frequent, effects on morale
14within the public service could be serious, and the restraints which 
should characterise the use of power in a democracy may be held to have 
been infringed. The security which provides the basis of loyalty within 
the public service should not be lightly undermined for reasons not 
connected with the individual officer's conduct and efficiency.
(b) Misconduct
The fundamental principle which governs the treatment of alleged 
misconduct in the Commonwealth Public Service is that
14See F.M. Marx, The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy, 
Chicago, 1957, p. 99.
^Discussion includes general disciplinary procedure, which is almost 
identical whether it results in dismissal or a lesser penalty.
Problems of the definition of misconduct and types of misconduct not 
subject to the normal disciplinary procedure, including the questions 
of loyalty, criminal offences and strikes, have been given more detailed 
study in a later chapter.
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No officer may be punished or dismissed without a full 
inquiry and proper consideration of the reasons for his 
offence.16
Attempts to establish entitlement to regular non-personalised processes 
of disciplinary appeal were an early subject of legislation in Australian 
colonial services, and the principle is now interpreted as the right of 
an officer to appeal to a specially constituted tribunal against the 
authorities which originally charged him with the offence.
The disciplinary appeal procedures enjoy considerable confidence, due
only in part to the nature of the formal procedures themselves, defects
in which are compensated by the manner in which appeals are conducted.
The boards of appeal or inquiry,^ like those in the State public
services, contain an elected representative of the public servants, so
that discipline ceases to be a matter solely for senior officers in
their discretion; a departmental representative, who is not the charging
officer; and a legally qualified chairman. The members are under oath
or affirmation to perform their duties and exercise their powers 'without
18fear or favour affection or ill-will', and although complaints have
16Training Document No. 1, Public Service Board, p. 27.
^First Division officers are entitled to a board of inquiry if they 
deny the truth of a charge, and punishment is recommended by the Public 
Service Board to the Governor-General. The composition of the board of 
inquiry is not specified in the Public Service Act and Regulations, 
except that it should not include the person by whom the charge was 
made.
Public Service Act, Fifth Schedule.18
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occasionally been made that the departmental representative may have 
knowledge of the case before it comes before him, the seriousness with 
which the obligation is taken and a certain awareness of the role 
expected, irrespective of that assumed outside the hearings of the board, 
make for impartiality in practice.
The disciplinary appeal process is isolated from the normal
departmental administration on the one hand and from the courts of law
19on the other. In some State services the appeal tribunals are 
organised under separate legislation and fulfil purposes other than 
disciplinary appeal, while in New South Wales and South Australia, the 
chairman is not a public servant but a member of the judiciary. In the 
Commonwealth the separation is not carried as far, and usually all the 
members of the tribunal are public servants, but the tribunal's decisions 
are final and cannot be changed by the Public Service Board, except in 
the case of a recommendation to dismiss.
No further appeal may lie from a board of appeal or inquiry, and the 
extent to which decisions are subject to judicial review through common 
law action for breach of statutory duty, prerogative writ or declaration 
is unclear. The former would only lie if the statutory procedure had 
been carried out incorrectly. The prerogative writs only lie where the
19New South Wales, Western Australia and Tasmania.
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'rights of subjects' are affected, and at common' law apart from statute,
20public servants have no enforceable rights. The Supreme Court of New
South Wales has asserted its authority to intervene by way of judicial
21review of decisions made by the New South Wales Crown Employees Board
and it has been suggested that similar considerations would also apply
22to similar Commonwealth tribunals. It has also been suggested that
a tribunal's decision is immune from attack provided that 
it 'is a bona fide attempt to exercise its power, that it 
relates to the subject matter of the legislation, and that 
it is reasonably capable of reference to the power given to 
the body'.23
A proliferation of appeals does not necessarily ensure fairness, and
in any case the tribunal, like those in the State public services, is
directed to investigate the case before it
without regard to legal forms and solemnities and to direct 
itself by the best evidence which it can procure or which 
is laid before it, whether the evidence is such as the law 
would require or admit in other cases or not.24
Although the board is given power to decide its own procedure, the
officer has certain minimum rights. He must be given the charge and have
20R. v. Metrop» Police Commissioner ex parte Parker t[1953) 2 All E.R. 717.
^ Ex parte Wurth re Tully (1954) 55 S.R. (N.S.W.) 47. However the 
G.E.A.B. differs from the Commonwealth tribunals because of the judicial 
element in its composition and the requirement for it to keep a written 
record.
22W. Friedmann and D.G. Benjafield, Principles of Australian Administrative 
Law, Sydney, 2nd ed., 1962, p. 166.
23R. Anderson 'The Application of Privative Clauses to Proceedings of 
Commonwealth Tribunals', University of Queensland Law Journal, Vol. 3, 
p. 51, 1956-9.
24Public Service Act, Section 57(2).
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time to prepare his case; he is entitled to legal representation, to 
receive copies of documents where practicable seven days before the 
hearing, to receive at least seven days’ notice of hearing, and to 
refuse to answer any question which would tend to incriminate him.
He is not entitled to receive a written record of proceedings, to know 
reasons for the decision, or to appeal against (a) his punishment (b) a 
decision that his appeal was ’frivolous or vexatious' so that he 
becomes liable to pay all the costs of the case (c) an order by the 
Public Service Board on the recommendation of the Chief Officer that his 
salary be forfeit during a period of suspension (d) non-recommendation 
of payment of expenses where a charge is not proved.
Despite the establishment of judicial type procedures which are
distinct from departmental administration, discipline in both
Commonwealth and State public services remains primarily a function of
the department and the extent of the powers which may be exercised by
authorised officers without appeal varies. Offences are generally
divided into minor and major categories. In the case of the former,
the Chief Officer of a Commonwealth department or his delegate may
reprimand the officer or fine up to 10/-. In Tasmania and Victoria fines
25may also be imposed but in other States only reprimands may be issued. 
25In Tasmania up to £1 and in Victoria up to £5 with right of appeal to 
the Minister.
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The summary procedure is abandoned where the offence is deemed more
serious, a formal charge in writing must be issued, and the officer may
be suspended from his duties. The Chief Officer, on receiving the reply
to the charge, may then inflict a full range of punishments against which
the officer may appeal except in the case of a fine of £2 or under.
In the State services, the powers of departments, after laying the
charge, are more restricted: in New South Wales, South Australia and
Victoria, power exists only to refer the charge to the Public Service
Board; in Western Australia a fine up to £10 may be inflicted with appeal
to the Public Service Commissioner and in Tasmania a fine up to £5 with
appeal to the Public Service Appeal Board only if the fine is above £2.
Commonwealth procedure therefore differs from that of other Australian
public services, in that initial punishment is decided within the
department, and no appeal is allowed against a fine. These differences
are not of great significance, firstly because the organisational context
within each service varies, making strict comparison difficult, and
secondly because, although a fine is recorded in the officer's personal 
2 6record the actual amount of fine against which there is no appeal, is, 
in terms of Australian salaries and spending habits very small, and 
would be considered analogous to similar summary fines for motoring 
offences.
2 6The record of punishment for a minor offence is kept for 2 years, and 
for other than a minor offence for 10 years. Regulation 24.
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The major characteristics of the Australian methods of dealing 
with misconduct are the formal right of appeal given to the officer, 
and the domestic nature of the proceedings. The result is a compromise 
between the rigid formal procedure of the courts of law and the arbitrary- 
discretion of the superior officer, between the rights of officers and 
administrative expense and convenience. Present processes, whatever 
formal loopholes may exist for injustice, are generally considered to 
work smoothly and protect officers' rights.
(c) Incapacity
Before permanent appointment to the Service, officers are required
to pass a medical examination so that it is hoped every recruit will be
able to perform his duties to retiring age. It may be necessary, however,
to retire officers prematurely if, due to invalidity, they become unfit
to carry out their duties efficiently. Statutory procedure demands
merely that the Public Service Board may, after report from the Chief
27Officer of the department and an investigation, retire the officer.
This procedure has been supplemented by provisions which make every 
effort to ensure the invalided officer receives full consideration.
Before reporting to the Public Service Board, the Chief Officer must 
receive a report on the officer from the Commonwealth Medical Officer, and 
if permanent incapacity is indicated, the Chief Officer must inform the
Public Service Act, Section 67.~21
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officer of his intention to recommend retirement and his right to submit 
within a specified time a written statement setting out reasons why such 
action should not be taken, which is forwarded to the Public Service 
Board. Usually retirement on invalidity will only be considered 
where an officer has been ill for a prolonged period and consequently 
has exhausted much or all of his credits for sick leave with pay. 
Departments are therefore exhorted to take care that no officer is left 
without income due to any gap between exhaustion of sick leave and 
commencement of superannuation payments, if necessary by taking 
advantage of powers under the Public Service Act to pre-date retirement
2
before completion of formalities (but only with the officer's consent).
Where an officer is retired on grounds of incapacity not due to his own
29fault, he is entitled to a full pension and is deemed to be on leave 
without pay, so that if he is reappointed, the period of retirement is 
not calculated as a break in service. The Public Service Board has 
power to re-employ a retired officer if it thinks his health is 
sufficiently improved, in which case the pension ceases, but only if 
the officer is receiving not less than two-thirds of his previous 
salary, or a salary as agreed. Similarly if the retired officer finds 
other employment or is re-employed in a temporary capacity, the pension
O O
General Orders 3/E/4.
Superannuation Act, Section 45.29
125
may be suspended if he earns more than two-thirds of his previous 
30salary. In addition if invalidity was caused by injury by accident
'arising out of or in the course of his employment', the officer is
entitled to receive compensation in accordance with the Commonwealth
Employees' Compensation Act 1930-62. The term 'injury' has been extended
to cover sudden illness as well as accident, if this occurs at a
31compensable time, although the matter is still in some doubt.
The provisions of the Public Service Act concerning incapacity are 
primarily intended to cover invalidity, but Section 67 also covers 
inefficiency or incompetency, where the same statutory procedure is 
applicable. The officer has the same right to show cause why he should 
not be transferred or retired. Occasional complaints have been made 
that this procedure is used to by-pass the procedure on misconduct, and 
that it violates an officer's rights as his file is not disclosed to him, 
nor is he allowed appeal against the decision of the Public Service Board. 
These criticisms become of less consequence when the nature of reasons for 
termination and prevailing mores in the public service are considered.
The judicial procedures which are suitable when it is necessary to decide 
whether a definite offence has been committed and what punishment should 
be allotted, irrespective of organisational considerations, may be less
30Ibid., Sections 64-5.
31P. Gerber, 'The Concept of "Injury" in Commonwealth Employees' 
Compensation Legislation', University of Queensland Law Journal, pp. 432-50, 
Apr. 1964. See Chapter 8 for fuller discussion.
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appropriate when the apportionment of blame is of less consequence than 
assessing the impact of an officer's manner of carrying out his tasks on 
the organisation of which he is a part. Further, it is likely that 
considerable tolerance would be shown towards any individual who for 
reasons of health or otherwise was failing to meet accepted standards in 
performing his duties. Work performance is often difficult to assess; it 
is possible environmental factors are responsible for slowness, carelessness 
and so on; superiors are reluctant to single out a person lest blame 
for conditions should rebound upon themselves; the decision to retire a 
person must be made by a number of authorities; and in the prevailing 
atmosphere of security and routine, in the absence of profit motive, 
preference would be not to sacrifice the individual except in extreme 
cases, or where retirement was obviously in the interests of the 
officer himself.
The experience of the Commonwealth Public Service in guaranteeing 
security to its officers while retaining the right to terminate their 
services in particular specified circumstances, demonstrates that it is 
possible to bring this area under the rule of law. The overall 
discretion held necessary to enable the state to exercise its 
sovereignty may be replaced by listing the causes for which termination 
of services may take place. Such an approach enhances the rights of
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officers, as cause must be assigned before termination of services may 
take place, and a definite procedure must be followed, eliminating the 
personal element in administering the provisions, and as a minimum 
involving collective decision-making. Although in practice the causes 
listed for termination of services may be comprehensive, and although 
the actual procedures involve considerable discretion on the part of the 
authorities, so that it would be difficult for any officer to challenge 
the administration through the courts except on technicalities, the 
legal rights conferred by the legislation are not without effect. The 
active intervention of the courts of law has been avoided, in view of 
their expense and technicality, the unwillingness of the officer to use 
such machinery, and their inherent unsuitability to decide matters of 
administration, but they remain as a sanction for the observance of due 
procedure. Essentially the security of the individual officer depends 
upon administrative and not judicial processes, and the general 
acceptance of the fairness of these procedures rests to a large extent 
upon the manner in which they are carried out.
CHAPTER 6
CAREER STRUCTURE
The Nature of a Career
The concept of a career service is a logical development from the 
security of tenure offered in the public service. The public servant 
demands not merely guaranteed employment to retiring age but the 
opportunity of rising in status from initial entry level according to 
ability and effort. To the public employer the career concept provides 
a means of attracting and retaining able employees, furnishing an 
incentive to maximum effort and filling the higher positions according 
to merit.
The public service tends to be distinguished from other organisations 
by the potential career it offers its officers. This career tends to 
be characterised by the same preference for uniform regulation as 
opposed to haphazard practices which permeate its methods of work in 
the conduct of public business as a whole. The tendency is strengthened 
by the permanent nature of employment which makes the area of advancement 
of acute importance to individual and organisation alike; by the scale 
of governmental organization; and by the self-regulating nature of 
personnel administration implying that decisions as to advancement are 
made by officers themselves so that interests in the process are not
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sharply divided and uniform criteria tend to be preferred to invidious 
distinctions among colleagues.'*' In the formal career structure which 
results, the rights of officers may be conceived in terms of the 
safeguards surrounding their positions, the operation of a merit system 
(as opposed to favouritism, patronage etc.) governing selection for 
higher positions, and over and beyond these, though influencing their 
nature, the possibilities open to the individual to challenge the 
decisions by the authorities regarding his future career.
The establishment of rights of the last kind within the career 
structure of a public service raises many problems. Firstly, the number 
of higher positions available depends upon organisational demand, 
ultimately decided by political decision. Their inevitable limitation - 
not everybody can get to the top - must result in competition by 
officers to achieve them. Consequently, unlike other rights which lie 
solely against authority, these affect other officers also, and it is 
extremely difficult to satisfy all concerned that a correct choice has
H. Finer contends that in private employment 'a certain ruthlessness is 
exercised by both employers and employed. The employer wants the best 
person at the top and the worst at the bottom, and the immediate index 
of the rightness of choice is the profit-and-loss account. Further, 
the relationship between employer and managers, and often even with 
individual workers, is close enough for the employer to sum up personal 
qualities. Nor is there any sense of colleagueship to prevent the 
expression of such a judgment. The tradition and spirit of private 
industry is all against it.’ The Theory and Practice of Modern Government, 
New York, 1949, p. 848.
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been made. Secondly, intrinsic difficulties exist in selecting an 
individual for a new work situation and particular administrative unit. 
It involves the prediction of performance and personal suitability which 
cannot be divorced altogether from personal factors. The results of 
selection cannot be assessed by objective criteria, and there is no 
means of deciding whether the 'right' choice has been made, as the 
personal and organisational factors which affect such a judgment remain 
fluid and unforeseen. Thus it has been contended that the concept of 
individual rights is inapplicable to this area because of its intrinsic 
uncertainty and the need to balance conflicting sets of rights which 
can never be completely accommodated, in particular those arising from 
efficiency and seniority. Further, the quest for an illusory perfect 
justice may involve adverse effects upon morale and discipline and 
result in rigidities in the system unsatisfactory to both organisation 
and individual alike.
If it were impossible to apply this concept of rights to the career 
process, there would be little point in discussing the subject any 
further. However if the aim of law and administrative arrangements is 
to satisfy human wants rather than establish a perfect justice, the 
incorporation of rights within any system of organisation depends less 
on abstract argument than on the practicalities of the situation. It is 
indeed the intrinsic uncertainties in the selection process which 
stimulate a demand for rights, as the individual feels he has as good a
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claim to judge the issue as those in authority and is suspicious of 
arbitrary decision and conscious or sub-conscious bias on the part of 
the selector. On the other hand, the administrator asserts the 
desirability of being allowed to choose those with whom he has to work.
The dual purpose of the career process - meeting the individual's 
desire to progress upwards and the organisation's need to fill positions - 
results in differing sets of criteria by which it may be judged, and 
although these co-incide to some extent, at certain points they remain 
irreconcilable. Resulting procedures form a compromise.
In the Commonwealth Public Service, the emphasis on officers' 
rights is reflected in two main ways. Firstly, classification is based 
upon the position, a group of duties, and not the officer personally.
To each position is attached a salary scale, whose maximum is reached 
by annual increments, allowing limited advancement within the position. 
Rights arise from the impersonality of the system, the rules observed 
in relating position to salary and qualifications, and the guarantees 
of status implied in the position. Secondly, officers are eligible to 
advance according to merit from the base grades to the top positions.
In practice, the Divisions into which positions are grouped form 
barriers based on educational qualifications, and further limitations 
exist through the extent of lateral recruitment in the higher grades, and 
the need for technical qualifications in certain areas. Temporary 
employees are excluded from the career structure while women tend to
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be confined to particular female occupations, which are generally 
regarded as carrying only limited career prospects. Rights arise 
from specific safeguards connected with selection for promotion from 
lower to higher positions.
Rights within a position
To the officer his position is of vital importance as it determines 
his duties, remuneration, status and prospects, his rights to which 
have been defined, safeguarded and limited by statute, regulation and 
arbitration award.
(i) Right to a position
No officer has an absolute right to his position as the 
distribution of positions depends upon organisational needs. Powers 
therefore exist to create and abolish offices (Section 29, Commonwealth 
Public Service Act), to transfer excess officers (Section 20) and to 
transfer officers temporarily from one department to another 1 in the 
interests of the Commonwealth Service' (Section 51). Although 
organisational requirements take precedence over personal preference, 
the officer is not without rights, as removal to a position lower than 
the one he occupies is usually regarded as a punitive measure.
Section 52(2) makes refusal to comply with an order of the Public Service 
Board directing removal from one position to another of equal or higher
status a breach of the Public Service Act, implying there is no
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obligation upon an officer to accept a lower position. An officer
has a right to appeal to the Public Service Board against a
promotion or transfer which is not to a position of equal importance,
involves pecuniary loss or to which he objects for 'other cogent
reasons' and if the Board finds the objection well-founded, he may
be permitted to decline without prejudice 'to his right of future
promotion or transfer' in accordance with Section 52(1) of the Public 
3Service Act.
(ii) Right to remuneration
According to British common law a public servant has no enforceable
4right to his pay. In the Commonwealth Public Service, the officer may 
rely upon statutory right for his salary, since the Public Service Act 
provides for mandatory payment of salaries (Section 30), such payment 
being dependent on Parliamentary appropriation for the purpose (Section 90).
This refers only to transfer from one position to another, as Section 
20 clearly covers transfer of an excess officer to a lower position.
Of course, an officer is always free to resign rather than accept 
the position offered.
^Regulation 111.
^Lucas V. Lucas and the High Commissioner for India (1943) 2 A.E.R. 
110.
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In spite of early doubts on the matter, the necessity for Parliamentary 
appropriation, is not usually brought forward by the Commonwealth as 
an objection to monetary claims on the part of public servants, once 
these have been legally proved on other grounds. Acceptance of the 
principles of public service arbitration implies the honouring of awards 
in spite of Parliamentary authority to reject the award as such.
Legally it has been held
’that an action will lie against the Commonwealth to recover 
the difference between the salary paid to an officer of the 
Public Service of the Commonwealth and that to which he was 
entitled under an award made by the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration 
(Public Service) Act'.?
The Commonwealth public servant is entitled to receive his salary 
in full, subject to deduction for taxation, in the same way as any other 
employee. Certain statutory deductions may be made e.g. fines for
In Miller v. R. (1903) 28 V.L.R. 530, the lack of Parliamentary 
appropriation was not held to affect the validity of a claim for 
arrears of salary due under statute, following Fisher v. Reg. (1890)
26 V.L.R. 781. In Bond v. Commonwealth (1903) 1 C.L.R. 13, Section 78(1) 
(corresponding to Section 90 of the current Public Service Act) was not 
held to debar the operation of a constitutional provision 'as a charge 
upon the Commonwealth Revenue of a sufficient sum to give effect to it, 
and as a sufficient authority to the Executive Government of the 
Commonwealth to make the necessary payments to the persons entitled to 
receive them.' In Cousins v. Commonwealth (1906) 3 C.L.R. 529, these 
precedents were overruled, but this was not the main ground for
rejecting the case.
£
E.g. Lucy v. Commonwealth (1923) 33 C.L.R. 229; Ryan and Shephard v . 
Commonwealth (1936) 57 C.L.R. 136.
K^ay V, Commonwealth (1920) 27 C.L.R. 327.
135
disciplinary fault, amounts to satisfy court judgment for debt, but
g
the amount which may be deducted is limited. Additions to salary may
be made by way of allowances. Under Public Service Regulations, right
to allowances usually only exists where these are intended to re-imburse
expenditure clearly incurred in performing duties. Where any doubt may
arise as to the exact circumstances which may result in a claim, the
9authorities have retained discretion in granting the allowance.
Provisions for allowances are modified through detailed arbitration 
awards, which may or may not over-ride the discretion of the authorities 
as to whether an allowance should be granted at all.
(iii) Right to higher duties allowance
The main significance of the position concept is that the public 
servant is allotted certain duties for which he is paid a certain salary,
In relation to deductions for overpayment of salary in error see 
E.E. Crichton, 'The Case of Miss Sonja Haansen', in B.B. Schaffer and 
D.C. Corbett, Decisions: Case Studies in Australian Administration, 
Melbourne, 1965, pp. 244-55.
9Mandatory allowances include overtime payment, higher duties allowance, 
meal allowance, travelling time allowance, travelling allowance, allowance 
for relieving officers, allowance additional to fare, allowance for 
camping, allowance in lieu of quarters for postmasters, removal expenses, 
allowance to married women on retirement and allowance to married minors.
Discretionary allowances include allowances to persons sleeping on 
office premises, shipkeeping allowance, travelling allowances in New 
Guinea, forage allowance, car or cycle allowance, allowance for cleaning 
and lighting, education allowance for lightkeepers, living away from home 
allowance, allowance where officers are unable to find quarters, and 
district allowances.
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and is not expected to perform other duties. The origins of this 
principle may be traced to the bitter experiences of the early years of 
the Commonwealth Public Service when officers were expected to perform 
duties of positions higher than their own for long periods of time, 
although promotion was denied. The situation was ameliorated by the 
introduction of a regulation in 1911, providing that an allowance be 
paid to those who acted in a higher position beyond six months, but the 
principle was developed through public service arbitration.^
Regulation 87, which corresponds to the provisions of the current 
General Conditions of Service Determination,^ sets out the detailed 
rules covering the right to higher duties allowance. An officer who 
performs all the duties of a higher office for more than one day is 
entitled to be paid the difference between his salary and the minimum of 
the higher class, although higher paid officers must serve a week in the 
higher position in order to become eligible. Above a certain salary level, 
any allowance is dependent on the discretion of the Public Service Board. 
While acting in a higher position an officer is entitled to receive the 
increments of that position if he serves for long enough, and special 
provision is made for broken service. If an acting officer is
^See Chapter 3, p. 73.
^The General Conditions of Service Determination incorporates the 
identical provisions of a large number of awards in order to ease 
reference. It does not apply automatically, but covers a large number 
of current awards.
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permanently promoted to the office, he may not suffer reduction in
salary as a result, by being made to start at the bottom of a class in
which he has already built up increments. The choice of officer for
12temporary transfer to higher work is also carefully regulated. For 
transfer up to one month the senior efficient officer is selected, but 
where higher duties are to be performed for more than one month, the most 
efficient available officer is chosen, and the same appeal procedures 
operate as in the case of promotion.
(iv) Right to increments
Limited advancement in salary is assured to the officer through the 
annual increments attached to his position. Under the Public Service 
Act 1902, the incremental scales were relatively long, and had increments 
been granted purely on the grounds of satisfactory service as intended, 
they would have provided a guaranteed career within a position. The 
interpretation of the Public Service Commissioner had the effect of 
limiting the scales, so that increments above a certain point became 
exceptional. The reversal of this interpretation through public service 
arbitration was short-lived, since the Public Service Act 1922 substituted 
short over-lapping salary ranges for the long incremental scales.
Although increments could now be regarded as virtually automatic, the 
limits were reached comparatively quickly, and for advancement, an
12Regulation 116.
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officer had to seek promotion. Through arbitration, the classification 
in the Fourth Division was restored to the previous position, but in the 
Third Division short salary ranges remained, although during the 1960s 
efforts were being made by the Public Service Board to rationalise the 
situation by broad-banding.
Increments are granted in recognition of increased proficiency, and
right to them depends on the 'conduct, diligence, efficiency or
attendance for duty of an officer'. An officer who is refused an
increment is entitled to receive from the permanent head of the department
a copy of the order denying payment and a statement of reasons for the
decision. Within seven days he has the right of appeal to the Public 
13Service Board.
Rights within the promotion process
The extent of advancement within a position is not great, and to 
further his career an officer must seek promotion to a higher position. 
Rights have taken the form of spread of responsibility for choice 
including provision for staff participation, thus wresting power over 
the careers of officers from the authorities alone, and the establishment 
of definite criteria for advancement as opposed to individual discretion. 
Concern with promotion processes ante-dates the establishment of the
Public Service Act, Section 31, and Regulation 114.13
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Commonwealth Public Service, and although right of appeal was accepted
from the beginning it was not considered effective for over forty years.
The fate of Section 50 of the Public Service Act 1902 illustrates both
the anxiety of officers to establish effective appeal rights and the
14wariness of the authorities in granting them. Section 50 had provided 
for general appeal to an advisory board by officers against 
recommendations affecting them to the Governor General, but power over 
promotion remained solely in the hands of the Commissioner, and loose 
drafting made it possible for him to refuse to consider appeals.
It was not until 1914 that the legality of the Commissioner's ruling 
was challenged. A case was brought by P.H. Killeen, who had been passed 
over in promotion by a junior officer, and whose appeal under Section 50 
as an 'affected' officer had been refused hearing by the Commissioner.
The High Court was called upon to consider the general interpretation by 
the Commissioner of the word 'affected' as confined tp circumstances in 
which 'the officer's status in the service is altered to his detriment'. 
Although the Chief Justice upheld the Commissioner's view, the majority 
held that Killeen was 'affected' as 'the loss of eligibility is a real 
deprivation, and whatever deprives an officer of the capacity of 
advancement necessarily affects him prejudicially'. However, as the
14
See Chapter 3, pp. 60 and 65 for a description of the origins and 
early administration of the provision.
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position was now filled, mandamus to compel the Commissioner to hear
the appeal vas held to be futile, and the High Court could offer no
remedy.^ Greater satisfaction resulted from a case brought by
P.A. O'Brien, who had been denied the right to appeal against being
passed over as the most efficient officer. The High Court held that
O'Brien was entitled to appeal and had made out a case for relative 
16efficiency.“ However the High Court continued to take each case on its 
merits, refusing to lay down any general principle as to the 
interpretation of the word 'affected'. Thus, when Kenny who had 
successfully won an appeal under Section 50, and was consequently 
recommended for promotion, attempted to appeal against cancellation of 
the recommendation when an excess officer was transferred to the position 
in question, the High Court, with the dissent of Higgins J., held he was 
not 'affected' under the Act."^ More serious was the administrative 
obstacle to appeal against which the favourable court rulings had 
provided no remedy. Unless the officer concerned knew of an adverse 
recommendation to the Governor General, he was obviously unable to 
appeal against it, and as officers were generally not notified until 
the recommendation was accepted, the right of appeal was virtually
R. v. Public Service Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Australia 
ex parte Killeen (1914) 18 C.L.R. 587.
^ R. v. Public Service Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Australia 
ex parte O'Brien (1919) 26 C.L.R. 380.
^ R. v. Acting Public Service Commissioner for the Commonwealth of 
Australia ex parte Kenny (1922) 30 C.L.R. 343.
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useless. Ir. any case final determination of the appeal rested with the 
authority originally responsible for the promotion.
Sectior. 50 disappeared with the repeal of the Public Service Act 
1902, but its legacy remained in the desire of public servants to gain 
effective appeal against decisions affecting their careers. The Public 
Service Act 1922 gave the Public Service Board power to make promotions 
and also hear appeals. In 1924 the Act was amended in conformity with 
its original plan, so that promotions were made within departments subject 
to appeal to the Public Service Board.
Dissatisfaction continued for in spite of the provision for appeal, 
decision remained in the hands of the authorities and the whole process 
was carried out in secret. The only right an aggrieved officer had 
was to submit a written statement to be forwarded through the department 
to the Public Service Inspector who dealt with it as he saw fit and 
recommended accordingly to the Public Service Board. The system was 
based on confidential reports which could not be challenged by the 
officer concerned, and the public service associations pressed for an 
independent appeal authority. In spite of increased discontent and 
association pressure during the depression, no change was made in the 
system until the end of the Second World War. The expansion of the 
Service, the enhanced strength of the associations in common with the 
rest of the labor movement, the appreciation of the Labor government
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for the co-operation of the associations during the war, and the 
contribution of several associations to the gaining of a Labor victory- 
provided the opportunity to achieve reforms. A Committee of Inquiry 
(Bailey Committee) was set up, including senior officers and association 
representatives, and its recommendations which were incorporated without 
further discussion in the Public Service Act 1945 form the basis of 
current rights.^
Rights within the promotion process vary according to the position
involved. In certain designated positions, where, because of the nature
of the work, it would be extremely difficult to distinguish between
officers on the basis of merit, promotion lies to the senior efficient 
19officer. Once seniority is calculated (according to detailed
regulations) an automatic criterion is available, ruling out bias or
favouritism on the part of the selecting officer. In other cases,
20apart from the First Division, promotions are made on a provisional 
basis only, according to relative efficiency, or, in the event of equal 
efficiency, relative seniority, by the permanent head of the department 
in which the vacancy exists. If the position is advertised and the
18See G.E. Caiden, Career Service, Melbourne, 1965, pp. 293-7.
19Public Service Act, Section 50 (3A) and Regulation 109G.
20Appointments and promotions in the First Division are made by the 
Governor General on the recommendation of the Public Service Board and 
appointments to the position of Permanent Head may be made without 
reference to the Public Service Board. (Public Service Act, Section 54).
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senior applicant is not promoted, he is entitled to be informed of any
specific adverse matter decisive against his selection - a right somewhat
difficult tc enforce.^ Any officer who feels he is superior in
efficiency to the officer promoted, or is of equal efficiency but senior
22in status, nay appeal to a Promotions Appeal Committee.
Promotions Appeal Committees exist in each State, the Australian
Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. Each consists of a
Chairman appointed by the Public Service Board (in Queensland, South
Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania, the Public Service Inspector),
an officer nominated by the permanent head of the department in which
the provisional promotion was made, and an officer nominated by the
appropriate organisation. Members of a Promotions Appeal Committee are
under oath to perform their duties 'without fear or favour affection or 
23ill-will' and are empowered to make inquiries 'without regard to legal
24forms or solemnities'. A Promotions Appeal Committee has power of 
final decision over appeals below a certain salary level where the 
appeal concerns only one State. Where the office concerned is above a 
certain salary, or an inter-State appeal is under consideration, the
^Regulation 108B.
22Public Service Act, Section 50(5).
23Public Service Act, Sixth Schedule.
24Regulation 109F.
144
Committee may only report and recommend to the Public Service Board 
which makes the final decision.
The formal requirements of the appeal process are slight and it is 
not surprising that from time to time efforts have been made to extend 
rights. Suggestions have been made to formalise the procedure by which 
the departmental nominee is chosen; to raise the salary limits within 
which the Committees have final decision; to place final decision for 
inter-State appeals with a Central Promotions Appeal Committee instead of 
the Public Service Board; to grant appellants fuller access to 
documents, information regarding the position and details of other 
appellants, the right to refute points made against them or fresh 
evidence arising in the course of inquiries, and entitlement to a 
personal hearing.
It is generally acknowledged that formal rules alone cannot eliminate 
prejudice or abuse. The rights embodied in the promotion process rest 
less on procedural requirements than upon the way in which it is accepted 
that they should be carried out. The perception of their role by the 
members of a Promotions Appeal Committee, especially of the staff 
representative, is a crucial factor. While participants accept the 
principle that promotion should be in the best interests of the public 
service, fair procedures are held to be of equal importance and
contribute to the same object.
145
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the rights available
to officers arising out of the career structure, particularly those
relating to appeal, are satisfactory either to the authorities or to
the individual officers. Such an assessment would require detailed
research into organisational goals on the one hand and individual
25opinions on the other, beyond the confines of this study. It is 
suggested however that acceptance of these rights may be related to 
attitudes affecting also other areas of administration such as preference 
for impersonal procedures and collective decision-making, embarrassment 
in confronting a fellow officer with unpleasant personal facts, as well 
as suspicion of unchecked authority. In the Australian context they 
represent an extension of the procedures ensuring regularity in personnel 
administration, and while it is unlikely that any change will take place 
in the direction of further individual rights, it is doubtful whether 
any limitation in the interests of administrative flexibility will take 
place, although modifications in the career structure itself may well 
alter their relative importance.
25See V. Subramaniam, Public Service Promotion in Australia, Ph.D. Thesis, 
Australian National University, 1959.
CHAPTER 7
PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS
The rights the Commonwealth officer enjoys are counterbalanced 
by the obligations he accepts. These arise from the standards which the 
community demands of those in its permanent employ. They may be seen as 
an extension of the obligations which the ordinary employer imposes 
upon his employees, or as arising from the special functions of the state 
and its peculiar political position as expressed in the constitutional 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Obligations refer both to 
official duties and extend beyond them into the private lives of officers. 
They are expressed in law, and also in the unwritten assumptions 
governing officers' behaviour. Some of them infringe rights which are 
claimed by members of the community who are not officers. Other 
unwritten obligations modify rights allowed to officers by law.
Officers' obligations may be divided into those relating to probity and 
disinterested service, those concerned with efficiency and continuous 
service, and those arising from the position of the state as protector 
of the public interest and executor of the wishes of the electorate.
Probity and disinterested service
It is generally assumed that official duties should be carried out 
according to strict standards of honesty, and that the laws and
146
147
regulations of the Commonwealth government should be applied according 
to their terns irrespective of personal consideration. The assumption 
is unstated in law, but is expressed by the oft-quoted 1928 British 
Treasury circular:
The State is entitled to demand that its servants shall not 
only be honest in fact, but should be beyond the reach of 
suspicion or dishonesty. A civil servant has not only to 
subordinate his duty to his private interest, but neither 
to put himself in a position where his duty and interests 
conflict. He is not to make use of his official position 
to further these interests, but neither is he so to order 
his private affairs as to allow the suspicion to arise that 
a trust has been abused or a confidence betrayed.
Dishonesty is dealt with through the ordinary laws of the land,
which enumerate specific official offences, as well as offences in
relation to public functions which may be committed by officials or
other persons. The most general of these laws is the Crimes Act, which
includes a special part relating to offences by Commonwealth officers,
covering stealing or fraudulent misappropriation of Commonwealth
property (Section 71), falsification, damage or destruction of documents,
furnishing of false returns (Section 72), obtaining or attempting to
obtain bribes (Section 73) and the making of false statements regarding
remuneration or receipt of property (Section 74). These are criminal
offences and are punishable by terms of imprisonment laid down in the
statute. Financial loss or irregularity is covered by the Audit Act,
under which the Auditor General has power to surcharge any officer for
deficiencies in funds for which he is responsible, the officer having
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t h e  r i g h t  o f  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  Governor  G e n e r a l  ( S e c t i o n  4 2 ) .  Pena l  
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Act  c ove r  m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n  o f  funds  and f r a u d u l e n t  
c o n v e r s i o n  ( S e c t i o n  6 4 ) ,  f o r g i n g  and c o u n t e r f e i t i n g  ( S e c t i o n  65 ) ,  
f a i l u r e  t o  a t t e n d  f o r  e x a m i n a t i o n  by th e  A u d i t o r  G e n e r a l  ( S e c t i o n  67 ) ,  
making o f  a f a l s e  d e c l a r a t i o n  ( S e c t i o n  68)  and any a c t i o n  c o n t r a r y  to  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Act  ( S e c t i o n  6 9 ) .  O the r  s t a t u t e s ,  a p p l y i n g  to  
b o t h  o f f i c e r s  and p u b l i c ,  cove r  o f f e n c e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  
a r e a s  o f  government  f u n c t i o n s .  For  example t h e  P o s t  and T e l e g r a p h  Act  
c o v e r s  such  o f f e n c e s  as  n e g l i g e n t  l o s s ,  w i l f u l  d e l a y  o r  d e t e n t i o n  o f  
t h e  p o s t  ( S e c t i o n  108) ,  l o i t e r i n g  w h i l e  d e l i v e r i n g  t h e  m a i l  ( S e c t i o n  110) ,  
f r a u d u l e n t  r e c e i v i n g  o r  e m be z z l ing  ( S e c t i o n  114) ,  t a m p e r i n g  w i t h  t h e  
p o s t  ( S e c t i o n  115) ,  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  s e c r e c y  o f  t e l e g r a m s  ( S e c t i o n  127) 
and t h e  r e - i s s u i n g  o f  p o s t a l  n o t e s  ( S e c t i o n  135) .  As o f f i c e r s  a r e  
g e n e r a l l y  p r o t e c t e d  i n  t h e  p r o p e r  c o n d u c t  o f  t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  d u t i e s ,  by 
s p e c i f i c  p r o v i s i o n  o f  s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i s a t i o n ,  a g a i n s t  l e g a l  a c t i o n  by 
members o f  t h e  p u b l i c ,  t h e  c l e a r  e n u m e r a t i o n  o f  c r i m i n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  i s  o f  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  i m p o r t a n c e .
The a s s u m p t i o n  o f  h o n e s t  s e r v i c e  e x t e n d s  beyond t h e  com m i t t in g  o f  
c r i m i n a l  o f f e n c e s ,  a s  i n t e r n a l  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  law p r o h i b i t s  c e r t a i n  
a c t i v i t i e s  wh ich  m igh t  p l a c e  t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t  i n  a p o s i t i o n  i n  which  
he m ig h t  be t em pted  to  commit an o f f e n c e .  O f f i c e r s  a r e  p r o h i b i t e d  from 
s e e k i n g  o u t s i d e  i n f l u e n c e  t o  o b t a i n  p e r s o n a l  a d v a n ta g e  ( R e g u l a t i o n  3 6 ) ,  
a c c e p t i n g  g i f t s  o r  f e e s  f rom members o f  t h e  p u b l i c  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y
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concerned with their duties (Regulations 37 and 38) and borrowing from 
or lending to one another (Regulation 39). Less clearly stated is the 
general concept of 'misconduct', which is enforced through the 
disciplinary procedures of the public service alone. In relation to the 
official duties of the officer, misconduct includes wilful disobedience 
or disregard of a valid order (.Public Service Act, Section 55(1) (a)), 
negligence or carelessness in duties (Section 55(1) (b)), inefficiency or 
incompetency through causes within his control (Section 55(1)(c)), breach 
of the Act or regulations (Section 55(1)(f)) and the furnishing of 
incorrect or misleading information on appointment (Section 55(1) (h)).
The concept of misconduct extends beyond working hours into the 
private conduct of the officer. The justification for this intrusion 
may be seen as a reflection of the paternal interest of the state in the 
affairs of its employees, the desire to uphold the prestige of public 
service as such, the possibility of incompatibility between private and 
official activities, the possible effect on public confidence of 
untoward private behaviour, and the possible impingement of outside 
activities on performance of work. Public service law does not lay down 
any single statement as to the expectation of private behaviour, perhaps 
because of a distaste for embodying in statute or regulation positive 
standards which cannot be enforced by formal disciplinary sanction.
Thus the Public Service Act contains only an outline of negative and 
specific sanctions, although the underlying concept of misconduct
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itself is broad and includes as a specific offence without further 
definition 'disgraceful or improper conduct in official capacity or 
otherwise' (Section 55(1) (e)).
Certain aspects of private life are clearly indicated as being of 
concern to the authorities. Thus, excessive use of intoxicating 
liquors or drugs is regarded as a disciplinary offence, although it is 
doubtful whether any action would be taken against an individual unless 
there were interference with his official duties, or his indulgence were 
connected with other private or official shortcomings (Section 55(1)(d)). 
Bankruptcy was originally of concern to the authorities because at 
common law a creditor could not take action against a Crown officer.
Since private financial difficulties may place him in a position of 
temptation in relation to official funds or lay him open to blackmail, 
provision is made to require an officer who becomes a bankrupt to 
inform the Chief Officer of his department and furnish any other 
information required. The department is entitled to deduct amounts 
from salary to satisfy judgment debts up to a limit of two-thirds of 
net salary (Sections 63-65).
More drastic disciplinary action results from conviction of an 
officer upon a criminal offence. The Public Service Board has power to 
dismiss the officer, reduce him in rank or salary or impose any other 
punishment, and unlike other offences against discipline no appeal is
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permitted (Section 62). Justification for the provision may be found in 
the protection of the public from persons in official positions whose 
honesty or obedience to the law are in question in any way, and in the 
upholding of the status of public service as an honourable career for 
which criminal activity renders a person unfitted. The Public Service 
Board has discretion as to the action it takes, the interposition of an 
Appeal Board is unnecessary as the courts have already proved the 
guilt of the accused, and the Public Service Board even under ordinary 
disciplinary procedure decides upon dismissal, whereas the Appeal Board 
may only recommend. Objection may be made to the provision as contrary 
to the fundamental principle that a person should not be punished more 
than once for the same offence, and that the punishment acts as complete 
retribution for the offence. The argument that the action of the Public 
Service Board is of a purely disciplinary nature does not detract from 
its punitive effect, and its exemption from ordinary disciplinary 
processes sets it apart from normal disciplinary fault. If other 
employers took the same attitude, social consequences concerning 
rehabilitation of prisoners could be serious, and the attitude of the 
public service may only be justified by its special obligation to 
protect the public.
Finally, the public service demands the full effort and allegiance 
of its officers. Section 91 of the Public Service Act forbids, except 
with express permission, public or private employment, the conduct of
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any business or profession (whether remunerative or not) or any 
remunerative employment other than an officer's duties for the 
Commonwealth. An officer may own shares in a company, but may not take 
part in its conduct except through his voting rights as a shareholder. 
The section was amended in 1945 to allow an officer, with approval, to 
act as director of a co-operative society, so long as it does not 
contract with the Commonwealth. Justification for these restrictions 
«(and therefore the principles on which permission may be granted) lies 
in the possible inefficiency which may result from fatigue in 
performing two jobs; a long-standing resentment against public servants 
with one secure job already competing in the labour market for extra 
employment, possibly depriving others of a livelihood; and the 
possibility of incompatibility between outside employment and official 
duties, which may bring the impartiality of the officer into question."*’ 
Whereas the first two of these reasons may appear of little account in 
a full employment economy where a second job is becoming increasingly 
common, particularly among lower paid workers, the third, affecting 
middle and top management levels is becoming of even greater consequence 
as government functions expand and the public servant is increasingly 
called upon to deal with competing pressure group claims, government 
contracts and the application of regulations to a mixed enterprise
"^General Orders 14/D/l - 14/D/7.
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economy. The statutory restriction is less severe than its counterpart
in European countries, where some restriction is also imposed on the
2public servant's wife and family, or Britain, where a public servant 
may not take up employment within two years of retirement without 
prior permission. It has been suggested that the latter restriction 
should be applied to officers of the Commonwealth Public Service who 
retire to take positions with private firms contracting with their 
departments, on the grounds that the offer of such a position to an 
officer runs counter to the accepted principles of disinterested service, 
and the firm which succeeds in recruiting such an officer gains official 
knowledge to which it has no right.
These restrictions are the clearest expression of the general 
concept of the manner in which it is desired officers should carry out 
their duties, which cannot be divorced from their own personal conduct 
and connections. Analogy with the loyalties owed in private employment 
is misleading, as public employment demands higher standards in official 
dealings and abhors discrimination quite legitimate in private business. 
The Commonwealth Public Service attempts to interfere as little as 
possible with the private lives of its officers, but where official 
activities are prejudicially affected is bound to enforce its standards
See B. Chapman, The Profession of Government, London, 1959, p. 134.2
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of self-discipline, so that some degree of aloofness and reserve 
becomes a characteristic of the public servant. The enforcement of 
these standards rests primarily on the awareness of their importance by 
officers themselves, organisational pressures and the incentives offered 
by the career service. At the most important points these are supported 
by severe legal sanctions, but the latter can only operate in extreme 
cases, as the enforceability of patterns of conduct rests less on 
legal enactment than upon the unwritten law of the organisation itself.
Efficiency and continuity
The obligation upon Commonwealth public servants to provide 
efficient service is similar to that expected of private employees.
During the hours of official business they are expected to devote themselves 
exclusively and zealously to the discharge of public duties, behave with 
courtesy to the public, obey superior officers promptly and correctly 
carry out all duties and comply with all laws and instructions concerning 
their duties (Regulation 32). In addition they may be required to work 
special hours, to live within a certain distance of their work, to 
perform work after hours on request, and so on, according to particular 
job needs.
The need for continuity in public services imposes upon the public 
employee an obligation to refrain from strike action, although 
freedom to withdraw services is usually recognised as a fundamental
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right of the worker. The prohibition against strikes is expressed in
Section 66 of the Commonwealth Public Service Act, which places offence
against it outside the normal disciplinary process:
Any officer or officers of the Commonwealth Service directly 
fomenting, or taking part in any strike which interferes 
with or prevents the carrying on of any part of the Public 
Service or utilities of the Commonwealth shall be deemed to 
have committed an illegal action against the peace and good 
order of the Commonwealth, and any such officer or officers 
adjudged by the Board, after investigation and hearing, to be 
guilty of such action, shall therefor be summarily dismissed 
by the Board from the Service, without regard to the procedure 
prescribed in this Act for dealing with offences under the 
Ac t.
In addition, it is an offence under the Crimes Act for any person by
threats or intimidation to obstruct or hinder the provision of public
services by the Commonwealth, to compel or induce any public employee
to surrender or depart from his employment by the Commonwealth, or
prevent any person from offering or accepting employment in connection
with the provision of any public service by the Commonwealth, on pain
of one year's imprisonment. In a state of emergency, it is also an
3offence to encourage a strike in the public service. More effective 
than either the disciplinary or penal sanctions against public service 
strikes are the normal procedures connected with the system of compulsory 
arbitration. The Industrial Court, under the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act has power to fine or de-register any organisation upon
3Crimes Act, Sections 30J and 30K.
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breach of an award. It has become increasingly common also to insert
clauses in awards forbidding strikes, so that an employer in the event
of a strike may apply to the industrial court for an order to enjoin
breach of award. Should the strike continue, penalties may be imposed
4for contempt of court. These provisions would also apply to public 
service organisations, which register under the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act despite their separate system of arbitration under 
special legislation.
Strike action by Commonwealth public servants has been specifically 
prohibited since 1922, when the original Public Service Act 1902 was 
replaced by the current statute. Previously, in spite of sporadic 
strikes or threats of strikes in both Commonwealth and State public 
services, strike action on the part of public servants was regarded as 
of doubtful legitimacy as a tactic. The general atmosphere of labour 
unrest following the First World War, and a prolonged and mishandled 
strike of Commonwealth public servants in Western Australia in 1919 
demonstrated the vulnerable position of the Commonwealth government, 
which took legislative action to provide it with powers to act
4See E.I. Sykes, Strike Law in Australia, Sydney, 1960; K.F. Walker, 
Industrial Relations in Australia, Massachusetts, 1956; and J.E. Isaac, 
'Penal Provisions under Commonwealth Arbitration', Journal of Industrial 
Relations, pp. 110-20, October 1963.
summari ly .  I t  j u s t i f i e d  s t a t u t o r y  p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  s t r i k e s  on t h e  grounds
t h a t  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  had a d e q u a t e  remedy f o r  t h e i r  g r i e v a n c e s  t h ro u g h
a p p e a l  to  P a r l i a m e n t  and a r b i t r a t i o n ,  and i t  was opposed on t h e  grounds
t h a t  s t r i k e  a c t i o n  i n  t h e  l a s t  r e s o r t  was a f u n d am e n ta l  r i g h t ,  d e n i a l
£
o f  which amounted to  f o r c e d  l a b o u r .
In  i t s  most ex t rem e  form,  t h e  c a s e  f o r  fo rm a l  and s e v e r e  p r o h i b i t i o n
o f  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  s t r i k e s  may be s t a t e d  as  f o l l o w s :
Government  i s  n o t  an end i n  i t s e l f .  I t  e x i s t s  s o l e l y  to  s e r v e  
t h e  p e o p l e .  The v e ry  r i g h t  o f  p r i v a t e  employees  t o  s t r i k e  
depends on the  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  government  under  
law. Every l i b e r t y  e n joye d  i n  t h i s  n a t i o n  e x i s t s  b e c au s e  i t  
i s  p r o t e c t e d  by government  which  f u n c t i o n s  u n i n t e r r u p t e d l y .
The p a r a l y s i s  o f  any p o r t i o n  o f  government  c o u ld  q u i c k l y  l ea d  
t o  t h e  p a r a l y s i s  o f  a l l  s o c i e t y .
P a r a l y s i s  o f  government  i s  a n a rc h y  and i n  a n a rc h y  l i b e r t i e s  
become u s e l e s s .  A s t r i k e  a g a i n s t  government  would be s u c c e s s f u l  
on ly  i f  i t  c o u ld  p roduce  p a r a l y s i s  o f  governm ent .  Th is  no p e o p le  
can  p e r m i t  and s u r v i v e . ^
S t r i k e  a c t i o n  by p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  may be viewed l e s s  as  an a t t a c k  upon 
the  s o v e r e i g n t y  of  t h e  s t a t e  o r  s o c i a l  o r d e r  t h a n  as  t h e  i n t e r r u p t i o n  
of  e s s e n t i a l  s e r v i c e s  which  s h o u ld  be a v o id e d  a t  a l l  c o s t s .  L e g i s l a t i o n  
aimed s p e c i f i c a l l y  a t  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  may n o t  be t h e  b e s t  means of
^See G.E.  Ca iden ,  'The S t r i k e  o f  Commonwealth P u b l i c  S e r v a n t s  1 9 1 9 ' ,  
P u b l i c  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  X^ydney) , pp.  262-74 .  September  1962.
ß
See Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n t a r y  D e b a te s ,  Vol .  94,  p.  7365 and Vol .  101, 
pp.  3251-3263.
^Veto Memorandum, March 27, 1947, quo ted  i n  H.E. Kaplan ,  'C o n c e p t s  o f  
P u b l i c  Employee R e l a t i o n s ' ,  I n d u s t r i a l  and Labor  R e l a t i o n s  Review, 
pp.  206-30 ,  J a n u a r y  1948.
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ensuring continuity of services, as has been pointed out by L.D. White.
Firstly it is possible that bad conditions may exist in public as well
as private employment. Secondly, private undertakings may perform
essential services whose interruption causes as much general
inconvenience as it would in public services. Thirdly, strikes in the
public service are likely to be exceptional, due to conservatism and
immobility, and when undertaken as a last resort may serve the public
interest in drawing attention to bad conditions. Fourthly, the right
to withhold labour is fundamental and risk of serious disruption is too
small to justify its curtailment. To these arguments may be added that 
9of Spero, who points out that punitive legislation is rarely effective 
in actually preventing strikes and may hamper resumption of services 
which should be the ultimate goal.
These writers, although phrasing their arguments in general terms, 
are strongly influenced by a background of industrial relations based
O L.D. White, 'Strikes in the Public Service', Public Personnel Review, 
pp. 3-10, No. 1, 1949. D.M. Watters (Assistant Secretary to the 
Canadian Treasury Board) has put forward the view that a limited right 
to strike ought to be conceded in the public sector, since the 
consequences are no more serious than those arising from strikes in 
many areas of the private sector. (Public Personnel Review, p. 266, 
October 1963) See also K.G.J.C. Knowles, Strikes: A Study in Industrial 
Conflict, Oxford, 1952, pp. 100-6.
9'Government has never conceded the right of its employees to strike and 
has always had ample powers to stop such strikes even without specific 
anti-strike legislation. However the knowledge of these facts has not 
prevented public service strikes.' S.D. Spero, Government as Employer, 
New York, 1948, p. 14.
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upon collective bargaining, to which the threat of strike action is 
fundamental, representing the strength of employees. It is worth noting 
that a right to strike has been recognised in no formal international 
text on human rights except by the Inter-American Charter of Social 
Guarantees.^  In Australia, because of the acceptance of the principle 
of compulsory arbitration, a strike tends to be regarded as a breakdown 
which the system was designed to prevent, rather than as a right on which 
it depends. Discrimination against public servants is therefore less in 
this context, particularly as strikes in the Commonwealth Public Service 
have been few and limited, and when they have occurred have neither 
invoked the specific statutory sanctions nor achieved their aims. It is 
suggested that the absence of strikes in the Commonwealth Public Service 
rests less on the existence of discriminatory legislation than upon:
(1) The ordinary sanctions applying to all organisations under the 
arbitration system, and the existence of public service arbitration 
itself. These sanctions have the merit of being non-discriminatory 
against public employment as such, involving no victimisation of leaders, 
nor depending on purely government action for their application.
(2) The importance of public opinion, particularly in view of a 
certain latent hostility against the public servant as such. In a
^C.W. Jenks, The International Protection of Trade Union Freedom,
London, 1957, p. 359.
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prolonged strike or one involving considerable disruption, it is doubtful 
whether much public support would be forthcoming for the strikers, so that 
the political position of the government would be strengthened.
(3) General acceptance by the majority of Commonwealth public 
servants of the obligation to keep services working. This might apply 
less outside the administrative and clerical groups, but even in these a 
limited strike is rarely seen as a useful industrial tactic. Such minor 
stoppages are not regarded as serious either in private or public 
employment, while a prolonged strike is only ever undertaken after 
considerable hesitation. The splintered nature of employee organisation 
in the Commonwealth Public Service makes it difficult to organise or 
sustain a widespread strike, and even in the larger associations 
difficulties of communication between branches and leadership and 
rank-and-file exist.
It is difficult to calculate the exact efficiency as a deterrent 
of the specific sanctions against strikes in the Commonwealth Public 
Service. It is possible that their existence adds little to the 
sanctions applying to other employees and the general factors limiting 
public service strikes. It may be argued that the ability of the 
government to act summarily is necessary in emergency, but it is doubtful 
whether the exercise of these powers would succeed in gaining the 
resumption of services, and the government has adequate powers under 
separate emergency provision (Crimes Act, Section 30J). However,
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repeal of Section 66 of the Public Service Act or Section 30K of the 
Crimes Act might produce the impression that strikes are condoned, 
while their retention as the formal expression of a general obligation 
does not appear to limit significantly the liberties of Commonwealth 
officers.
Loyalty
Freedom to hold and voice opinions contrary to government policy 
and to belong to any organisation not prescribed by law is an 
acknowledged right of the citizen, but one which is restricted by the 
obligations of public service. Because of the nature of government 
functions and the strategic position of the officer in administering 
them, he is expected to refrain from what may be construed as subversive 
activities. This limitation affects the rights of the officer in that, 
not only is he precluded from taking part in activities which are 
perfectly legal, but he is also constantly subject to surveillance in 
order to ensure his loyalty. If he becomes suspect, the safeguards of 
ordinary judicial or disciplinary procedures do not apply, and action 
is likely to be taken against him on evidence he is not allowed to 
challenge or even know.
In the Commonwealth Public Service the loyalty of officers may be 
enforced in a number of ways. Before appointment every entrant must 
make an oath or affirmation swearing allegiance to the Sovereign and to
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uphold the Constitution. Violation of this oath is an offence under 
Section 55 of the Public Service Act. While the oath of office forms the 
basis of the obligation upon the officer, it does not express fully 
the insistence upon loyalty which has become a major characteristic of 
public services throughout the world since the Second World War. Whereas 
in many public services, attempts have been made to limit the sweeping 
powers over officers by the establishment of procedures designed to 
protect the individual, the Public Service Act does not do so, and is 
somewhat vague regarding powers in this connection. Section 94 passed 
during World War I empowers the Public Service Board to recommend 
dismissal of any person whose birth or parentage is adversely reported 
upon by a Royal Commission. The Public Service Board may also as a result 
of its own inquiry recommend dismissal on the grounds that employment of 
a person is 'detrimental to the public safety or the defence of the Common­
wealth' . It appears however that this section is not used in cases 
where public servants come under suspicion of disloyalty. Security 
check before appointment may result in non-employment, even if no other 
grounds exist, through the Public Service Board's power to reject any 
applicant who is not 'a fit and proper person to be an officer of the
'The taking of this oath is designed to prevent the admission to 
our Public Service of persons who are opposed to constituted authority.' 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 104, p. 7366.
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Commonwealth Service'. Security cases within the Service are
13apparently dealt with by transfer or dismissal upon other grounds.
It is not difficult to fault these procedures or lack of them,
according to the criteria of the rule of law, but it is doubtful whether
the procedures used in other countries represent any great improvement.
They attempt to provide a gloss of justice over what is essentially a
political judgment, underlined by the participation of the political
14authorities in most of these procedures. The apparent necessity for 
hunting out the 'unreliable', and the methods inevitably used for the 
purpose can only be justified in an assessment of the safety of the 
community, in its total form ever an excuse for the sacrifice of the 
individual and his rights.
Public Expression
Subject to the laws of libel, obscenity, incitement etc., the 
citizen has a right to express his opinions in written or verbal form
12Public Service Act, Section 34.
13'Australia has no security system as such. Powers now possessed by 
the Public Service Board, to dismiss or transfer an officer if it should 
find him not necessary for the efficient working of a department or 
inefficient, are employed to take care of security cases.' D.C. Jackson, 
'Individual Rights and National Security', Modern Law Review, pp. 364-80, 
July 1937, p. 370.
14'Why should a person charged with treason be allowed to confront his 
accusers, and yet a person about to be dismissed because he is likely 
to commit treason be denied these minimum judicial rights?', H. Street, 
Freedom, the Individual and the Law, London, 1963, p. 228.
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without restriction. The Commonwealth officer is subject to further 
restrictions arising out of his office. These relate to general 
comment on political affairs or governmental administration and the 
disclosure of official information. They have been held to arise from 
the constitutional doctrine of ministerial responsibility, the 
requirements of official neutrality and the nature of government 
functions. The responsibility of the minister for his department has 
been held to imply his monopoly upon all information relating to it, 
since unofficial disclosure amounts to active intervention by the officer 
who is merely an agent and politically irresponsible - 'a kind of 
perpetual secretary1.^  Public service neutrality is the price of 
permanence in the face of potentially changing political control, and 
involves the subordination of personal views to official policy, lest 
ministers lose confidence in their permanent staffs who thereby become 
unfitted to serve them. The nature of governmental functions, touching 
upon the private affairs of individuals, the conflicting interests of 
groups and the internal and external security of the community, demands 
that the officer be discreet as well as disinterested in carrying out 
his duties.
In the Commonwealth Public Service these restrictions are expressed 
through criminal and public service law. Commonwealth officers are
H. Laski, Authority in the Modern State, New Haven, 1919, p. 344.15
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precluded by Section 70 of the Crimes Act, under penalty of two years'
imprisonment, from publishing or communicating except to an authorised
person any fact or document secured in virtue of their office and which
it is their duty not to disclose. Until 1960, this provision related
specifically to communication of information which it was the duty of
officers to keep secret. The effect of the amendment has been to give
penal sanction to existing Regulations ([previously enforced only by
internal disciplinary procedures), prohibiting the use of official
information for other than official duties, public comment on the
administration of any department or release of official information
16without authority. At the same time, the provisions of the Crimes Act 
were extended to apply to persons who had left the Service, unless they 
could prove lawful excuse or authority.
These provisions have been criticised on two main grounds - as being 
based upon faulty theoretical assumptions, and as running contrary to 
the principles of democratic administration. It is not difficult to 
point out flaws in the doctrines of ministerial responsibility or public 
service neutrality.^ Both appear unrealistic in view of the obvious
The Regulations allow public comment upon affairs within the Australian 
Capital and Northern Territories. For the history of the amendment see 
G.E. Caiden, 'Ellis and the Department of the Interior', in B.B. Schaffer 
and D.C. Corbett, Decisions: Case Studies in Australian Administration, 
Melbourne, 1965, pp. 225-243.
See B. Chapman, British Government Observed - Some European Reflections, 
London, 1963, p. 39; and W.A. Robson, 'The Public Service', in 
The British Civil Servant, London, 1937, p. 19.
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limitations to ministers' personal direction of departmental business,
the well-known fact that officers are not merely obedient servants but
play a part in the initiation as well as the carrying out of policy, and
that they do hold personal opinions which affect their duties whether
these are expressed or not. Such criticism however remains unhelpful,
since it is difficult to suggest an alternative to official subordination
and neutrality which does not involve the direct participation of the
18public service as an autonomous political force.
Criticism from the point of view of the requirements of democratic 
administration has been more fruitful. Enforced official silence has 
been decried as limiting the potential contribution of officers on 
academic matters touching upon governmental policies or administration, 
depriving the public of knowledge to which it is entitled regarding the 
administration of public business, restricting frank testimony before 
Royal Commissions or committees of inquiry, interfering with legitimate 
staff association activity and giving rise to suspicions of abuse.
Its limitation of the civil rights of officers may be considered to 
amount to the maintenance of autocracy in the midst of democracy.
Efforts have therefore been made to liberalise existing restrictions, not 
by attempting to supplant the doctrines of ministerial responsibility
18See G.E. Caiden, 'The Political Role of the Commonwealth Bureaucracy', 
Public Administration (Sydney), March 1966.
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or public service neutrality but by modifying the implications which 
have been drawn from them.
19Thus, Professor R.S. Parker has proposed that only the release of 
official secrets should be classified as a crime, and the release of 
other information should be conditional upon the good sense of officers 
themselves, with internal disciplinary action where established convention 
was overstepped. General freedom of public comment should be allowed 
save in the 'white collar' administrative classes, except so as to 
identify an official with support or criticism of a political party on 
matters of controversy, to criticise the minister of his own department 
(unless he believes unlawful action has been taken), to comment on policy 
currently being considered by the government or to embarrass 
international relations. Beyond these formal restrictions, all officers 
would be expected to observe a general code of discretion in their public 
comment.
Professor Parker's suggestions would not absolve the officer from 
obligations which may conflict with the rights enjoyed by other 
citizens. The problem is the merging of the role of citizen and 
employee, which transforms normal employee obligations into those 
affecting citizen rights. Clearly there is an area of general
19R.S. Parker, 'Official Neutrality and the Right of Public Comment', 
Public Administration (Sydney), December 1961 and September 1964.
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discreetness regarding private affairs of citizens which is directly
analogous to similar obligations in the field of private employment, and
which does not conflict with usually accepted rights. The further
restriction upon disclosure of information regarding governmental
administration may be justified in similar terms. However fear exists
that the officer may be forced to keep silent through official obligation
upon matters which it is his duty as a citizen to reveal in the public
interest. The private employee is faced with a similar dilemma regarding
the activities of his employer, and has only the same sanction at his
disposal - resignation - if he wishes to dissociate himself. The
officer's position differs in degree and because he faces penal
sanctions (as the law currently stands) and not merely disciplinary ones.
This is indeed the heaviest burden of public service employment, for an
individual can never be wholly irresponsible for the actions he takes,
20irrespective of the dictates of constitutional doctrine. Finally, 
the officer is restricted from general comment upon the affairs of 
government and therefore from the right to join in political discussion.
Provision is made for an officer who considers he has grounds of 
complaint arising out of an official instruction or any other cause to 
appeal to the Chief Officer of his department, but he must carry out 
the instruction unless it is countermanded by competent authority.
Appeal lies against the Chief Officer to the Permanent Head of the 
department, who must transmit it for determination to the Public Service 
Board if he does not allow it. (Regulation 33) See B. Chapman 
The Profession of Government, op.cit., pp. 142-4, for a discussion of 
this problem, and comparable regulations in European countries.
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The law is framed to prohibit only public comment, and relates only to 
departmental administration and not matters of broad political interest.
In fact the provision is broadly construed, and its sanctions are less 
those of the law or internal discipline than inculcated attitudes and 
fear of repercussions upon future career.
The obligations of the officer therefore set him apart to a greater 
or lesser extent from other citizens, in view of his dual role as 
citizen-employee, in which the citizen tends to be subordinated to the 
officer. Obligations are enforced through the criminal law, internal 
discipline and the unwritten assumptions governing behaviour. The latter 
are equally, if not more, important than the former, as enforcement of 
any law depends upon majority acceptance and conformity, particularly 
where misdemeanor is difficult to prove, and implied obligation supplements 
written precept and modifies the exercise of rights.
CHAPTER 8
POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL RIGHTS
The obligations assumed by the officer affect the extent of his 
rights. This chapter examines the area of freedom allowed to him to 
enjoy rights possessed by the rest of the community. Discussion falls 
into three main areas - political liberties, industrial rights and 
rights to guaranteed conditions of employment. In spite of the special 
position of the officer which affects certain aspects of these rights, 
the tendency has been towards greater similarities between public and 
private employment, so that the existence of a right depends to a large 
extent on comparisons between the two sectors. In each case, the right 
is not wholly conditional upon absence of restraint, but depends to a 
greater or lesser degree upon positive enactment by the Commonwealth in 
relation to its officers, which may or may not result in equivalent 
rights to those possessed by other individuals by virtue of a different 
source.
Political Rights
The civil and political rights of Australian citizens depend not 
on written constitutional guarantees but upon lack of restriction by 
statute and the general freedom allowed under common law and upheld by 
the courts. The Commonwealth officer is included in this general
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assumption of liberty subject to the obligations discussed in Chapter 7.
Certain of his political rights fall within this category, and where no
legal restriction exists, may be exercised without hindrance, and without
the need for positive enabling enactment. Thus, the exercise of voting
rights through secret ballot has never been in dispute in the Commonwealth
Public Service, and the removal of regulations restricting political
activity in 1909 left the officer free to join a political party, attend
its meetings and engage in political activity at the various governmental
levels without hindrance.^- The question of parliamentary candidature was
more complex. The incompatibility of the political and official careers
had been recognised soon after the grant of responsible government to the
Australian colonies, and officers, as occupying a place of profit under
the Crown, remained ineligible for parliamentary candidature. In 1945,
the Public Service Act was amended to permit an officer to retire from
the Service to contest a federal or state election and if unsuccessful
to be re-appointed at the same salary without loss of rights due to
2discontinuity of service. He is entitled to his previous salary and to 
have his absence reckoned as leave without pay. Resignation from the 
Service must take place not earlier than one month before the closing date 
for election nominations, and the officer must apply for re-appointment
'‘See Chapter 3, pp. 65-9 ; also V. Subramaniam, 'Political Rights of
Commonwealth Public Servants', Public Administration (Sydney), pp. 22-33, 
March 1958.
2Public Service Act, Section 47C.
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within two months after the declaration of the result. It is stressed
that leave of absence will not be granted to any officer to enable him
3to campaign for election.
This right is one of eligibility rather than an absolute entitlement, 
for the Public Service Board retains discretion as to the re-appointment 
of an unsuccessful candidate. It has never exercised this discretion, 
for to do so could be regarded as victimisation, amounting to censorship 
of the activities of a parliamentary candidate. Further, although 
re-appointment without loss of status is virtually assured following 
initial electoral defeat, the officer loses his eligibility for 
re-instatement if he wins a seat and loses it at the subsequent election. 
The career service is closed once the choice is made to adopt a political 
career.
In the case of general political liberties, the written obligation 
as to public comment and the unwritten assumption as to political 
neutrality take precedence over what would otherwise be rights under 
common law in the absence of restriction (as statute overrides common 
law). The limited right to parliamentary candidature has been granted 
by means of positive enactment. The question therefore arises whether 
the obligations assumed by the officer are incompatible with the
General Orders, 3/D/8.3
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exercise of this right, and if so, how they have been accommodated.
Incompatibility may be fundamental, for the parliamentary candidate
should be independent of official influence or pressure and in a position
freely to criticise the government: separation of the political and the
administrative careers is a basic feature of British parliamentary
democracy. More practically, the declaration of allegiance to a
particular party by a candidate reveals publicly political opinions of
the officer, which, should he return to the Service may be embarrassing,
4breaching official neutrality and anonymity. The written obligation 
not to comment upon governmental administration cannot be adhered to in 
an election campaign in which the candidate is expected to voice his 
opinion on the policies and administration of the government. The same 
does not necessarily apply to disclosure of official information, 
although once again the knowledge of official matters by a member of the 
opposition party could be politically embarrassing.
There has been no reconciliation of an officer’s right to 
parliamentary candidature and his obligations on a theoretical level.
4'Clearly it would be impossible for a civil servant having vociferously 
championed the losing party in an election and vilified the victors, 
to return to his desk to execute policies he had declared to be 
execrable. The civil servant attempts no schizophrenic gymnastics.
He keeps his politics to himself, maintaining freedom to serve all 
comers to Westminster impartially.' T.A. Critchley, The Civil Service 
Today, London, 1951, pp. 45-60. See also H. Laski, Reflections on the 
Constitution, Manchester, 1951, p. 191.
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It may be argued that a neutrality which rests upon the suppression of 
the real views of officers is an artificial creation, that the officer's 
political opinions still exist whether they are declared or not, that a 
government should have nothing to hide and that the opposition party 
and community in general should have wider access to administrative 
affairs than exists at present. However such accommodation as exists 
derives from more practical considerations. Firstly, the formal 
position ensures that before an officer may become a candidate he must 
resign from the Service, so that the only restriction which still applies 
to him is that applicable to past officers under the Crimes Act.^
Secondly the problem of incompatibility only arises with officers in 
policy-making positions, and these rarely exercise the right to 
candidature. Upon defeat they have not resumed their Service career. 
Should they choose to do so, it is unlikely that their future career would 
be entirely unaffected. For the career official, therefore, the right 
cannot be regarded as absolute in the sense that its exercise will have 
no effect on his treatment. The officer who deliberately breaches
”*See Chapter 7, pp. 167-9.
ß
The case of Dr J.W. Burton is discussed in G.E. Caiden, Career Service, 
Melbourne, 1965, p. 339. The announcement of the decision of 
Dr R.A. Patterson to stand as a candidate for the Australian Labor Party 
at the end of 1965 similarly raised problems regarding his status in the 
Service prior to his resignation under Section 47C of the Public Service 
Act. (Sydney Morning Herald 19/8/65; Canberra Times 20/8/65; The 
Australian 9/9/65 and 24/9/65; Age (Melbourne)28/9/65).
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anonymity takes the risk that his political preference may be considered, 
particularly in relation to promotion, in the same way as his other 
personal characteristics. It is therefore feared that if the obligations 
of the career service are allowed to become subordinate to political 
rights, a spoils system will arise.
It has been suggested that a relationship exists between the temper 
of politics in a country and the extent to which it is permissible for 
the bureaucracy to participate in political activity. Thus in Denmark, 
Sweden, Austria and Finland, public servants may retain office while 
sitting in Parliament. In France, Holland, Italy and Spain, they may 
take leave of absence and return later to their official career. In 
Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium and West Germany, public servants may 
stand as candidates in national elections but must resign before taking 
their seats. In Australia the conventions of parliamentary democracy 
and the relative absence of rigid social divisions tend to lessen the 
intensity of political conviction and narrow the differences between 
political parties. The right to stand for Parliament is exercised by 
comparatively few people, and many others, besides public servants, 
would feel that their occupation and its obligations do not allow them 
a concurrent political career. The limitations upon the right of 
Commonwealth officers may be viewed in this light.
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Rights of association
Like political rights, rights connected with association depend on 
both absence of legal restraint and positive legal recognition. The 
general freedom to join associations which is available to the citizen 
extends also to the officer, who may participate in associations 
consisting exclusively of public servants, or those containing both 
private and public employees. The public service associations 
themselves are free to affiliate with trade union bodies such as the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Australian Council of Salaried 
and Professional Associations, and also with one another. They are 
equally free to affiliate with or support political parties and to 
further their interests by direct pressure group activity.
However for their effective existence as a legal entity apart from 
their members, associations depend upon positive recognition in law.
An association unless recognised in law has no legal protection of its 
property, cannot enforce its rules upon its members nor exercise any 
form of industrial rights. This position derives largely from historical 
factors, since trade union activities in both Britain and Australia were 
unrecognised at common law and were held to conflict with the 
individual's freedom to contract for employment. Their original 
proscription as criminal conspiracy was modified in favour of their 
existence outside the law, although their activities, apart from 
friendly society functions, remained illegal. The recognition of their
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legitimacy in the 1870s left their internal affairs outside the
jurisdiction of the courts and some of their activities open to
prosecution in tort, which in Britain (and also in Queensland) led to
further legislation to counteract decisions of the courts. In Australia
the adoption of compulsory arbitration^ changed radically the status
of trade unions, and led to their recognition,
'as bodies which can take part in a process which results in 
an award fixing wages and conditions for their present 
members. They are not merely agents of their members. They 
are bodies whose concern is the industrial condition of the 
whole trade or industry which is covered by the constitution 
of the union. Awards may be made binding on employers in an 
industry in respect of their employees whether members of the 
union concerned or not, and a union is able to take steps to 
have wages and conditions fixed in an establishment in which 
it has no members at all.'8
Possession of industrial rights in Australia therefore implies legal 
recognition of status and participation in the processes determining 
conditions of work. Trade unions are granted authority in relation to 
their members, non-members and employers which are kept in check by 
corresponding obligations administered through the device of 
registration with the arbitration authorities. Organisations are 
entitled to participate in the process of award-making, to be recognised
Victoria and Tasmania adopted a wages board system and not compulsory 
arbitration. 'The main distinction between wages boards and arbitration 
courts is that the former do not recognize trade unions. An arbitration 
award can impose rights and duties on a trade union, a wages board 
determination cannot'. J.H. Portus, The Development of Trade Union Law, 
Melbourne, 1958, p. 147.
8Ibid., pp. 129-30.
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as representative of employees in an industry, to sue for breach of
awards, to exercise disciplinary powers over members and possibly to
occupy a privileged position in relation to employment in the industry
through the provisions of awards. In return the rules of an organisation
must contain satisfactory provisions for democratic election of the
governing body. Those which are contrary to law or to an order or award,
are tyrannical or oppressive, prevent members from observing law or award,
9or impose unreasonable conditions upon membership, may be disallowed. 
Awards may also set out rights enabling association officers to carry out 
work of organisation or to police awards. These include rights by - 
accredited union representatives to interview employees on legitimate 
union business during non-working hours such as lunch breaks, to 
interview the management on union business at all reasonable times by 
appointment, to enter the premises, and for job representatives to be 
allowed necessary time during working hours to interview supervising 
authorities.^
9Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-64, Sections 132-58; Regulations 
115-46.
^For example, Determination No. 39 of 1951, 31 C.P.S.A.R. 198; No. 51 
of 1951, 31 C.P.S.A.R. 263; No. 34 of 1952, 32 C.P.S.A.R. 203; No. 53 
of 1954, 34 C.P.S.A.R. 433; Nos. 94-96 of 1959, 39 C.P.S.A.R. 611.
Career officers of the Commonwealth Public Service appear to have placed 
less emphasis upon such rights, as such provisions appear to be 
confined to awards relating to temporary and exempt employees belonging 
to unions outside the Commonwealth Public Service.
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The rights of officers' associations are almost identical to those 
of other unions, although they are based upon separate legislation.
Their right to arbitration has remained unchanged in essence since its 
recognition in 1911, in spite of organisational changes.’*’’*’ In 1920, a 
new Arbitration (Public Service) Act deprived Commonwealth public 
servants of the right to appear before the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration, largely in order to avoid the delays and 
inconsistencies which had developed under the original legislation.
It established a Public Service Arbitrator, whose functions and powers 
differed little from those previously exercised by the Court in relation 
to public service organisations. Re-integration of Commonwealth public 
service arbitration with Commonwealth arbitration in general began in 1952, 
when the Arbitrator was empowered to refer matters of importance, and 
either party was empowered to appeal, to the Full Court of the Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. In 1956, the Arbitrator was 
permitted to refuse claims where employees belonged to organisations of 
both public and private employees, and his jurisdiction was limited to 
exclude matters under the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 
1930-54, the Commonwealth Employees' Furlough Act 1943-53, the
1 1See Chapter 3, pp. 72-77. The history of arbitration in the 
Commonwealth Public Service is covered in E.E. Crichton, Arbitration 
in the Commonwealth Public Service, Canberra, 1960, and 'The Development 
of Public Service Arbitration', Public Administration (Sydney), 
pp. 150-66, June 1956; pp. 214-31, September 1956; and pp. 319-33,
December 1956.
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Superannuation Act 1922-56 or any other prescribed Act. In 1959, the 
Arbitrator became empowered to sit with the Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission which had succeeded the Commonwealth Court 
of Conciliation and Arbitration.
The differences between the right to arbitration possessed by 
Commonwealth officers and those of other employees subject to federal 
award are relatively slight. Firstly, officers' plaints are dealt with 
at least in the first instance by a separate tribunal, and under special 
legislation. Secondly, awards are subject to disallowance by Parliament. 
Thirdly, awards of the Public Service Arbitrator, or of the Commission 
acting under appeal and reference provisions, over-ride current and 
subsequent legislation and regulation. Fourthly, Commonwealth public 
servants' organisations enjoy concessions relating to the number of their 
members requisite for registration and are exempt from the necessity to 
prove that an inter-state dispute exists before applying for an award.
The close identity between the right to arbitration of Commonwealth 
officers and other employees appears to lie largely in the deep-rooted 
acceptance of the principle of appeal from the authorities, similar to 
the right of the outside employee to appeal against his employer. The 
size and variety of the public sector means that conditions of work are 
increasingly interwoven with those outside, so that it had long been 
necessary for the public employer in employing categories of workers
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extensively employed in industry, to observe awards of other arbitration 
tribunals. The principle of arbitration tends to be regarded as an 
extension of the delegation by the Commonwealth government of direct 
responsibility in personnel matters to independent authority.
Similar assumptions apply less to other forms of association
participation in management. Collective bargaining or direct
negotiation by associations with management has on occasion been put
forward on a variety of grounds as preferable to arbitration in the
12Commonwealth Public Service. In a limited form it exists as conciliation, 
the process of reaching agreement without the necessity of intervention by 
the Public Service Arbitrator except as a means of ratification. 
Conciliation is regarded almost as a duty rather than a right and needs 
no enabling legal authorisation to take place. The only compulsion upon 
either side to conciliate derives from the attitude of the Public Service 
Arbitrator. It may be noted that collective bargaining involves somewhat 
different premises as to rights compared with arbitration. Under the 
former an equality between employer and employee is assumed which takes 
no note either of the over-riding power of the government or of the 
obligation as to continuity of service limiting the equivalent sanction 
available to the employee, whereas under arbitration equality is enforced 
through joint consent to submission to a third party.
Ibid., Chapter 9, 'In Criticism of Public Service Arbitration'.12
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Other rights exist to participate in management. The vesting of 
responsibility for personnel administration in the Public Service Board 
and departments implies that officers are themselves responsible for 
their own control. Beyond participation through the self-regulating 
administration, staff associations have gained rights to participate in 
certain processes in order to safeguard fair treatment for the individual 
through access to official information, a check upon official reasons 
for decisions and the possibility of more effective intervention with 
the authorities than the individual himself could undertake. The 
rights of elected divisional representatives to sit upon disciplinary
14tribunals and Promotion Appeals Committees have already been discussed. 
Similar rights existed between 1945 and 1952 in relation to Classification 
Committees.^ Efforts to achieve direct representation as of right 
upon the Public Service Board by staff associations have failed, 
although in 1945 the informal consultations between staff and official 
sides were formalised through the establishment of a Joint Council 
consisting of representatives of organisations and departments chaired
Union participation in management in Australia is not an extensive 
practice. For a description of its extent in several industries, see 
K.F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, Massachusetts, 1956. 
14See Chapter 5, pp.118-21 and Chapter 6, pp. 137-45.
For an explanation of the role of Classification Committees in the 
reclassification of the Service following the Second World War, see 
G.E. Caiden, Career Service, op.cit., pp. 302-3 and 351-2.
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by a representative of the Public Service Board. Its function is 
to consider matters of general interest relating to the Commonwealth 
Public Service, and if it wishes, to make recommendations. However its 
existence implies neither a right to consultation nor the delegation of 
any part of the responsibility for personnel administration.
The evolution of the notion of rights to conditions of employment 
has been discussed in Chapter 3. Such rights may be considered in two 
ways - firstly in terms of their enforceability against the employer and 
secondly in relation to those of other employees. In the first case, 
certain difficulties of definition exist as it may be argued that those 
conditions of work which formally rest upon discretion are just as much 
rights in effect as those acknowledged as such by mandatory wording. 
However the distinction still does retain some significance. Firstly, 
the authorities are allowed discretion in applying the rules to the 
marginal situations which are bound to arise, without the necessity to 
argue legal technicalities before any other body (except through the 
general appeal allowed any officer to the Public Service Board), and in 
particular the courts of law are clearly excluded. Secondly, it is 
possible for benefits to be withdrawn or lapse where the demands of 
public service outweigh the convenience of individuals. Thirdly, 
deprivation or lapse of benefits give rise to no monetary claim on the
Public Service Act, Section 19A.16
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part of the officer, particularly upon leaving the Service. Fourthly, 
in several cases a distinction is drawn between the career service of 
permanent officers, particularly the top echelons, whose loyalty is 
expected to transcend considerations of individual right, and temporary 
and exempt employees who are hired in much the same way as a private 
employer would hire his employees, and subject to similar rights.
Certain difficulties also exist in comparing these rights with 
those of other employees, in view of the variations which exist in the 
pattern of industrial relations as between different industries and 
different States. Further, minimum provisions binding as rights against 
an employer by virtue of State legislation or arbitration determination 
may not represent rights above the minimum arrived at through 
collective bargaining in firms or industries. Similarly, in the 
Commonwealth Public Service no single code of rights exists. Sources 
of rights cover general statutes and regulations, other legislation 
covering officers in specific departments, and awards of the 
arbitration authorities applying either exclusively to officers or to 
both officers and other employees. These tend to overlap, create 
disparities between different types of public servant, occasionally 
provide choices between different rights and make it difficult to 
ascertain the rights which an officer may claim. The purpose of this 
study is neither an analysis of Australia-wide industrial conditions 
nor the detailed enumeration of comprehensive conditions of work in the
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Commonwealth Public Service, several of which have been covered in 
earlier chapters. Its purpose is rather to consider how far the 
various conditions of work can be classified as rights binding upon the 
public employer. Account has been taken of differences between the 
conditions of officers and other employees only for the purpose of 
illustration in relation to particular examples.
The foundation of officers' conditions of work and the manner in 
which they are administered may be found in the Public Service Act.
A feature of many of these statutory conditions is that they tend to 
retain their original character as privileges, reflected in the lack of 
mandatory phrasing in the Act, although they have been supplemented by 
arbitration award. Thus, departments may grant recreation leave up to 
a maximum number of days annually (Public Service Act, Section 68), but 
no right exists. Officers may be directed to take leave due to them 
'at such time as is convenient to the Department' (Regulation 46), and 
recreation leave may not accrue for more than two years (Regulation 48) 
except in special cases (Regulation 49), otherwise it lapses (General 
Orders 5/B/l). In contrast, temporary employees are entitled to receive 
a monetary equivalent for leave outstanding when their employment is 
terminated. They may also receive rights to recreation leave under the 
General Conditions of Service Award or the award of any other applicable 
industrial tribunal (General Orders 5/B/17). The former entitles 
temporary employees to three weeks' annual leave for each year of
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completed service, together with payment in lieu, on termination of 
employment, of l ^ 2 days' pay for each completed month of continuous 
service. Annual leave has long ceased to be a privilege of public 
servants alone and in 1963 the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission granted three weeks' annual leave to workers under 
Commonwealth awards.
A similar situation exists in relation to furlough. Permanent 
officers may receive furlough under the Public Service Act and payment 
in lieu may be made in the event of retirement or death (Public Service 
Act, Sections 73-4). The discretionary nature of the benefit is underlined 
by the necessity to examine an officer's conduct record, the 
desirability for officers to state the reasons why they are seeking 
furlough, the disapproval of officers taking up employment when on 
furlough, and the loss of eligibility for furlough upon dismissal 
(General Orders 5/G/1-19). Temporary and exempt employees may receive 
furlough under the Commonwealth Employees' Furlough Act on similar 
terms. In contrast, private employees receive long service leave 
under State legislation passed during the 1950s, which varies in the 
benefits it confers.
Several other conditions of work are governed jointly by public 
service legislation and arbitration award, although their status as 
rights is not necessarily affected. For example, details of the
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administration of sick leave (such as production of medical certificates) 
are contained in Public Service Regulations, but the amount of sick 
leave and the terms on which it is available are subject to the Common 
Rule on Sick Leave for permanent officers, and the General Conditions 
of Service Determination or other award for temporary employees. None 
of these sources confers a right to sick leave. On the other hand such 
normally expected conditions of work as payment for overtime, stipulation 
of hours of work, payment for work on Sundays and public holidays, which 
are closely regulated by award in private employment tend to be 
similarly treated in the public service, so that although regulations 
exist which govern computation of payment, entitlements can only be 
ascertained by reference to various awards. A result is that definite 
rights are recognised to these conditions of work, although they do not 
apply to the higher ranks of the Service, who are expected to devote 
themselves to the public weal without account of hours spent.
In contrast to the extension of officers' privileged conditions of 
work to other employees, the right to compensation for injury against 
their employer follows a pattern of legislation which had already been 
adopted by State governments.^ It therefore shares features common 
to such legislation in relation to type of benefit conferred, the 
necessity for election in claiming the benefits of the legislation, and
^See Chapter 3, p. 75-6.
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appeal to courts of law in case of dispute. However, particular 
characteristics which differentiate officers' conditions of work remain, 
such as the avoidance of granting clear over-riding rights, administration 
from within the public service, and the intervention of arbitration.
Upon injury, officers elect between the benefits of the 
Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act, the Common Rule on Accidents 
made by the Public Service Arbitrator in 1925, sick leave under the 
Public Service Act or litigation for negligence. Under the Commonwealth 
Employees' Compensation Act, lump sum compensation is payable to the 
dependants of an employee upon death, and weekly payments upon total or 
partial incapacity, as well as medical expenses. These payments are 
subject to a maximum amount laid down in the Act and the weekly 
payments are reduced where superannuation is received from the 
Commonwealth. For specific injuries, lump sum payments are made 
according to a scale set out in the Third Schedule. The Act covers 
employees of the Commonwealth Government, but officers may elect to 
forego its benefits and claim instead under the Common Rule on Accidents. 
This distinguishes between cases where the department is responsible 
for the accident (a minority of cases) and those where no blame can be 
attached. In the former case, leave on full pay up to a maximum 
period is granted without deduction from sick leave credits and hospital 
and medical benefits are paid. In the latter, leave on half pay up to 
a maximum period without deduction from sick leave credits is granted,
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and only first aid expenses are paid. The benefits of the Common Rule,
or any other compensation or damages, may not be claimed in addition
to compensation under the Act, so that officers must make a choice.
The administration of the Common Rule is in the hands of the departments,
while the provisions of the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act are
administered by the Secretary of the Treasury, ex officio Commissioner
for Employees' Compensation, who has power to determine all matters
and questions arising under the Act, subject to appeal to a County
Court. Reported litigation under this heading has not been extensive,
and has been concerned mainly with definitions under the Act. Cases have
18arisen regarding industrial diseases eligible for compensation, the
interpretation of the phrase 'arising out of or in the course of
19 20employment', the permissible form of appeal, the definition of
21 22 travelling to and from work, the right to sue in cases of negligence,
18Commonwealth v. Ockenden (1958) 32 A.L.J.R. 235; Commonwealth v.
Matheson (1955) 29 A.L.J. 81; Bavcevic v. Commonwealth--(1957) A.L.R. 1065; 
Alcorn v. Commissioner for Employees' Compensation (1938) 32 Q.J.P. 7.
19Goward v. Commonwealth (1957) 31 A.L.J. 618; Commonwealth v. Oliver 
(1962) 36 A.L.J.R. 133.
20Martin v. Commissioner for Employees' Compensation (1953) Q.S.R. 85; 
Commonwealth v. Walker (1962) A.L.R. 312; Swartz v. Commonwealth (1959)
33 A.L.J.R. 115.
21Commonwealth v. Anderson (1957) 31 A.L.J. 608; Commonwealth v. Wright 
(1957) 30 A.L.J. 592; Carter v. Commissioner for Employees' Compensation 
(1946) 40 Q.J.P. 44.
Thomson v. Commonwealth (1948) S.A.S.R. 116.22
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and the coverage of employees by the Act. The general tendency has 
been to widen the concept of 'injury' since the amendment of the Act in 
1948 substituting 'or' for 'and' in the phrase 'arising out of or in the 
course of', although the courts have been slow to recognise the 
implications of the change,^ and a degree of uncertainty as to the 
exact liability of the Commonwealth has resulted in anomalies and
increased importance to the discretion allowed to the Commissioner in
u * 25the Act.
The existence of special provision for Commonwealth public 
servants may be seen as an assertion of the sovereignty of the public 
employer, but appears to arise rather as the result of the constitutional 
position of the Commonwealth government which has no jurisdiction over 
industrial conditions in general and can only legislate in this sphere 
for its own employees. The significance of this position results from 
the dual nature of the government-employer on the one hand and the 
citizen-employee on the other. Rights to conditions of work in general 
depend jointly upon legislation, arbitration award and initiative by
^ Doust v. Commonwealth (1944) 61 N.S.W.W.N. 250.
24P. Gerber, 'The Concept of ’'Injury" in Commonwealth Employees' 
Compensation Legislation', University of Queensland Law Journal, 
pp. 432-50, April 1964.
25The Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act contains no schedule of 
diseases eligible for compensation, and it is obviously difficult to 
ascertain whether certain causes of death or disablement such as heart 
disease have resulted from employment.
private employers in a full-employment economy. Unless a policy of 
'model employer' is adopted, officers tend to be deprived of the 
benefits of the last of these sources, previously expressed in the
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traditional privileges of the public service career, as their rights to 
actual conditions of employment tend to be conceived in relation to the 
rights of other employees' minimum conditions of employment. Officers, 
therefore, in spite of growing identity between the conditions applying 
to them and other employees - whether these relate to political 
liberties, industrial relations or conditions of work - continue to 
remain in a special position owing to the different basis for their 
rights.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
No general theory of rights has emerged from the experience of the 
Commonwealth Public Service, and the co-existence of several theories, 
in certain respects incompatible with one another, tends to confuse 
arguments where specific rights are in dispute. Two of these views 
deny entirely the possession of rights by public servants. For instance, 
the British doctrine of dismissibility at pleasure is reflected in the 
attitude of the courts of law in their interpretation of statutory 
provisions. Absolute mandatory rights only are recognised, no inquiry 
may be made into the exercise of discretion and documents may claim Crown 
privilege.'*" The fiction of the contract is maintained although one party 
retains the right to alter its terms unilaterally. More generally, the 
theory of the sovereignty of the state, founded in the mandate of the 
government of the day to implement the will of the electorate, denies 
the individuality of the public servant, who becomes merely a part of 
governmental machinery, assumed as neutral in political affairs.
"^In an unreported case, Tracy v. Bradley, No. 2413 of 1936 in the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales, Mr Justice Maxwell held that even if 
false and defamatory statements were made in a report upon an officer, 
the document was privileged and the officer could not sue for defamation. 
The records of the case are held in the Archives of the Australian 
National University, Canberra.
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Enforcement of neutrality necessarily denies to public servants the 
rights possessed by other individuals to participate in the political 
process, or to act in their own interest as a group. The essential 
independence of the sovereign state precludes its acceptance of binding 
rights against it by its servants, and the necessity for their public 
identification with government policies denies their liberties.
In contrast to these views, a general consensus appears to exist 
that public servants in Australia do possess rights. These are 
expressed through statute and statutory procedures to which adherence 
by the authorities in relation to the individual is ensured by 
application of the legal principle of ultra vires, insisting that the 
exercise of power conforms to its authorisation by law in the 
circumstances laid down by law. Thus the relationship between public 
employer and public servant may be regarded as statutory, although it 
falls short of the European conception of a code of rights, being 
neither comprehensive nor dependent upon a coherent system of 
administrative law. Somewhat more vaguely, it is felt that public 
servants are entitled to fair treatment from their employer in much the 
same way as other employees, and that there is an obligation upon 
politicians to ensure this. In Australia the theory of 'model employer'
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is not a radical doctrine. In one form it expresses the freedom of 
the public employer to stipulate whatever conditions it likes upon its 
own responsibility bound only by the moral obligation assumed by the 
good employer; in another it is expressed by the willing commitment of 
the public employer to arbitration which transfers decisions as to 
fair conditions to another authority and ensures comparability with 
other employees. Finally, elements of syndicalist theory are reflected 
in participation by public servants in a representative capacity in the 
administrative processes affecting them as individuals, which is 
accepted as legitimate in areas such as discipline and promotion.
The generally accepted concept of public servants' rights in 
Australia may be considered as having three main aspects. Firstly, 
rights are conceived in terms of a challenge to the discretion of 
authority. As such they imply recognition by the public employer of 
rights against it, irrespective of considerations of sovereignty, and a
2See e.g. the speech by Senator Playford (S.A.) in the debates on the 
Public Service Bill 1902:
'We treat our civil servants better than any private establishment, and 
it is quite right that we should do so, because the state ought to be a 
model employer.' Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 7, p. 9227.
See also the speech by Senator Russell (Vic., Vice President of the 
Executive Council) in the debates on the Public Service Bill 1921:
'We must have a contented Service if we are to have an effective 
Service, and, therefore, the conditions ought to be just, if not even 
generous, because the Commonwealth should be one of the best and not one of 
the worst employers. At the same time, we are entitled to demand effective 
business methods and a fair day's work for a fair day's wage, and to 
expect a united Service, actuated by a keen desire to give the very best 
return to the country which employs it.' Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates, Vol. 94, p. 7358.
195
more liberal attitude towards political and industrial rights than 
would appear to be implied in the doctrines of British Parliamentary 
democracy. Secondly, the term rights conveys the enjoyment of similar 
conditions of public servants to other employees, and the avoidance of 
discriminatory restrictions upon generally accepted liberties. Finally, 
rights are conceived as objective standards expressed through law.
These aspects are not wholly consistent, do not completely correspond with 
reality, are the subject of considerable debate, and raise both 
theoretical and practical problems in their implementation. Nevertheless 
they represent a trend of thought which provides a departure from the 
dominating Western traditions and practices.
(a) Rights conceived as a challenge to authority
The sovereignty of the state, as usually conceived in Western 
Parliamentary democracies, does not admit the legitimacy of a challenge 
to it by its employees, and consequently all rights of public servants 
are subject to unilateral determination by the state. In Australia, 
sovereignty is not an issue of importance. Its relegation to the 
background may be seen as a reflection of the federal nature of the 
state and the tendency to delegate to non-political bodies responsibility 
for functions requiring discrimination among individuals, in particular 
personnel administration. This tendency makes plausible the separation 
of the functions of state and public employer necessary to accommodate
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rights within the framework of sovereignty. Perhaps more important 
however is the habit of pragmatism, in which law adjusts itself to 
needs and pressures irrespective of basic theory, so that the claims of 
sovereignty tend to be ignored rather than refuted through argument.
The theory of sovereignty is, however, reflected in relations 
between the government and the administration, in which ministerial 
responsibility implies the observance of neutrality on the part of public 
servants. The obligation upon them to stand aloof from the political 
arena as individuals and to avoid using potential powers as a group to act 
as an autonomous force, tends to modify political and industrial 
liberties that are not explicitly restricted or may even be authorised 
by law. The theory remains intact because obligations, whether written 
or unwritten, take precedence over the exercise of rights, less through 
formal sanctions (although the disciplinary concept of 'misconduct' is 
sufficiently wide to cover disciplinary action on charges relating to 
breaches of expected standards of behaviour) than through organisational 
pressures, fears of repercussions upon career, conformity to official 
mores, individual inclination, and acceptance by public servants 
themselves of the need for a self-denying ordinance in conformity with 
the expectation of society that official and political hierarchies should 
be strictly differentiated. This should not be held to imply that rights 
do not exist, but merely that their impact is muffled by the manner in 
which they are in fact exercised. If they were insisted upon more
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stringently, it is possible that they might modify the governmental 
structure accordingly, e.g. in the direction of a modified spoils 
system in top positions. The balance between rights and obligations and 
between law and practice is a delicate one, depending less upon written 
enactment than upon people's conceptions of their role. The problem may 
be illustrated by the statutory prohibition upon strikes in the 
Commonwealth Public Service, which, for a variety of reasons, has not 
been put into force to deal with strikes, and consequently appears of 
little more than theoretical interest. If, however, the pattern of 
industrial relations within the Service changes, it may be necessary 
either to implement the provision, or to re-assess the position of 
strikes in relation to public servants. Social trends can never be 
completely contained within legal formulation. In the case of 
Commonwealth public servants the latter is both buttressed and modified 
by a sophisticated conception of their role in relation to constitutional 
norms and community needs.
The peculiarly public nature of the public bureaucracy has had the 
effect of enhancing the rights of public servants. In the same way as 
the public tends to insist upon democratic procedures in its relations 
with the administration, it tends to be sympathetic to similar 
procedures within the administration, allowing the individual public 
servant rights of appeal against decisions which affect him, and the 
ability to insist upon his entitlements against his superior, thereby
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restricting the discretion of the latter. It may be argued that such 
rights are irrelevant, for in any bureaucratic organisation uniformity 
and regularity are essential elements. The individual finds his rights 
not in assertion against authority, but in the regularity of 
administration and the uniformity of rules and conditions which are 
bound to apply in a large organisation. While the individual is 
submerged in the system, his rights are automatically safeguarded by the 
very lack of impact his individual claims make. Rights thus become 
merely the benefits which the individual receives from the automatic 
working of the machine, which prevents distinctions as between persons 
and subordinates all equally to uniform rule.
An opposing view of bureaucracy similarly denies the applicability 
of rights, not because their existence is automatically ensured as the 
corollary of large-scale organisation, but because they stand in direct 
opposition to the essential principles of hierarchy and subordination 
characteristic of bureaucracy. The recognition of legal rights does not 
reflect the situation of the individual who wishes to exercise them.
In gaining his short-term goal, the individual runs a variety of long­
term risks, such as alienation of the sympathy of his colleagues and 
antagonism of superiors with subsequent detrimental effects upon his
career.
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... the doctrines of democracy and liberalism which underlie 
our state have made almost no impact upon our bureaucratic 
organizations. The only nonlabor-union movement in this 
direction has been the attempt by some personnel people to 
introduce into the bureaucracy rudimentary elements of 
procedural due process to protect the personal goals of 
employees. But because of the persistence of the old role 
definitions and the actual power of hierarchies, the 
assurance of procedural due process is problematical in 
any particular organization and more or less dependent upon 
the personalities or connections of the people involved.
To avail oneself of such protection is to risk impossible 
working relations with the boss.3
Attempts to confer rights may also be regarded as undesirable, 
since the achievement of organisational goals frequently requires 
subordination of individual rights. Individual interest may conflict 
with general interest. Rigidities caused by insistence upon challenge 
by individuals may impede smooth working. Not everyone may direct the 
enterprise. Infinite appeals may prove expensive, time wasting and 
distracting for all concerned, defeating their own purpose by the 
pursuit of an illusory justice. The procedures and assumptions suitable 
for a court of law are unsuitable for the administration of an 
organisation.
Further, the purposes of the organisation may themselves 
determine the kind of rights permissible, and where the former change, 
the latter may be evaded or become an impediment. This is particularly 
the case in relation to promotion, where selection for high office
V. Thompson, Modern Organization, New York, 1963, p. 65.3
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depends not only upon the availability of positions but the type of 
person desired for them. In the career as 'progress through life', 
the deserving do not necessarily receive the reward to which they are 
morally entitled: the organisational career is no different. 
Organisational need and character are not neutral but the result of 
human manipulation, and in this situation rights may be inapplicable if 
they demand an objective standard which is out of keeping with reality.
However the basis of the concept of public servants' rights lies not 
in arguments about relative efficiency or bureaucratic norms, but in 
liberal democratic thought and the assertion of the common man against 
authority which is the major contribution of Western democracy. To 
deny such rights absolutely would be to subordinate the individual to the 
state and the means to the end, and to deny the fallibility of authority. 
The problem is to define the permissible extent of those rights, to 
balance the demands of the organisation, derived from those of the 
public, against individual interests. In the Commonwealth Public 
Service, the solution appears to have been to define the extent of 
rights allowed to officers in terms of those applicable to outside 
employment with modifications where necessary to meet the special 
demands of public service.
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(b) Rights conceived as equality of conditions of work
Rights may therefore be conceived in terms of a comparison between 
the public servant and the ordinary employee. Fair conditions are 
thought of as those applicable to employees in general, whether political 
or industrial liberties or concrete benefits. This approach is manifest 
in the correspondence between actual conditions of work in private and 
public sectors, the enjoyment of arbitration rights by public servants 
and the large measure of political liberty allowed them. The approach 
is appealing as it appears to offer a ready-made standard by which to 
decide upon the extent of public servants' rights.
The analogy may however be misleading. A basic problem is lack of 
knowledge of the effective rights of the ordinary employee. Although 
the legal formulation may be found in the law relating to master and 
servant and industrial relations, statutory regulation of industrial 
conditions, provisions of the awards of industrial tribunals and welfare 
legislation, it is difficult to ascertain the rights of private employees 
in general because (a) these vary from industry to industry and State to 
State, (b) they are dependent upon individual negotiation, and (c) 
employers are reluctant to permit research in this area. There is a 
tendency to assume that the private employee enjoys enhanced effective 
rights compared with the public servant, although supporting evidence 
is scanty. For example, the private employer is free to impose standards 
of dress and behaviour upon his employees as part of the employment
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contract and to refuse to allow challenge to his decisions regarding 
deployment of work force, relative salary and so on. The employee who 
fails to conform to the conditions offered, or proves himself 
unsuitable by his public activities has little redress against his 
employer.
Public servants' rights on the other hand derive from the needs of 
the state for a permanent workforce of a particular kind. Thus they 
become entitled to a security of tenure which, though not absolute, is 
assured by the continuity of the functions of the state, while the 
private employee is ultimately dependent upon his employer remaining 
in business. From permanence derive the limited rights to a career 
implied in a career service, which the ordinary employee does not enjoy 
apart from particular posts in large-v*m^le organisation. The standards 
of democratic administration which the public expects of its public 
service spill over into the personnel field to allow the public servant 
rights of appeal against his superiors inapplicable to private 
employment - the right to appeal to the legislature in right of 
citizen although relating to employment; the general right to query 
decisions by appealing beyond his superior to the Public Service Board; 
the right to internal judicial inquiry when charged with an offence; 
the right to challenge another officer's promotion.
The public servant is also set apart by his obligations enforced 
through internal discipline and directly through the ordinary law of
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the land. The former, through the concept of misconduct applied through 
special procedures and resulting in special sanctions, subjects the 
public servant to a private system of law which has the backing of the 
state but does not apply to the community generally and is divorced 
from normal judicial procedures. On the other hand, the public servant 
is directly liable for breach of certain of his obligations in criminal 
law, in which case the state-employer uses its powers as state in 
relation to its own employees.
It is this dual concept of state-employer and citizen-employee 
which proves confusing in any comparison of the rights of public servants 
and other employees. In certain respects the state acts in relation to 
its employees as does any other employer, but in others the powers 
asserted are those of the state. Conversely in certain respects the 
public servant is in the same position as any other employee, while in 
others he enjoys special rights and obligations. It is difficult, 
therefore, to place the state employer in exactly the same position as 
any other employer, since it retains its special characteristics in 
applying law to the rest of the community in relation to its own 
employees. It is not subject to the limitations of profit and loss and 
external control which determine the extent of rights appropriate in 
private employment. The state-employer is therefore forced to create 
different criteria from the private employer in dealing with emerging 
problems such as the effect of automation on public servants, the impact’
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of political decisions upon organisation of its administration and the 
repercussions upon the community in general of its policies towards its 
workforce, all of which affect public servants' rights.
In Australia such problems are eased by the diversity of forms of 
public employment and public authorities. In particular, the Commonwealth 
Government, because of its restricted jurisdiction over industrial and 
social matters, is somewhat isolated from difficulties arising from 
comparisons between the treatment of its own workforce and the community 
and in general. However its constitutional inability to pass laws in 
industrial and social spheres, except in relation to its own employees, 
appears to have resulted in a reluctance to take the initiative in 
extending their rights, relying upon arbitration to take the place of 
direct bargaining in private industry except in particular areas such 
as superannuation.
In spite of these criticisms, the concept of public servants' rights 
as analogous to those of other employees retains significance. Firstly, 
it places the onus upon the state, in imposing obligations upon the 
public servant, to justify departures from the normally accepted rights 
of citizens. Secondly, it helps to prevent the emergence of public 
service as a privileged caste above the vicissitudes of life affecting 
the rest of the community. Thirdly, it extends to the public servant 
the benefits of normal industrial procedures and helps ensure that public 
service conditions do not lag too far behind those in other occupations.
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It is misleading insofar as it ignores the special rights and 
obligations applying to public servants and attempts to provide a 
complete analogy with or justification for them.
(c) Rights conceived as set standards expressed in law
Rights may be expressed in a number of ways - through contract 
between parties, constitutional or statutory enactment, delegated 
legislation or customary arrangements. Each has different advantages 
for different situations, and public servants' rights represent a 
combination of all of them.
According to judicial precedent, following British doctrine, the 
relationship between the Crown and its employees is a contractual one.
A contract is usually distinguished by mutual agreement between the 
parties signing it, and unilateral abrogation may give rise either to 
enforcement or damages upon application by the aggrieved party to the 
courts. Attempts to apply this doctrine to the public service 
relationship have met with difficulties, not only because British common 
law doctrine insists upon dismissal at pleasure robbing the contract of 
its binding power, but also because of the intrinsic inequality of the 
parties to the alleged contract and the ability of one party to alter 
its terms at will through its sovereign power. Further, as it is not 
possible to point to any single document as being the contract, disputes 
exist as to whether specific conditions of employment are contractual,
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and terms which clearly do form part of an employment contract may be 
negated by directly contrary implied terms. It may therefore be 
suggested that the relationship is one of status rather than of contract. 
Such a relationship is perhaps not as exceptional as it might seem, for 
the concept of contract in the case of large-scale enterprise generally 
is becoming drained of its meaning, the source of rights and obligations 
beind founded rather on a kind of internal law applicable to all 
employees without exception, arrived at through collective bargaining or 
arbitration and binding upon third parties not directly involved in its 
creation.
As we move to the role of the worker, i.e., those members 
of the organisation whose norms for conduct are highly 
concrete and specific, we find that such norms apply to many 
instead of few. To create and sanction these norms as law 
through contract becomes impossible as a matter of individual, 
person-by-person negotiation. There cannot be a multitude of 
disparate employee contracts, each having a different 
normative content, when workers all perform essentially 
similar functions, occupy similar relationships, and hence 
are all subject to essentially similar norms.^
In the Commonwealth Public Service, the idea of contract is
subordinated to that of statute. It is possible to argue that in view
of the attitude of the courts, this formulation of rights is without
significance, as both their creation and enforcement rests entirely in
the hands of the state. This view ignores certain practical features
4K.S. Carlston, Law and Structures of Social Action, New York, 1956, 
pp. 244-5.
207
of statute as employed in the Commonwealth Public Service. The statute 
provides a clear statement of definite rights to which the public servant 
is entitled. It sets out the conditions in which claims are regarded as 
valid, and the doctrine of ultra vires provides the same check to 
discretion, irrespective of common law relating specifically to public 
servants, as it does in other areas concerning the use of powers by the 
administration. Further, a statute is a public document, unlike a 
contract which concerns only its signatories. Changes in statute cannot 
be made simply at will, but involve the necessity of finding space in the 
Parliamentary timetable and running the gauntlet of public debate upon 
the proposals for change. Thus, by the manner of its creation, statute 
confers upon the public servant a public status, emphasising his 
position as different from the private employee of the state-employer.
The self-denying ordinance of the courts restricting their own 
jurisdiction over the discretionary element in public service 
legislation should not be held to imply a denial of rights to the public 
servant. Rights may be enforced by means other than the judiciary.
In the case of public service legislation, interpretation is not entirely 
unilateral. At points where the disputes affecting the individual most 
intensely occur, quasi-judicial procedures have been incorporated into 
the system of administration. Personnel administration is not a unity: 
it involves a number of participants, a feature which in itself helps to 
ensure rights, since it makes individual arbitrary or illegal decision
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more difficult. It also makes possible effective appeal rights within 
the administration itself, particularly where staff participation is 
permitted. In these appeal procedures it is not always possible to 
allow for 'openness, fairness and impartiality', as individual rights are 
not absolute against organisational policy. However the existence of 
administrative tribunals and other appeal procedures may be seen as an 
embryonic form of administrative justice, which it has been freely 
acknowledged may be as efficacious a means of preserving rights as justice 
administered through the courts of law.
It is evident, therefore, that the formulation of rights in the 
Commonwealth Public Service has departed from the British common law 
conception and bears some resemblance to that current in European 
countries. It differs from the latter chiefly by reason of the fact 
that rights are not codified in a single statutory source. In order to 
ascertain his rights the Commonwealth public servant has to consult a 
number of statutes, and the regulations and instructions made under 
their authority. He has also to discover the arbitration award 
applicable to his appropriate association and note its provisions as 
varied from the date of their original promulgation, as no time limit 
is placed upon their continuance and they over-ride statute. Finally, 
in the exercise of his rights the public servant has to observe 
unwritten rules of behaviour, which smooth the difficulties arising 
from the strict letter of the law - a kind of lubricant preventing friction.
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The complexities and uncertainties of the current situation in 
which the rights of Commonwealth public servants are scattered throughout 
a number of sources might be remedied through the adoption of a code 
of rights and obligations similar to that in European countries, thus 
gaining the advantages of clarity, simplicity, precision and ease of 
access. Whatever the merits in theory of codification, it appears unlikely 
it will take place in relation to the Commonwealth Public Service, at 
least in the near future. Any attempt to do so would involve debate 
upon the problem areas of public servants' rights in an effort to clarify 
them which, however praiseworthy, would disturb existing compromises.
It would be difficult to find a time which would ever be convenient 
for such a reappraisal, and debate would probably be characterised less 
by a discussion of first principles or abstract considerations than by 
practical politics in which the parties concerned would strive to gain 
maximum advantage for themselves. Such a debate would bring to the 
fore incompatibilities in rights and obligations, and might restrict 
the area of desirable discretion, and with it the area of tolerance which 
accommodates them. The extension of the law into the sphere of unwritten 
rights and obligations might raise problems of enforcement, at present 
solved not through external restraints but individual consciousness.
It is rarely desirable to incorporate into law vague standards of 
behaviour, particularly where these relate to private conduct, breaches 
of which are capable neither of precise definition nor of being easily
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discovered. It would also be difficult to accommodate within the code 
the varying provisions of arbitration award, or to allow for public 
service arbitration itself, which modifies the unilateral regulation of 
the public service implied by a comprehensive codification of rights 
and obligations.
Some of these problems may be solved by the adoption of a code of 
ethics, which would clarify standards of behaviour expected of public 
servants without involving the rigidities caused by the exigencies of law 
enforcement.^ To some extent the adoption of a code of ethics involves 
the same difficulties as codification of the existing law - incompatibilities 
would be revealed, problems sharpened, and the area of tolerance reduced. 
Additional problems arise from the status of such a code. It is possible 
that if its provisions are to have more than the status of mere 
suggestions they would drift into the same position as law, and be 
enforced in the same way. On the other hand, they may merely reflect 
wishful thinking, and fail to correspond to reality, so that yet a third 
set of standards of behaviour may arise, taking precedence over both 
law and the code of ethics. The ambiguity of such a code, attempting 
to express both desirable standards of behaviour and those which 
actually exist, would probably make for a confusion which does not
proposed code of ethics for Commonwealth public servants has been 
circulated by the A.C.T. Group of the Royal Institute of Public 
Administration. At the time of writing no action has been taken to 
implement the suggestion.
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attach to law which clearly sets out what behaviour is regarded as 
intolerable, and which enforces its standard through penalties. The 
present situation, whatever its drawbacks, has at least the merit of 
flexibility, which in view of the disparate concepts of public servants' 
rights at present held in Australia, is a desirable asset.
It may be concluded that the Commonwealth officer cannot ascertain 
exactly what his rights are. Although over a wide area concrete 
entitlements are clear, in others, conflicts between written enactments 
and the differing standards expected by administrative authorities, 
politicians, the public and officers themselves produce confusion as to 
the correct course of action or the extent to which any firm right exists. 
The three aspects of the concept of public servants' rights tend to 
merge into one another and become confused in any discussion of the 
subject. The fundamental difficulty is that while in many respects the 
rights of the public servant may be compared with those of the private 
employee the analogy is not complete. The right to challenge the public 
employer within legally defined channels, and the recognition by the 
public employer of rights binding against it by virtue of statute, 
express the special position of the public servant in relation to the 
rest of the work force. This position is further expressed in the 
rights he possesses to tenure and within the career process as well as
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in the obligations he assumes in response to community demands. The 
particular compromise between these three aspects is one which has been 
found suitable for the needs of the Commonwealth Public Service at the 
present. Needs, however, are constantly changing and if it is the task 
of law to fulfil them, it too must change in response. The present 
synthesis between the three aspects of rights may be sufficient to- 
accommodate emerging problems; alternatively the balance between 
them may require adjustment in accordance with the needs and desires of
those whom the law exists to serve.
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